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This thesis investigates the continuation or shift of Indonesia’s human rights policy from the 
perspective of realism. As it stands now, the International Relations (IR) literature on third world 
countries from a realism point of view are limited. Hence, this research aims to explain third world 
countries’ motives and policy responses from a theoretical perspective which could significantly 
contribute to filling the literature gap. Thus, to better understand Indonesia’s human rights policy, 
unlike the approaches of liberalism or constructivism, which view human rights as a common value or 
an internationally accepted norm, this thesis applies a realist perspective which views human rights as 
an instrument of power practised by great or small powers within the domain of domestic and 
international politics. 
As the chosen IR theory, this research utilises a modification of realism’s sub-schools 
(classical realism and neorealism) which is referred to as neoclassical realism.  In this thesis, 
neoclassical realism is used to analyse the interplay between Indonesia’s external and internal 
environments in the shaping of Indonesia’s human rights policy. By expanding realism’s 
methodology, apart from focussing on Indonesia’s external environment, it also investigates the 
domestic variables, namely ‘domestic power structure’ and ‘leader perception’, which could 
potentially influence policy choices. By doing so, the research shows how, why and under what 
circumstances Indonesia pursues certain human rights policy as a response to external stimuli.  
Furthermore, in order to fully capture Indonesia’s policy continuation or shift, the developed 
model of neoclassical realism ‘domestic power structure-leadership perception’ is applied alongside a 
historical survey in the progression of this thesis research. The historical survey is presented in order 
to understand the flow of Indonesia’s human rights policy from the Sukarno era all the way to the 
present Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono era. The research also investigates the pattern whereby 
Indonesia’s inter-changeable role as both advocate and violator of human rights can be placed within 
the given specific context of its own history. Overall the research finds that, through neoclassical 
realism analaysis, Indonesia’s human rights policy is greatly affected by the interaction between 
Indonesia’s foreign and domestic politics. In this regard, consistent with realism’s stand, Indonesia’s 
human rights policy can be seen as a state strategy, as a small-to-medium power, in responding to 
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  Human rights development can appear to be an elusive process in Indonesia. At one 
stage in its history, Indonesia pioneered and vindicated human rights improvements for 
former colonies worldwide. Instead of flourishing, however, human rights development was 
constrained as Indonesia became an authoritarian state. Previously, most analysts specializing 
in Indonesia have categorized it as authoritarian in nature, particularly during the Sukarno 
and Suharto periods, since Indonesia seemed to have been continuously violating the civil 
and political rights of its citizens and denouncing any efforts, domestic and international, to 
rectify its human rights conditions.
1
 Yet, at the present being, Indonesia is recognized as a 
democracy.
2
 It has also held seats in the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) for three periods 
and has initiated human rights related innovations within its regions through the Association 
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Bali Democracy Forum (BDF).
3
 The Australian 
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) has even stated that Indonesia is now the 
third largest democracy and “robust media and civil society, combined with direct and fair 
elections, are at the heart of Indonesia’s political institutions”.
4
 
  The important questions that need to be asked are: “how and why did Indonesia alter 
its behaviour from being opposed to democracy and human rights to being in favour of 
democracy and human rights within a span of less than ten years and after more than 50 years 
of dictatorship and authoritarian rule?” and “what were the external and internal political 
contexts that allowed such changes to take place within such a short term?” In this regard, 
                                                          
1
 Adrian Vickers stated that Sukarno had an authoritarian tendency, particularly during the 1957-1965 period  
in Vickers, 2005, p.148  and Anders Uhlin stated that Suharto’s regime was an authoritarian regime since the 
‘third wave’ of democracy came late to Indonesia in Uhlin, 1997, p.2. 
2
 Prof. Takashi Shiraishi stated that democracy is alive and well in Indonesia in Shiraishi, 2005 and Edward 
Masters, former US ambassador to Indonesia, stated that the current SBY (Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono) 
government has strengthened democracy to the point where any turning back to old ways of governing now 
seems unlikely in Masters, 2005. 
3
 Indonesia had been seated in the UN human rights council three times: in 2006, 2007 and 2011 in “RI 
selected to join UN human rights council”, May 21, 2011. 
4
 Indonesia Debrief in DFAT, 2014.  
2 
 
this thesis will problematize and question the decision-making process of leaders and the 
manoeuvres of state in relation to external stimuli and national interests by examining and 
investigating the determining factors for Indonesia’s policy shifts throughout its history as a 
modern state.  
  The first section of the introductory chapter of this thesis will outline a background on 
the issue of Indonesia’s human rights policy shift.  It will explain the contexts of Indonesia’s 
human rights – the institutional/practical circumstances that may describe the transformation 
of Indonesia’s practice and policy, post-World War II. It will position Indonesia as a country 
which lies in the South East Asia subregion where the neighbouring environment seems to be 
condoning anti-human rights behaviour while other external pressures continue to demand 
otherwise. Indonesia, in this regard, seems to have played on both sides of the argument and 
thus renders the question of whether Indonesia is a protagonist or antagonist state in terms of 
its respect for human rights. The second section of this chapter will discuss the existing 
literature on Indonesia’s human rights policy shift. It will show how this thesis relates to 
previous work in the area. The third and the fourth sections of this introductory chapter 
present the research question and the objective of the research. The fifth section will discuss 
the research methodology used in the historical case-study chapters of this research. The sixth 
section will discuss the research limitations, including a discussion on the limitation of 
neoclassical realism as a theoretical framework, as well as the limitation of this research itself 
due to the chosen neoclassical realism model and the method of analysis. Finally, the last 
section will give an overview of the following chapters of the thesis. 
 
1.2 Overview of Human Rights and South East Asia  
 
 In South East Asia, the claim that human rights are universal may still be on contested 
ground and, yet, the claim that human rights are not universal may also share the same fate. 
Debates around the universality of human rights have been apparent particularly since the 
adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) by the United Nations (UN) 
in 1948.
5
 According to the UN, human rights are considered to be rights that are inherent to 
                                                          
5
 UN definition of human rights is derived from the United Nation Office of High Commissioner on Human 
Rights in OHCHR, 2014. 
3 
 
all human beings. Further, states assume obligations and duties under international law to 
respect protect and fulfil human rights, and it is assumed that democratic forms of 
governance are needed to realise such obligations and duties.
6
 However, attempts by Western 
countries to introduce the significance of human rights into non-Western regions such as 
South East Asia have been challenged on the grounds that such efforts prioritise particular 
rights over others, such as civil and political rights over economic, social and cultural rights. 
It has also been argued that such claimed universal rights are not always consistent with local 
values.
7
 There have also been studies by a number of scholars which indicate the 
incompatibility between Asian and Western Values. The conclusion is that traditional social 
values conflict with the democratic values that underpin Western notions of human rights.
8
 If 
this conflict of values is ignored by Western states, then Fareed Zakaria was not off the mark 
when he argued that, as their response, Asian countries would be likely to practice an 
“illiberal” form of democracy. Illiberal democracy refers to a democracy which carries 
Western symbols, such as election processes, but with an Asian aspect such that the elected 
governments may instead weaken the rule of law, violate human rights and restrict the 
freedom of speech of its citizen.
9
 The relativist argument on human rights seems to have 




Inspired by the success of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in maintaining 
stability and development, nations such as Malaysia and Singapore have claimed that they 
may have to sacrifice some political and civil freedoms in order to protect the economic 
security of their people and the stability of their societies. Mahathir Muhammad from 
Malayasia and Lee Kuan Yeuw from Singapore have warned other Asian nations that too 
much democracy can lead to anarchy and detract from economic progress.
11
 They also 
pointed out the moral bankruptcy and the double standardness of the Western powers’ 




 Kishore Mahbubani argued that the Western emphasis of democracy and human rights is at the expense of 
the economic /developmental rights of less developed countries and their pre-existing social-cultural contexts, 
1993. 
S
 See Chang and Chu, 2002, pp. 1–32; Park and Shin, 2007, pp. 341–61 and Nathan, 2007. 
9
 See Zakaria, 1997, p.22. 
10
 Indonesia’s ideological inheritance of human rights highly depended on Indonesia’s history as it explains 
Indonesia’s adherence to ‘Asian Values’ as well as Indonesia’s particular cultural relativism in response to its 
encounter of different forces claiming universalism in Halldorrson, 2003, p. 117.   
11




displays of democracy and human rights.
12
 Yet, Amartya Sen, a Nobel Prize recipient whose 
argument was backed by the annual UN Human Development Report, seems to think 
otherwise.
13
 He stated that moving toward democracy actually makes for more stable 
societies as those societies themselves can decide on the trajectory of development and 
growth, rebutting many South East Asian leaders’ arguments that a slower shift to democracy 
is necessary to maintain order.
14
 Similarly, Richard Robison argued that the relativist 
argument articulated by South East Asian leaders is merely a cloak or a justification for their 
own preference for authoritarianism.
15
 
Based on the official position of South East Asian governments over the past 20 years, 
it would appear that there has been a gradual shift to an official acknowledgment of the 
importance of human rights.
16
 However, many are still reluctant to condone the imposition of 
universal human rights, especially to their neighbouring countries.
17
 The arguments range 
from referring to Asian countries’ colonial experiences, their status as developing states and 
smaller powers, “Asian Values” or Asian identity, to inter-state relational problems with 
Western countries. Yet, the United States (US) and most European Union (EU) countries 
seem determined to influence South East Asian countries’ human rights conditions through 
economic and trade conditionality, such as the ASEAN-European Union Meeting (ASEM) 
trade clauses which include human rights conditions for trade agreements.  
In this context, Indonesia, as one of the large nation-states in South East Asia, has 
certainly played on both sides of the argument. Indonesia’s first President, Sukarno, 
repeatedly claimed that the Western democracy which embodies the Western version of 
human rights does not suit the Indonesian personality.
18
 In fact, he was among the first to 
entrench the Indonesian political system with Indonesia’s own traditional and collective 








 See Robison, 1996, pp.316-8.  
16
 Such shifting  governments positions could be traced from the birth of the ‘Asian Values’ debate during the 
1993 World Conference of Human Rights in Vienna, where China, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia’s 
governments decided to show a unified defensive stand against Western human rights infuence and can be 
compared with the current position of these governments, particularly during the establishment of the ASEAN 
human rights mechanism whereby Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia decided that the ASEAN needed a form 
of human rights acknowledgement. 
17
 This could be clearly seen in ASEAN’s soft engagement with Myanmar regarding Myanmar violation of 
human rights. 
18
 Soekarno claimed that the Western style democracy does not resound well within the Indonesian spirit as it 
was an imported democracy in his “Konsepsi” in Sukarno, 1957.  
5 
 
values such as “musyawarah dan mufakat” (consultation and consensus). This can be seen in 
Indonesia’s first constitution known as Undang-undang Dasar 1945 (UUD 1945) and 
Indonesia’s “Pancasila” as a national ideology which acts as a foil to the full implementation 
of the Western version of democracy in Indonesia.
19
  Suharto, as Indonesia’s second 
President, also stated that community rights to stability and development should always 
prevail over individual rights.
20
 Yet, in the Post-Suharto era, Indonesia made significant 
policy shifts in the area of human rights by amending the UUD 1945 with the insertion of 
Western individual human rights clauses in article 28 of UUD 1945 and the adoption of the 
1948 UDHR through law no. 39/1999 as well as the ratification of some of the most 
important UN Human Rights Conventions. To accompany such domestic changes, Indonesia 
also launched bold regional initiatives by proposing the setting up of the ASEAN Human 
Rights mechanism through the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on 
Human Rights (AICHR) and, finally, the ASEAN Declaration on Human Rights.
21
 Given 
such policy shifts, this research investigates how and why different human rights policies 
have been pursued by Indonesia over time.   
 
1.3 Existing Explanations and Contribution of the Research 
 
Several prominent Indonesian scholars, such as Todung Mulya Lubis, Bagir Manan, 
Ismail Suny and Adnan Buyung Nasution have written extensively on the topic of human 
rights in Indonesia including Indonesia’s human rights policies.
22
 Most of these works 
explored the sources of Indonesia’s conception of human rights during the period before 
independence, as well as the evolution of Indonesia’s human rights policy after 
Independence. Lubis, Manan and Suny indicated that the concept of human rights has long 
been acknowledged in Indonesia, even before the adoption of the UDHR in 1948.
23
 These 
scholars highlighted that Indonesia’s indigenous version of human rights is largely sourced 
from the pact made by Indonesian kingdoms and the influences of Islam, cultural values and 
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the nationalist movements which incorporated a mixed concept of human rights as part of 
their struggle.
24
 Manan, for example, mentioned that earliest forms of human rights that the 
Indonesian nationalist movements had tried to achieve during the colonial period consisted of 
the right to freedom of expression and the right to peaceful assembly (by Boedi Utomo), the 
right to self-determination (by Perhimpunan Indonesia), the right to equal treatment (by 
Indische Partij), the right to independence (by PNI), the right to a decent living (by Syarikat 
Islam) and socio-economic rights (by PKI).
25
 In the post-independence period, these scholars 
also highlighted Indonesia’s attempt, after gaining independence, to ameliorate the tension 
between the 1948 UDHR (external version of human rights) and the indigenous conception of 
human rights.
26
 They analysed the development of Indonesia’s human rights policy during 
consecutive changes of regime and leadership, and explored where it was consistent with the 




However, such works rarely take into account the external environment that is vital in 
determining policy options and policy outcome. For example, Nasution and Lubis hinted that 
the derailing of progress in human rights and democracy in Indonesia was mainly due to 
Sukarno and the military’s deliberate “killing off” of Indonesia’s 1950s democratic 
environment. They argue that if Sukarno and the military had not done so, the democratic 
movement which began in the 1950s would have flourished and Indonesia might now have a 
stronger democratic environment and better respect for human rights.
28
 The reasoning, 
according to Nasution and Lubis, is mostly internal, since Sukarno, who was thought of as an 
accomplice of the Japanese military regime, preferred an authoritarian style of governing and 
so was opposed to Western human rights ideas because he associated them with 
imperialism.
29
 Although such claims might be true, nevertheless they ignored relevant 
external factors. One of them was the fact that during this period, the Cold War was at its 
peak and the battle for influence over Indonesia by the great powers had deeply destabilized 
the country. This could be seen in local and provincial instances of unrest at the time, as they 
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were greatly supported by power blocs, causing Indonesia’s territorial integrity to be at 
stake.
30
 So, despite the importance of internal factors, the impact of the external environment 
also needs to be considered when exploring Indonesia’s human rights policy. In this regard, 
this research aims to supplement the existing literature by providing an emphasis on the 
analysis of the geopolitical (external) factors which are crucial in determining why the 
Indonesian state pursued certain human rights policies. 
  Other scholars have drawn on International Relations (IR) theories to explore the 
changes in Indonesia’s human rights policy. Liberalism postulates that liberal democratic 
states are inherently peaceful towards one another, as described by Kant in his “Perpetual 
Peace”
31
 and they tend to act in a cooperative and non-aggressive manner.
32
 War and 
conquest, according to liberalism, is the product of non-liberal attitudes in the form of 
authoritarianism or illegitimate political authorities/unrepresentative elites. Thus, in order to 
strive for peace, domestically and externally, states will firstly need to satisfy the need for a 
legitimate domestic political order through the application of liberal values such as 
democracy, which is comprised of civil liberty, freedom of speech, equality before the law, 
respect for human rights, and representative government.
33
 Once this has been achieved, such 
democratic values would then be applied to the relations among states, as stated in the 
“democratic peace” thesis which argued that democratic states rarely fight one another as 
conflict usually occurs between democratic and undemocratic states.
34
 Regarding this matter, 
Francis Fukuyama further stresses that the Western liberal model is the model to be followed 
to end conflict between states, as Western liberal states were thought to have transcended 
their violent instincts and to have institutionalized norms that pacify relations among them.
35
 
Such institutionalized norms translate into free trade regimes, human rights regimes, treaties 
and conventions that allow the possibility of a “complex interdependence” among states 
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  The early making of Indonesia into a democracy and its interaction with other liberal 
democratic states as argued in the claims made by the advocates of the “democratic peace” 
thesis are captured in the works of scholars which have provided liberal explanations of 
Indonesia’s continuation or shift in its human rights policy. Among the first to do so was 
Herbert Feith in his “Constitutional Democracy” thesis in which he stated that Indonesia, in 
the 1950s, had implemented a functioning constitutional democracy in which the civil and 
political rights of its citizen were granted and leaders and elites respected these rules, 
indicating that the roots for liberalism and democracy had been planted at the very early stage 
of Indonesia’s modern history.
37
 At this stage, Indonesia was also seemingly favourable to 
liberal and democratic states, particularly the US. However, according to Samuel 
Huntington’s “Third Wave” thesis, Indonesia, though seemingly democratic at the time, had 
applied a confused form of democracy which led to the second reverse wave of 
democratization. In this way, Huntington’s thesis serves as a complementing explanation to 
the incongruences found in the “democratic peace” thesis if applied to Indonesia’s case.
38
 
According to the “Third Wave” thesis, Indonesia’s confused form of democracy was mainly 
because democratic supporters at the time could not consolidate power while Sukarno, as the 
influential leader, concentrated power within the single presidential role, resulting in 
authoritarianism.
39
In line with “democratic peace” logic, Indonesia’s reverse wave of 
democratisation resulted in Indonesia’s anti-West and anti-human rights behaviour and 
Indonesia, during the later stage (1956-1965), began to conflict with other  liberal democratic 
states. 
 
  From then until the end of Suharto’s New Order regime in 1998, Indonesia 
implemented policies that were not consistent with international human rights standards and 
most liberal explanations of Indonesia’s authoritarian rule were toned down. Even so, there 
were still scholars who analysed Indonesia’s human rights policies during this period in 
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accordance with “modernisation” and “democratisation”.
40
 They argued that, as Suharto’s 
Indonesia tried to modernise its socio-economic development by economically engaging the 
external world (particularly liberal countries) while improving the standards of living 
domestically, the rise in the demand for better respect for the rule of law and human rights 
coming from Indonesia’s foreign partners and middle class (intellectuals, civil society and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs)) became inevitable, and change towards a 




  As changes in Indonesia occurred in 1998, liberal explanations for Indonesia’s case 
gained the spotlight once more as scholars such as Bob S. Hadiwinata and Harold Crouch 
employed the “democratic consolidation” and “democratic transition” theses in analysing 
Indonesia.
42
 They argued that changes in Indonesia’s regime must be accompanied by 
concrete domestic changes which are conducive to a democratic environment, as failure to do 
so may bring back authoritarianism or militarism, as had already been demonstrated in the 
1950s.
43
 In this regard, the democratic transition and democratic consolidation theses are 
good explanations for Indonesia’s human rights policy and its adoption of a democratic 
system of government. Such argument was bolstered by the fact that external supporters of 
democracy have successfully pushed for domestic democratic actors to consolidate power in 
Indonesia. Several of the successful feats of such pressure were the amending of the UUD 
1945, the ending of Suharto’s three party system and the forcing of governments to sign and 
ratify international human rights covenants such as the UN International Convention on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR), the UN International Convention on Economic, Social and 




  Other literature that explores Indonesia’s human rights policies adopts a constructivist 
perspective. Constructivism emerges as a refinement of the positivist-rational schools by 
accommodating the non-rational and non-material elements of a state’s behaviour and 
policy.
45
 Constructivist scholars challenged the dominant understanding of the materially-
driven international structure in shaping a state’s behaviour and offered the possibility of the 
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role of shared ideas or beliefs in shaping national interests based on the formation of identity 
as a result of a social construction process.
46
 In other words, constructivism allows for 
ideational factors to be significant determinants in international relations as they are viewed 
as having the potential to shape a state’s behaviour. Three propositions that constructivists 
offer to the study of a state’s behaviour are: 1) normative and ideational structures shape 
individuals’ or states’ behaviours; 2) social identities that are conditioned by these non-
material structures influence the formulation of interests which ultimately result in actions; 
and 3) agents and structures influence each other.
47
   
 
Since constructivism, as an approach, puts much emphasis on norm formation and 
identity, it allows for a vigorous discussion of norm contestation between the Western-led 
human rights norms (with their universal claim) and the local domestic norms which are 
closely related to states’ identities.
 48
  As a result, according to most Western scholars usage 
of “constructivism”, the discussion revolves on how to reconcile states’ domestic norms with 
the already-agreed human rights norms or how to make norm-violating states (in this case 
Indonesia) comply with such international norms.
49
  Constructivist scholars such as Anja 
Jetschke and Michele Ford, for example, argue that Risse, Ropp and Sikkink’s “Spiral 
Model”
50
 is useful in explaining Indonesia’s policy shift. The model combines ideational 
factors with material factors in explaining the process of persuading norm-violating states to 
comply with human rights norms.
51
 The model also argues for the role that human rights 
networks play and describes the five stages of the model that a target state may progress 
through in order to become a human rights norm-abiding state: repression, denial, tactical 




Yet, Amitav Acharya, as a constructivist scholar with an Asian perspective, 
challenges the usage of such a “Spiral Model” by highlighting the process of “Norm 




 Burchill, 2009, op.cit., pp. 220-2.  
48




 See Jetschke, 2009, p. 140 and Ford, 2011, pp.38-56. 
51
 Ideational factors were  discussed, such as the process of the ‘naming and shaming’ of norm-violating states, 
as well as material factors, namely how to force powerful states to exert material pressures such as 






Diffusion” within the state. He explained how external norms could be localised into a state’s 
domestic norm and how a state’s domestic norm can be utilised by leaders and elites, either to 
resist or be reconciled with the external norms.
53
 In this regard, the usage of constructivist 
theory such as the spiral model was criticised for downplaying the role of local domestic 
actors and institutions in the diffusion process, as the model seems to rely on the pressures of 
the great powers, combined with human rights networks set up by these powers, to act locally 
while continuing to treat the local actors and leaders as passive recipients with little or no 
influence over the content of the norm.  
 
In complementing the constructivism explanation, the English School of International 
Relations may also be relevant in discerning Indonesia’s continuity or shift in its human 
rights policy, especially since non-material elements such as identity and ideas are the main 
emphasis of the English School. Here, the English School seems to be the middle ground 
between realism and idealism. One of the most prominent English School’s scholars, Hedley 
Bull, argues that instead of simply accepting an anarchical society which has its roots in 
human nature as argued by realist as a natural condition, the idea of a society of states or an 
“international society” is a possibility and that there are common values or interest shared 
among states.
54
 Bull also argues that, considering states’s identity within a system of states, 
states at times feel obliged to observe international rules and norms because of their own 
awareness as a member of “international society” with the obligations to abide by “rules of 
coexistence”.
55
An example of such rule is the existence of international law and a shared 
sense of universal morality as demonstrated in human rights conventions.  
 
The relevance of the English School’s explanation in discerning Indonesia’s human 
rights policy can thus be seen particularly during the post-Suharto era.  Since Indonesia 
changed its identity from an authoritarian to a democracy, Indonesia felt obliged to observe 
international human rights standard and acted in accordance with its identity within the limits 
set by the idea of an “international society”. But even though it is relevant in discerning 
Indonesia’s human rights policy in the post-Suharto era, the English School’s explanation 
seems to be insufficient in explaining the motives behind Indonesia’s numerous change of 
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identity throughout its history as well as Indonesia’s attempt to exert its influence on the 
creation of an “international society”. The English School also lacks the potential to explain 
state’s policy (inclusive to human rights policy) during the transitional period where in most 
cases, the change of policy of a state during such period is also affected or mobilised by 
material forces at play as argued earlier by the proponents of constructivist’s “Spiral Model”.   
 
Meanwhile, very few scholars have explored Indonesia’s changing human rights 
policy from a realist perspective. The main reason may be due to the fact that, although states 
are the primary concern for realists, little has been written on third world states as well as 
intermediate powers because realist’s main concerns are usually great powers. The earliest 
analytical literature regarding Indonesia from the realist perspective includes the writings of 
Geroge M. Kahin and Jon M. Reinhardt.
56
 Both scholars presented their theses on Indonesia 
based on its position in the midst of the great powers’ sphere of influence and, hence, 
explained Indonesia’s policy choices, including human rights, in accordance with Indonesia’s 
interests and the great powers’ agenda.
57
 In other words, they considered the geopolitics of 
Indonesia and other external factors as an important explanation of Indonesia’s policy, 
particularly during the period of the 1940s and 1950s. During the Suharto period, if seen from 
a realist perspective, Indonesia (as an object of analysis) is merely a product of the Cold War 
and a key ally to the West and, hence, a realist analysis of Indonesia’s human rights policy at 
this stage indicates that Indonesia’s human rights violations were tolerated by the Western 




After Suharto stepped down as the regime’s leader, Indonesia entered a new period 
and its shifts in human rights policies became an interesting object of analysis for realists.  
Hikmahanto Juwana, as one noteable example, can be said to have indirectly analysed 
classical realism elements, such as leaders’ interests and perceptions of power in Indonesia’s 
domestic power structure, in his exploration of Indonesia’s shift in human rights policy.
59
 In 
his view, this shift is not purely due to international pressure, but rather due to the interests of 
individual leaders at the time in safeguarding their positions by siding with the democratic 
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 Chomsky argued that Indonesia’s military ‘New Order’ regime is supported by the US since the other option 
is a possible “communist Indonesia” and hence Indonesia’s human rights infringement is tolerated by 
Washington, 1998, p. 3. 
59
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defenders (both in the domestic and international spheres, including powerful Western 
states).
60
 He also argued that, although some liberals and constructivists have claimed that 
NGOs have been key players in pushing for a shift in terms of human rights policies, the 
government managed to utilise the creation of its own NGOs to deny a human rights agenda 





   After discussing the possible explanations in discerning Indonesia’s policy shift, it is 
also important to know each theory’s limitations.  The limits of liberalism to explain changes 
to Indonesia’s human rights policies include that the applicability of liberal values to non-
Western countries are still subject to debate, especially with the existence of other competing 
values, both traditional and religious, which had mostly existed prior to the spread of liberal 
values.
62
 Thus, for liberal values to take root, Michael Ignatieff argues that there would be a 
long process of diffusion.
63
 In addition, the usage of liberalism as an IR approach in 
analysing Indonesia’s case seems to be limited to only a certain period of time. For example, 
while liberal theories could provide an extensive explanation during Indonesia’s globalisation 
and reformasi era (1980s-1990s), liberalism has little potential to explain why Indonesia’s 
closeness to other liberal countries such as the US, the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia 
in the 1960s-1980s did not greatly improve Indonesia’s human rights policies. Liberalism 
also offers a limited explanation as to why Indonesia’s relations with other well-known 
democratic countries, namely Australia and the US, was strained during its democratic 
period, even though it never led to an open war, particularly when compared with the period 
of close relations during Suharto’s authoritarian regime.
64
 This is especially pertinent in 








 Juwana argued that some NGOs were financed by a number of government figures and their existence 
diminished as the figures retired from office, while other NGOs were financed by external actors which may 
have had interests other than promoting human rights in Juwana, 2003, op.cit., pp.661-6. 
62
 The spread of liberal values here refers to the Washington consensus on the free market and Clinton’s 
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63
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64
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  Meanwhile, constructivism’s privileging of inter-subjective ideas and identity in its 
explanations of state behaviour leads the approach to over-emphasize the causal relationship 
between non-material factors and state behaviour. Further, due to their largely abstract nature, 
it is argued that, if constructivism’s privileging of inter-subjective ideas is not placed within a 
broader framework of other IR paradigms, it may present an incoherent and confusing 
account of a state’s behaviour, particularly in Indonesia’s case. 66  Mainly, this is because 
constructivism alone cannot be applied independently as a self-contained approach, but 
always as a foil to positivism. If ideational factors and identity matter so much in 
constructivism, then why did a post-colonial country like Indonesia, with human rights norms 
already enshrined in its 1945 constitution,
67
 not incorporate such pro-human rights identity 
into the the global indentity of human rights advocate much earlier?  Why did it choose to 
promote at some stages and yet, at other times, negate the importance of human rights? 
Indeed a constructivist explanation might point out the swift change of state identity (from 
authoritarian to a democratic state) as a possible reasoning for Indonesia’s case, but 
constructivist explanations may downplay the importance of the role fulfilled by material 
factors in explaining Indonesia’s human rights policies over time. 
 
  Another constructivism limitation is that Western scholars’ usage of constructivism 
also suffers from a “moral proselytism” in which the approach concentrates more on 
conversion or the teaching of external norms than on the actual process of norm contestation 
at, and adaptation to, the local level. Thus it can be considered to privilege a biased form of 
morality or values which encourages the notion of “good” systemic norms and “bad” 
domestic norms. In this sense, Western countries and NGOs have the tendency to convert the 
targeted state or norm-violating states (which are mostly Asian and African developing states) 
while less conversion can be done to the former by the latter as they are not at the same level 
of playing field.
68
 Meanwhile, the usage of constructivism by scholars, regardless of whether 
they are Western or Asian, to understand the process of norm diffusion in weaker states also 
suffers the general weakness of constructivism. One example is that, even though norm 
diffusion theory is more elaborative in understanding norm contestation or adaptation, 
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particularly in the third world, the link between external pressure and the decision-making 





Based on the limitations of the existing literature as outlined above, an exploration of 
Indonesia’s human rights policies needs to consider external and internal factors and both 
material and idealist elements. In addition, the main concern for the existing IR analysis of 
Indonesia’s policy shift or continuity, as applied by a number of scholars coming from realist, 
liberalist and constructivist traditions, is time limitation. Scholars coming from a variety of 
theories and perspectives seem to fixate only on a very limited time period when conducting 
their observations to prove the validity of their approaches.
70
 They tend to overlook that the 
approaches adopted may no longer be relevant over a different period of time which can 
suggest that they were selective in choosing the appropriate time period to match their desired 
approach. In this respect, the researcher is of the view that Indonesia’s human rights policy 
should be explored through all the stages of Indonesia’s history, and not just selected periods, 
in order to show the development of Indonesia’s human rights policy from its birth as a 
nation state until the present. Also, the researcher  believes that constructivist and liberalist 
tendencies in privileging external values over domestic values is a distortion of the analysis, 
as the two must be considered of equal importance in order to capture the full spectrum of 
Indonesia’s human rights policy and the reason for its continuation or shifts. 
 
 The continuation, or shifts, of Indonesia’s human rights policy are indicative of the 
linkage between Indonesia’s human rights policy and the given opportunities and threats 
provided by the international system’s structure, the changes within Indonesia’s state 
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structure and the perspectives held by leaders. In this respect, the realist perspective is 
relevant due to fact that realism provides a robust theoretical justification for the hard-fought 
independence and territorial integrity considered to be important components of Indonesian 
foreign policy; and IR as a discipline was brought to Indonesia in the 1950s by a group of 
American scholars from the John Hopkins University which basically disseminating realism 
as by product of American IR scholarship. Realism assumes that interests in terms of power 
have always been the main motivator of a state’s behaviour, whether it is a superpower or a 
lesser power. It is for the purpose of the attainment of power that states devise strategies and 
policies, which could potentially explain the motives behind the interplay between external 
and internal factors. However, realism as a theory is also faced with limitations. Classical 
realism’s heavy emphasis on the state-society relationship and the role or perspective of 
individual statesmen, for example, has overlooked systemic opportunities and threats which 
were crucial for Indonesia’s survival as a third world state. Meanwhile, neorealism’s over-
reliance on a systemic level of analysis also could not comprehensively discern Indonesia’s 
defiant behaviour toward systemic constraints, despite its “shape and shove” explanation.  
 
The more recent modification of realism, neoclassical realism, combines classical 
realism and neorealism levels of analysis and may be useful in explaining the paradoxes and 
inconsistencies in Indonesia’s behaviour in relation to human rights. One of the most 
interesting analyses on Indonesia’s policy shift was made by Kai He.
71
 He applied a 
neoclassical realism analysis on Indonesia’s foreign policy shift and not its human rights 
policy in particular.
72
 He did, however, enter the human rights topic when he touched on 
Indonesia’s foreign policy shift in respect to East Timor and he described the change of 
Indonesia’s foreign attitude regarding East Timor. The shift of policies on East Timor, 
according to him, was not because Indonesia was changing its identity from a norm-violating 
state to a norm-abiding state, as would be argued from a constructivism perspective. Instead, 
it was mostly because of Indonesia’s relative power distribution in the international system at 




  To accommodate the theoretical complexity faced, in this study neoclassical realism’s 
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“domestic power structure-leader’s perception” model will be applied to analyse Indonesia’s 
case. This is mainly due to the nature of neoclassical realism work, which is to study and 
understand foreign policy of particular states instead of attempting to create a grand theory of 
international politics, as in the case of neorealism. Consequently, neoclassical realism 
analysis has the potential to move away from theoretical conflicts or barriers of existing 
research traditions by incorporating limited ideational factors, such as perception and threats, 
with material factors such as economic sanctions and military embargoes, on a particular and 
specific case. 
 
1.4 The Research Question 
 
The research question for this study is: 
  
“What are the main causes of the shift or continuation in Indonesia’s human rights policy?” 
  
If approached via the neoclassical realism “domestic power structure” and “leader’s 
perception” model, answering this question can be pursued through an analysis of variables 
as follows:  
 
a. The independent variables: the external environment of the decision-making process 
and relative power distribution.    
b. The intervening variables: the decision-making domestic environment (domestic 
power structure and processes) and the decision-makers’ behavioural and cognitive 
factors (leader’s perception) of Indonesia’s external environment and public human 
rights policy and practices.   
c. The dependent variables: changes in Indonesia’s overall human rights policy. 
 
Here, Indonesia’s human rights policy is considered to include both foreign and domestic 
human rights policies.
74
 It is understood as the application of human rights in (1) Indonesia’s 
foreign policy and diplomacy; and (2) domestic legislation, policy-making and 
implementation.  
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1.5 The Objective of the Research  
 
Given the research question of “what causes Indonesia’s policy continuation or shift?” 
the main objective of the research is to determine the reasonings behind Indonesia’s 
continuation or shift in terms of human rights policy, through the neoclassical realism 
framework. In answering the question, the link between external drives and domestic 
decision-making processes will be problematised. Consistent with neoclassical realism 
analysis, the starting point of this research would be an analysis of the extent to which 
external influences condition Indonesia’s human rights policy.
75
  Here, the analysis will begin 
with the chosen independent variable of the external environment of the decision-making 
process of Indonesia’s foreign policy and practices. It will assess the external enviroment 
within each period of the decision-making process and will identify the contraints and 
opportunities that were faced in terms of policy options to be exercised by Indonesia’s 
decision-makers. It will identifiy a causal relationship of the three groups of variables. The 
findings will test the validity of neoclassical realism. 
 
 With regards to the intervening variables, the roles of leaders and senior state officials 
in the policy-making process will be important to investigate, similar to the assumptions of 
the “great man” or “charismatic leader” theory.
76
 In this sense, ideas and perceptions of 
leaders at the individual level are significant in the neoclassical realism approach, consistent 
with Hans J. Morgenthau’s view that “when people see things in a new light, they may act in 
a new way.”
77
 In addition, Mead notes:  
 
It matters who the President is. If Theodore Roosevelt and not Woodrow 
Wilson had been President when World War I broke out, American and world 
history might have taken a very different turn.
78
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  Thus, the perceptions of leaders on issues of human rights and international relations 
are considered key to understanding their decisions, both on internal and international fronts, 
despite the existence of international constraints or domestic structure, particularly for new 
democracies or the third world. Here, Steven R. David argues in his “omnibalancing” thesis 
that: 
 
...realism must be broadened to examine internal threats in addition to 
focusing on external threats and capabilities [that is, structural arguments], 





Such a claim is quite valid in analysing a developing country like Indonesia because policy 
decisions have often been made by a single individual or, at most, by a small elite.
80
 As a 
result, this individual leader may not necessarily be as responsive to domestic civil society as 
the leader of a developed democracy in which public opinion also has a minimum say in 
decision-making.
81
 Such third world phenomena will be explored in this research, in 
accordance with the neoclassical realism school. 
 
  In addition, neoclassical realism considers the domestic power structure as a potential 
intervening variable that can interpret the external constraints. In this regard, the domestic 
power structure serves as an important factor in relation to policy-making. Here domestic 
power structure refers to the power sharing mechanism or structure among the executive, 
legislators, the judiciary, and state apparatuses such as the military and human rights 
commissions, as well as NGOs and other civil society groups. As a result, an analysis of the 
domestic power structure will potentially revolve around two major questions.
82
 The first 
would be, “which institution tends to dominate or have more power to influence in terms of 
policy-making?” The second would be “which actors are involved in the process?”
83
All of 
these considerations will be investigated in this research. 
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Another research objective is to indicate the role that a small-to-middle power like 
Indonesia can play in its relationships with great powers as demonstrated by Indonesia’s 
human rights policy responses. An additional variable in neoclassical realism includes the 
importance of a leader’s perceptions of the state’s relative power distribution which can 
prevent a small-to-middle power from being overshadowed by neorealism’s “great power” 
emphasis. Such logic allows the possibility of explaining how Indonesia, as an intermediate 
power, managed to defy greater power pressures because of its leader’s perception of 
Indonesia’s relative power. This also shows the significance of neoclassical realism 
considerations regarding an individual leader’s perceptions of the developing world, as 
individual leaders have been prominent in forging foreign policies in the developing world. 
Yet, the neoclassical realist approach does not fall prey to the “charismatic leader” approach 
to foreign policy-making in developing countries, criticised by third world scholars for 
psychological reductionism. 
 
1.6 Research Methodology 
 
This dissertation can be categorised as qualitative research. John Creswell defines 
qualitative research as that which starts with the use of theoretical lens to study social or 
human problems.
84
 In this regard, qualitative research intends to explain the mechanisms 
within or linkages between causal theories or models, since these theories generally do not 
tell us about why people responded as they did, the context in which they responded, or their 
deeper thoughts and behaviours that governed their responses.
85
 Thus, the advantages of a 
qualitative approach for this research are its ability to analyse social phenomena within its 
own natural setting 
86
 and its suitability for the study or exploration of a research problem 
where a complex, detailed understanding is needed.
87
 This dissertation, for example, begins 
with realism as a general theoretical lens in trying to understand Indonesia’s human rights 
policy shift or continuity as the chosen problem for investigation. It then uses qualitative 
research methodologies to explore and investigate the problem within a very specific context 
where an extensive and detailed analysis is needed to discern the complex reasonings behind 
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such shifts or continuity. 
 
The first method that this qualitative research uses is comparative historical analysis. 
Mahoney and Ruschemeyer define comparative historical analysis as a method with “a 
concern on causal analysis, an emphasis on processes over time, and the use of systematic 
and contextualised comparison”.
88
 Such method is crucial because this dissertation is 
designed to rely on a historically grounded approach in analysing the topic; namely, 
Indonesia’s human rights policy. It analyses Indonesia’s human rights policies throughout its 
history with the aim of showing the link between internal and external factors and how they 
interact in determining policy outcomes. Comparative study of Indonesia’s human rights 
policy between selected periods of Indonesia’s leadership also is used to show the evolution 
of Indonesia’s human rights policy, whether it has progressed or regressed and whether there 
is continuity or discontinuity of policy. Through an investigation of historical changes in 
Indonesia’s regimes, external environments and domestic structure, as well as a comparative 
analysis among the periods of Indonesian history, the researcher aims to discover how each 
of these factors interact and under what circumstances each of the variables can prevail over 
others. 
 
This research also uses theory-guided tracing. George and McKeown define theory-
guided tracing as a method which places emphasis on the investigation into the decision-
making process whereby various initial conditions are translated into outcomes.
89
 It is a 
method for within-case analysis which aims to identify the steps in a causal process leading 
to an outcome.
90
 The theory of neoclassical realism identifies a causal relationship among 
three groups of variables that should be apparent if the theory is to hold true in the case of the 
Indonesian historical experience under examination: the dependent variable – Indonesia's 
human rights policy; the intervening variables – “leader's perception-domestic structure”; and 
the independent variables – external pressures and incentives. It analyses the independent, 
dependent and intervening variables to explain Indonesia’s human rights policies throughout 
Indonesia’s history with the aim of showing the link between internal and external factors and 
                                                          
88
 See Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, 2003, p.6. 
89
 See George and McKeown, 1985, p.35.  
90




how they interact in determining policy output. The causal assumption is that the intervening 
variables will interpret the independent variables, which results in policy output - the 
dependent variable. 
 
The third method used in this research is qualitative case studies. A case study 
approach in qualitative research is design to answer the question of “how” and “why” certain 
events occurred.
91
  Yin defines case study as an “empirical inquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”.
92
  In this regard, the main purpose 
of the usage of case study method in this research is to analyse the real-life context in which 
certain decisions are made, particularly decisions concerning Indonesia’s human rights 
policy. The secondary purpose of the usage of such a method is to elucidate the historical 
process whereby the relevant variables has effect and thus test the consistency or 
inconsistency of a chosen theory, which represents a causal mechanism among a set of 
specific variables. 
 
(1) Data Collection 
 
In order to explore the neoclassical realism variables mentioned above, the data and materials 
on Indonesia’s external environment and domestic power structure were collected through 
secondary sources, namely books and journal articles accessed via library research. In regard 
to leaders’ perceptions (intervening variable) and Indonesia’s foreign and human rights 
policies (dependant variable), the data and materials were collected from formal 
documentations such as professional reports and policy archives in the field of the policy 
issue. These materials were accessed from collections of leaders’ and Presidential speeches, 
and the Government of Indonesia (GoI) White Paper formal documents archives, some of 
which were accessed directly from Indonesian ministries in hard copy form, while others 
were accessed via Indonesian government institution websites (as soft copies) since most 
archives are now online.  From such materials, the phenomena at each step are carefully 
observed. The descriptive part of process-tracing is not about observing policy change or 
policy sequence, but rather focussing on taking good snapshots at a series of specific 
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(2) Data Analysis 
 
Causal process observation or causal inference was the next research procedure. Process-
tracing paid close attention to the sequences of independent, dependent and intervening 
variables. The author then explored the Indonesian historical experience while looking for 
congruence or incongruence between the neoclassical realism expectation and the process 
observation. Such an approach was used to highlight the anomalies of policy response in 
Indonesia’s case. Neoclassical intervening variables, such as a leader’s perception and 
domestic structure, are assumed to have the potential to initiate abrupt shifts in several of 
Indonesia’s long-held human rights positions as well as its foreign policy characteristics. 
Thus the research aims to show not only the correlation, but also the causal relationship 
between the variables and to determine which intervening variable could potentially be 
affecting policy outcomes. In this sense, neoclassical realism also has the potential to explain 
the process of the emergence of what sometimes seem to be “irrational” policy choices and 
outcomes, by analyzing all possible variables in the actual practice of policy-making.  
 
Overall, this research aims to understand the external and internal factors which 
influence the topic, as conventional approaches based on rigid stages in the policy process 
(that is, agenda setting, decision-making and implementation) are unlikely to be suitable for 
examining the transformation of Indonesia’s human rights policy. This research seeks a 
multilayer-staged transformation that reflects practice and actual policy evolution involving 
multiple interacting cycles rather than a single policy cycle. This framework looks at policy 
evolution across the recent history of Indonesia (especially since the 1945 enactment of the 
Indonesian constitution as a national aspiration of decolonization), where one or more 
political coalitions have altered their core beliefs. The proposed research will thus examine a 
multiple set of potential sources of influence for the policy shift by taking a level-of-analysis 
approach (that is, the state system, the nation-state, decision-making). Conventional 
approaches to an explanation of this type of policy evolution simply highlight the mutual 
interplay between separated levels of politics. In contrast, this study will identify the 
determinants of the policy shift by taking an interactive levels approach while viewing the 
24 
 
policy shift as influenced simultaneously by both domestic and international constraints and 
opportunities. 
 
1.7 Research Limitations 
 
The writer is fully aware that IR theories that emanate from third world scholars are 
yet to be fully developed, and specific IR theories that largely match the third world 
experiences are relatively rare. Such a disadvantaged position is highlighted by the fact that a 
number of scholars have tried to introduce third world theories of IR.
93
 Subaltern realism, for 
example, tried to pinpoint the flaw in most IR theories by stating that the mainstream IR 
theories have claimed to “transcend time and space” or “hold universal value” despite the fact 
that such claims do not correspond to the logic of social science since most are strictly and 
inescapably bounded by time and space.
94
  Such critiques have vindicated the opinion that 
most IR theories best suit Western countries, due to the existence of ethnocentrism in the 
theory building process and to an overlapping advantage, since the current third world is 
almost similar to the experience of states during the middle ages of Europe but with Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International being vigilant on their actions.
95
 In other words, 
most existing IR theories are still grappling with the realities faced by third world states, like 
Indonesia, which are often characterized by a post-colonial aftermath comprising of a weak, 
yet dominant, military regime, underdevelopment, intra- and interstate conflicts, and 
legitimacy problems which may not be explicable by the current IR theories. Hence, as 
Ayoob suggested, one way of averting such “timelessness” and “spacelessness” is to look at 
the application of IR theories through a historically grounded approach, in order to 
accommodate the changes, the transformations and the actual contexts of reality when these 




In overcoming such conditions, this research will thus maintain the application of 
mainstream IR theory, namely realism, but it will move from the conventional application of 
realism to an enriched or modified version of realism. As already argued above, the two 
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important modifications that will accompany IR theories used in this research comprise of 1) 
a historically grounded approach, and 2) the usage of a theory-guided process. A historically 
grounded and theory-guided approach is viewed as necessary because this research explores 
Indonesia’s human rights policy from the time of its inception as an independent state until 




However, in doing so, the research would therefore be exposed to reductionism 
because not all crucial factors can be taken into account as potential variables in answering 
the research question. For example, other potential intervening variables such as legitimacy 
or identity could potentially be of equal importance in becoming the main reason for the shift 
in Indonesia’s human rights policy, but this research will not consider them as pertinent. The 
reason is because the researcher believes that, although legitimacy is quite a significant 
factor, it is less valid than the already chosen variables since an authoritarian regime, despite 
its weak legitimacy, may have an assertive policy due to its effective government control or 
partial immunity from domestic or external interferences when deciding policy choices.
98
 
Whereas, regarding identity, even though it is significant, the formation of identity and 
ideology will be positioned in the context of neoclassical realism emphasis on the relative 
weights of external-material versus domestic-ideational factors in affecting Indonesia’s 
human rights policy. In its usage of neoclassical realism, the research also will use 
neoclassical realism’s emphasis on particularism as a theory of foreign policy rather than a 
political theory. As a result, this research may only be able to provide a theoretical 
framework for research which is applicable to Indonesia and which might not be applicable to 
all states or other third world states. 
 
1.8 Overview of the Thesis 
 
  In Chapter Two, an overall discussion of neoclassical realism takes place starting with 
a brief analysis of realism as an IR theory and leading to its development in the forms of 
neorealism and neoclassical realism. Realism’s strengths and weaknesses as a tool of analysis 
are highlighted in this section, as well as the differences and areas of convergence with other 
IR approaches. Also in this chapter, realism’s positioning of the issue of human rights is 




 Dosch, 2006, op.cit., p.46 
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briefly discussed. The last part of Chapter Two explores the applicability of neoclassical 
realism’s “domestic power structure-leader’s perception” model and its potential in analysing 
the transformation of Indonesia’s human rights policy throughout history. 
   
  Chapter Three is the first case study in the application of the neoclassical realism 
“domestic power structure-leader’s perception” model and it explores the Sukarno era from 
1945 to 1966. This chapter examines Indonesia’s struggle against colonialism and Indonesia’s 
early practice of democracy during 1945-1950. It analyses Indonesia’s usage of democracy 
and human rights discourses in its attempts to win its independence.  It also investigates 
Indonesia’s practice of democracy during ‘parliamentary democracy’ and Indonesia’s display 
of its state rights externally through the Asian African Conference in 1955, held in Bandung.  
Then it elaborates further on Indonesia’s decision to abandon discourses of democracy and 
human rights just as it began to develop its very own “Guided Democracy”. 
 
  Chapter Four is the second case study, which analyses Indonesia’s pro- and anti-
human rights policies during the Suharto period from 1966 to 1998. Here, a neoclassical 
realism approach is used to explore Suharto’s application of both pro- and anti-human rights 
policies during his early rule from the late 1960s to the middle 1970s. It highlights the 
progress of human rights as Suharto was detaching himself from Sukarno’s “Old Order” and 
the human rights tragedies that followed. Following this, Suharto’s anti-human rights 
policies, as captured in his “Pancasila Democracy” involving Right to Development (RTD) 
and government-sponsored violations of Indonesia’s civil and political rights, are also 
analysed, up to and including his downfall in 1998. 
 
  The important shift in Indonesia’s history from an authoritarian state to a democratic 
one is addressed in Chapter Five. This chapter analyses Indonesia’s human rights policy shift 
during the reformasi period (1998-2004). Neoclassical realism analysis, here, is used to 
investigate Indonesia’s pro- and anti-human rights policy under three different Presidents, 
namely Bacharuddin Jusuf Habibie (1998-1999), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001) and 
Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004). This chapter investigates the policies and incidents 
which were pivotal in influencing Indonesia’s human rights policy during reformasi, such as 
East Timor’s independence from Indonesia, the amendments made to Indonesia’s UUD 1945 
constitution, the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM) and Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) 
27 
 
separatist movements, as well as other regional unrests which had been critically observed by 
external powers. The pressures exerted by external powers on Indonesia also are discussed 
with respect to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Banks loans to Indonesia, 
the rise of the transnational advocacy network and the “War on Terror” campaign. 
 
  Chapter Six is the last case study presented in this thesis and it explores the human 
rights policies of Susilo Bambang Yudhyono (SBY) during his ten year rule from 2004 to 
2014. Indonesia during this period was already considered as a functioning democracy in 
which SBY himself had been elected democratically through a direct presidential election, yet 
there were still signs that Indonesia had not completely adhered to democracy and human 
rights concepts as understood in the West. SBY’s elusive human rights policies are explained 
through neoclassical realism’s “domestic power structure-leader’s perception” model. A 
number of human rights issues during SBY’s rule are presented with a focus on ASEAN and 
BDF, the West Papua case and the Ahmadiyah case, and they are analysed via a neoclassical 
realism approach.  
 
  The overall conclusions of this research are discussed in Chapter Seven. The findings 
of the research from each period of Indonesia’s history (1945-2014), as discussed in great 
detail in each chapter, are summed up and compared to detect the actual policy shift or 
continuation from time to time. Conclusions as to the usefulness of neoclassical realism in 
explaining Indonesia’s human rights policy shifts and continuation are also highlighted. The 
contribution of this research to the IR literature and the way forward in analysing third world 
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  This chapter will introduce neoclassical realism as a sub-school of realism to explain 
the shift or continuation in Indonesia’s human rights policy. In this regard, neoclassical 
realism seems to be aptly suited to analysing the behaviour of a third world state like 
Indonesia, since neoclassical realism has been identified as a framework of research which 
focuses less on becoming a grand theory (as in the case of neorealism) but rather appears to 
be adjustable to the country-specific conditions of the object of the research.
1
  In particular, 
neoclassical realism has the potential to deal with the relative weights of external-material 
versus domestic-ideational factors affecting Indonesia’s human rights policy.   
 
  The first part of this chapter will give a brief introduction to realism as an IR theory. 
Then it will elaborate on the modification of realism from its origins in classical realism, to 
neorealism and to the recent development of neoclassical realism. This will include a critique 
of neoclassical realism. The second part of the chapter will present how the issue of human 
rights is perceived within the realism paradigm. The discussion will involve how human 
rights are defined as value claims, a political tool or a manifestation of the state’s policy and 
the conflict between state rights and human rights. The last part of the chapter will introduce 
the “domestic power structure-leader’s perception” neoclassical realism model which is used 
to analyse the transformation of Indonesia’s human rights policy. 
 
2.2 Realism as an International Relations Theory 
 
  The diverse intellectual development of realism derives from its basic assumptions. 
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29 
 
The state is the most important actor or formal grouping in international relations.
2
 States are 
considered to be sovereign entities that make up the international system. Through its 
privileging of states as actors, realism can be differentiated from the liberal approach, which 
takes into account the significance of other actors in international relations, such as 
International Non-governmental Organisations (INGOs), NGOs and multinational 
companies.
3
 The state is also assumed to be rational in its behaviour and, hence, the premise 
that the state could behave in an irrational manner is considered as an anomaly in realism.
4
 
For realists, irrationality, anomaly, misperception and deviation from the logical/rational 
pattern of behaviour suggest an inaccurate perception or an imperfect “transmission belt” on 
the part of decision-makers.
5
 The state is also considered to be a unitary entity because 
realism assumes that the fragmented divisions of society and their differing opinions on 




  Realists consider that the world is anarchic due to the absence of a single authoritative 
entity that could subjugate all states under its control.
7
 This is exemplified by states’ perpetual 
conflicts of interests which are likened to billiard balls colliding with one another. Such 
realist ideas, for example, are exemplified in the idea of mutual self-destruction as a reason 
for peace
8
 in contrast with the liberal conception of collective security deliberation to achieve 
peace.
9
 Therefore, states have pessimistic, suspicious or distrustful views of others’ intentions 
and are normally in a state of conflict, particularly regarding the pursuance of national self-
interests.
10
 Hence, the basic premise of realism is that “the strong do what they have power to 
do and the weak accept what they have to accept”.
11
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 Mutual self-destruction refers to the nuclear weapon threats where each state has a common interest of 
avoiding nuclear warfare in order to ensure their own survival. 
9
 Collective security refers to a deliberation or aspiration on the part of states, based on the idealist concept of 
harmony of interests, where each state attempts to guarantee each other’s security through the usage of 
institutions and, hence, war can be avoided. 
10
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11




  Most realists tend to see relations among states based on the idea of a “balance of 
power” scenario due to the anarchic condition of the system and the positioning of the states 
based on the distribution of power within the system.
12
 This means, in a system of anarchy, 
states will be divided into strong and weak categories based on their power distribution, and 
states will normally attempt to balance out the superiority of other states in order to seek 
power or to maintain their survival.
13
 Many realists think that, in an anarchic condition, states 
tend to have a pessimistic view of other states’ intentions and if they do not balance the 
power among competing states then their survival will be at stake.
14
 According to the realist’s 
point of view, the “balance of power” mechanism will continue to be the main ingredient in 
state relations with one another until it reaches some sort of “equilibrium” or a situation of 
being temporarily balanced.
15
 Such stability, however, will soon be upset again and the whole 
“balance of power” process will repeat itself. 
 
  Although the insertion of morality in the field of politics, such as through the issue of 
human rights, is acknowledged by realism, particularly classical realism, it is not the main 
concern in states’ relations since power and survival, as captured in the realist’s conception of 
national interests, predominate over moral politics.
16
 Thus, realism assumes that morality and 
universalism are used by states to attain influence or power over other states and hence they 
are merely the means to an end.
17
 Morgenthau and Carr argue that the claim made by states to 
obey universal moral law is a way to hide the pursuit of self-interests and that all great 
powers in history have articulated universal moral claims which benefitted them.
18
 This can 
be seen in the moral justifications made for colonialism by European imperial powers in the 
19
th
 century and the moral justification for democracy and human rights promotion to 
strengthen US hegemony in the modern era.
19
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2.3 Classical Realism and Neorealism 
  
Realist assumptions are based on classical realism and the work of independent realist 
thinkers, starting from Thucydides to the middle years of the Cold War.
20
 This also includes 
Thomas Hobbes, Nicollo Machiavelli, E.H. Carr and Hans J. Morgenthau. In general terms, 
classical realists believe that international politics are based on the inherent selfishness of 
human nature and, hence, the pathologies of human drives will also be projected by states in 
international relations.
21
 In their view, the concept of interest can be defined in terms of the 





For the purpose of the research, it is important to note that apart from the shared 
similarities among realist assumptions already mentioned above, such as anarchy and 
“balance of power”, one of the most important features of classical realist analysis is the 
important role that domestic structure and individual statesmen play in determining a state’s 
behaviour. Most classical realists consider both internal and external state politics in their 
analyses.
23
 In other words, according to classical realists, the individual leaders, as well as the 
state, cannot be overlooked. The states, according to Morgenthau, are seen as rational actors 
especially in their choice of policies, and each is considered as a unitary actor when it comes 
to foreign policy-making.
24
 Yet Morgenthau further argues that “the statesman must think in 
terms of the national interest, conceived as power among other powers”.
25
 Thus, to most 
classical realists, individual statesmen, elites or princes are the main interpreters of interest 
defined in terms of power although their decisions are also greatly affected by the social 




  Classical realism as a working theory in IR, however, is problematic. Kenneth Waltz, 
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for example, argues that classical realism can hardly be categorized as a theory as it does not 
structure its arguments in a systematic way, such as in showing causal relationships for war 
and peace.
27
 For example, Waltz argues that anarchy is the enduring “permissive or 
underlying cause of war” while people and states account only for particular wars.
28
 Classical 
realist works are considered as simply a compilation of distilled wisdom of generations of 
practitioners and yet they can hardly constitute a clear theory with ample applications.
29
 
Another problem faced by scholars from the classical realism tradition is that most of their 
insights, opinions and analyses were derived from great power incidents which mostly 





  In this regard, neorealism emerges as a modification of classical realism. One clear 
example is neorealism’s more scientific approach in IR.
31
 Mainly this can be seen through the 
works of Kenneth Waltz, one of the leading scholars in neorealism/structuralism. He makes 
an important adjustment to the realist school of thought by arguing that states do not consider 
power, as proclaimed by classical realists, as an end goal but rather as a means to maintain a 
state’s survival.
32
 Another systematic approach that Waltz brings to neorealism is the 
introduction of three levels of politics in his analysis of the cause of war.
33
 The three levels of 
separate politics or “three images” comprise of the individual level as the first image, the 
state or the unit level as the second image and the international system level as the third 
image.  
 
  A distinctive feature that differentiates between classical realism and 
neorealism/structuralism is neorealism’s emphasis on the system level of analysis.
34
 
According to neorealism, the international system is construed as a structure which not only 
defines the units but also causes the emergence of state behaviour patterns, such as balance of 
power, due to the existence of the structural constraints of the system.
35
 The constraints push 
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states toward certain behaviours in a top-down scheme.
36
 It is important to note that 
neorealism does not expand further on the discussion of the interaction between a system and 
the state itself.
37
 Neorealists also believe that the key players in the international system are 
powerful states or “great powers” because changes in the system are mostly determined by 
their changing fates rendering the condition in which less powerful states must respond 
accordingly to the rise and fall of those great powers’ influence and status. 
 
  In addition, neorealism argues that the international political structure has two 
ordering principles: anarchy and hierarchy.
38
 Anarchy refers to the condition where there is 
no authoritative power to subjugate the people and no requirement to obey, whereas hierarchy 
refers to the condition where there is an authoritative power to command and the requirement 
to obey. According to neorealism, states in a condition of anarchy tend to balance the existing 
other powers whereas states in a condition of hierarchy tend to bandwagon with them.
39
 
Neorealism also argues that states may perform internal balancing behaviour, whereby a state 
uses internal efforts, such as moving to increase its economic capability, developing clever 
strategies and increasing military strength,
 
or external balancing behaviour by taking external 
measures to increase security such as forming alliances to ensure its survival.
40
 Another form 
of balancing could be “soft balancing”, or an act of balancing without directly provoking the 
state that is being counter-balanced.
41
 “Hard balancing” indicates a deliberate military 
alliance to contend with another alliance, such as the former Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republic’s (USSR’s) “Warsaw Pact” that was introduced to contend with the US-led North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Examples of soft balancing include states’ diplomatic 
manoeuvres in the UN (hence within the domain of neoliberalism) to limit a powerful state’s 
hegemony through making coalitions.
42
 For example, Russia, PRC and other less powerful 
countries managed to activate their combined veto power and cultivate diplomatic consensus 
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  Despite these theoretical developments, neorealism is criticised for being too 
deterministic in identifying the causes of state behaviour.
44
 Such criticism is directed towards 
Waltz’s over-emphasis on systemic constraints which rendered the states as being helpless in 
facing external pressure.  Henry Kissinger, with well-known “voluntarism” views (as 
opposed to Waltz’s “determinism”), noted that systemic constraints are the product of a 
state’s foreign policy and not the other way around and, hence, the constraints are not 
automatic but are a creation of state policies, particularly powerful and influential states.
45
 
Regarding this matter, Waltz has taken precautions and made amendments by stating that 
structural theory does not fully explain a state’s behaviour as it is only capable of “shape and 
shove” and it is indecisive since states themselves have the ultimate responsibility in deciding 
their policies and behaviours.
46
 The nearest that neorealists can get to explaining state 
behaviour is through the examination of a state’s tendency to balance existing power at the 
system level, as argued earlier.  
 
2. 4 Neoclassical Realism  
 
Since neorealism’s explanation seems to be rather limited in understanding the 
reasoning behind the abrupt ending of the Cold War, particularly regarding the USSR’s 
policy in the late 1990s to implement perestroika (restructuring), glasnost (openness) and 
demokatizatsiya (democratisation), most realist scholars re-traced their roots in classical 
realism to understand what they perceived as the USSR’s irrational and illogical policy 
option.
47
 They contend that, since Waltz’s neorealism has deeply privileged the third image 
(systemic environment) as neorealism’s starting point of analysis, the immediate effect is that 
classical realism’s emphasis on the first image (the individuals) and the second image (states 
and domestic society) is heavily undermined.
48
 To address this, the significance of classical 
realism analysis must be reinstated and its variables further studied in order to explain states’ 
behaviours.
49
 Hence, a new breed of realist scholars known as neoclassical realists began to 
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incorporate classical realism’s individual and domestic variables as well as neorealism’s 
systemic variable in their analysis of states’ behaviours. 
 
Neoclassical realism opens up the possibility of inserting constructivist elements 
(individual perception) and liberalist elements (domestic-societal relations) into the realist 
approach.
50
 This also means that neoclassical realism has the potential to open neorealism’s 
“black box” assumption of domestic politics by adhering to classical realism’s conception of 
the state in which the individual and the domestic condition begin to matter in determining 
policies while, at the same time, neoclassical realism retains neorealism’s premise that the 
external condition of the state acts as a restraint for the exercise of policy choices.
51
 In short, 
neoclassical realism tries to explain why, how and under what conditions the internal 
characteristics of state influence the policies which leaders pursue.
52
 Hence, neoclassical 
realism as an approach acts as an imperfect “transmission belt” in trying to link systemic 




Neoclassical realism can be seen through the works of a number of scholars. Stephen 
Walt’s 1985 “balance of threat” theory suggests that it is the perceptions of threat rather than 
power itself that drives states to a bandwagoning or balancing act.
54
 Here, Walt suggests that 
although threats can be sourced from objective material threats, such as aggregate capability, 
geographical proximity and offensive capability, they also can be sourced from subjective 
ideational threats such as aggressive intention.
55
 He argues that it is the statesmen who will 
determine the potential threat and prospective allies.
56
 Then there is Fareed Zakaria’s 
neoclassical realism “domestic power structure” model. In his model, Zakaria investigated 
why the US did not pursue an expansionist policy when it had all the resources to do so.
57
  He 
considered that the strength of the domestic institutions vis-à-vis a weak state power within 
the US was the main impediment for the state to utilize its nation’s aggregate capabilities 
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(national power) for an expansionist policy. Meanwhile, Thomas Christensen’s neoclassical 
realism “internal mobilization” model focused on the process of internal mobilization of 
societal resources in the form of domestic manipulation of the public by leaders. Here, the 
decisions of Harry Truman of the US and Mao Zedong of the PRC to support their own grand 
strategies led to the conflicting behaviour between the two as seen in the unexpected, 
prolonged Sino-American conflict during the Cold War.
58
 Jeffrey Taliaferro also introduced 
his neoclassical realism “state-resource extraction” model. Through the model, he signified 
the important role that the state’s resource-extraction capability plays in affecting policies.
59
 
The contribution of all of these works could indeed help to explain state behaviour, which 
may not be fully captured if relying solely on neorealism’s privileging of systemic constraints 
as the main motivator of state behaviour.  
 
The common ground in all neoclassical realism analysis, however, is the effort to link 
the classical realism level of analysis (first and second image) and neorealism level of 
analysis (third image) by introducing a multilevel approach in analysing a state's behaviour.
60
 
It does so by taking into account the importance of the system level, the unit level and the 
individual level analyses in its method. In this sense, neoclassical realists uncover domestic 
politics by considering numerous possibilities of intervening variables which affect the 
making of policies. Such intervening variables could be found either in domestic politics (unit 
level) such as state structure, institutional strength, societal forces, interests groups and elite 
cohesion, or in individual leaders (individual level) such as the perspectives of individual 
leaders/decision-makers in assessing threats, opportunities and relative power 
distribution/capabilities, as well as their persuasion abilities. Further, according to 
neoclassical realism, policies and state behaviours are treated as the dependent variable, while 
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By taking into account the concept of “balance of power” found in classical realism 
and neorealism, neoclassical realism tries to complement it by suggesting that a state does not 
necessarily balance against power but, rather, they tend to balance against threat or what 
seems be more threatening to the key leaders.
61
 Thus, according to neoclassical realism, the 
concept of “balance of threats” has a potential to explain a state’s under-balancing behaviour, 
when a state fails to balance, out of either inefficiency or incorrectly perceiving the other 
state as less of a threat than it actually is. Randall Schweller argues that, in determining state 
balancing behaviour, one of the possible domestic intervening variables is elite consensus.
62
 
Here, elite consensus refers to an agreement or shared perception among political elites of 
what constitutes a threat.
63
 In this sense, the construction of threats and states’ relative power 
distributions are all influenced, not only by the material condition as found in the structuralist 
and positivist argument, but also by how leaders and elites perceive threats and opportunities 
and how they assess the state’s relative distribution of power. Hence, neoclassical realism 
suggests that perception, particularly decision-makers’ and individual leaders’ perceptions of 
threat, power and interests, is subjective and relative. 
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2.5 Neoclassical Realism Differences Compared with Liberalism and 
Constructivism 
 
The main difference between neoclassical realism and other IR paradigms lies in the 
starting point for analysis. Neoclassical realism’s starting point, like neorealism, begins at the 
structure or system level (top-down approach) and not domestic politics or ideas. Again it is 
worth reiterating that neoclassical realism analysis would begin to venture into other possible 
causes found in the analysis of domestic politics only if a state’s behaviour deviates from the 
ideals of neorealism.
64
 The main reason is that, if domestic political factors have an 
overwhelming influence in the decision-making process, causing state interests to be 
sacrificed for parochial interests that cause them to deviate from neorealism’s assumed 
behaviour, there will be consequences.
65
 The more the state is captured by parochial actors, 
causing elites or leaders to believe in alternative social constructions of reality different from 
the “objective” reality outlined by neorealism, the more severe the penalty will be.
66
 The 
example of states being dominated by domestic politics can be seen in Schweller’s 
underbalancing example of France and the UK’s appeasement of Germany in the 1930s when 
they should have balanced.
67
 The result proved to be disastrous for both countries as too 
much consideration was given to societal forces by the state, which had caused them to 
underbalance the actual threat.  
 
Neoclassical realism also differs from any liberal or pluralist theory in terms of the 
role of the state since, in most pluralist theories, the state is considered to be hijacked by, or is 
an agent of, societal forces.
68
  Neoclassical realism, meanwhile, stipulates that the state still 
plays the autonomous role of interpreting external threats, defining national interests and 
determining policy trajectory. In this sense, neoclassical realism maintains realism’s 
privileging of the state and neorealism’s systemic constraints. However, unlike classical 
realism and neorealism, neoclassical realism suggests state authority has to consider or 
bargain with other domestic forces which exist at the unit level in order to be able to extract 
or mobilize resources to support their chosen policies. Regarding state behaviour, despite the 
fact that neoclassical realism still takes into account realist arguments such as the condition of 
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anarchy and power distribution, it differs by not taking the concept of national interests for 
granted. Instead, national interest is considered subject to interpretation by the state or the 
individual leaders. 
 
In contrast with constructivism, neoclassical realism puts limits on its use of ideas and 
perceptions.
69
 For example, neoclassical realism problematises the use of perception and it 
does not deny realism’s conception of the existence of objective reality. This stand is in 
contrast with constructivist argument, which repudiates the existence of objective reality and 
states that all reality is socially constructed and “anarchy is only what states make of it”.
70
 
According to neoclassical realism, states must often fall back on perception, not because 
reality is socially constructed but rather because they lack complete information about that 
reality. Walt is often alleged to have stepped beyond the bounds of realism, toward 
constructivism, by stressing perception of aggressive intentions as a key element of threat.
71
 
But intentions are never known for sure and, hence, any attribution of intent must always be 
based on perception. Neoclassical realists are not arguing that the interpretation of threatening 
behaviour is a product of norms and identity, as suggested by a constructivist perspective. 
Rather, neoclassical realism employs ideas as merely the product of a leader’s perception or 
misperception (mistakes) of realism’s claim of “objective” reality. As a result, in most cases, 
when neoclassical realism is discussing perception, it is hinting at leaders’ perceptions on 
their states’ relative positions in terms of power distribution to avoid straying too far from 
realism’s domain of objective reality.
72
 For example, according to Snyder’s “myths of 
empire” thesis, leaders tend to wrongly perceive their relative power, or other states’ relative 
power distribution and the objective reality. As a result they tend to believe that expansion is 
possible and likely to lead to greater power, although such belief mostly goes against 
systemic rules of international politics.
73
 Most expansion, for example, has resulted in self-
encirclement, as seen in the act of balancing by other states against the aggressors, either by 
trying to overwhelm or besige them.
74
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2.6 The Strengths and Limitations of Neoclassical Realism 
 
One of neoclassical realism’s strengths as a framework for research is that 
neoclassical realism has the flexibility to offer a lot of variants in its application. Hence, 
neoclassical realism is an analytical tool that is fluid enough to be adjusted to historical 
specificities and their transformation in different periods through empirical study, particularly 
when compared with the rigidity of classical realism and neorealism. This makes neoclassical 
realism a very useful tool in analysing not only great power states, which are mostly 
accounted for in the domain of neorealism, but also third world states or intermediate states, 
as it helps in understanding how third world states translate systemic pressure or constraints 
provided by the great powers, through the existing internal/domestic intervening variables, 
into policy responses. Samples of analytical research which have utilised a number of 
neoclassical realism models on third world states have been plentiful, such as Thomas 
Juneau’s neoclassical realism “Perception, Identity, and Faction Politics” model on Iran’s 
foreign policy, Kai He’s neoclassical realism “International Pressure-Democratic Legitimacy” 
model on Indonesia’s foreign policy and Candice Eleanor Moore’s neoclassical realism 





In respect of foreign policy, the other strength of neoclassical realism is that it offers 
an explanation for not only great powers’ foreign policies but also for smaller powers’ 
policies.
76
 Unlike neorealism’s emphasis on great powers, neoclassical realism takes into 
account the pattern of behaviour that states with lesser power can display in trying to control 
and shape their external environments.
77
  In this regard Mohammed Ayoob’s “Subaltern 
Realism” and Steven David’s “omnibalancing” on third world countries’ conditions and 
alignments, perceptions of internal and external threats, and state behaviours vis-à-vis great 
powers are pertinent in supplementing the existing neoclassical realism assumptions. Smaller 
powers here refer to former colonies and developing, warring, divided, weak or failed types 
of states.
78
 Such converging potential is due to neoclassical realism’s inclusion of both 
internal and external variables and, hence, despite the primacy of systemic constraints, threats 
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can be considered to emanate from both a state’s external and internal environments. 
79
 In this 
regard, leaders, particularly third world leaders, are assumed by neoclassical realism to be 
capable of preserving their rule by acting domestically for international reasons.
80
 Such 
strength also is demonstrated in neoclassical realism’s potential for analysing third world 
states’ behaviours that are more complex than neorealism’s “balance of power” theory as 
normally displayed by great powers.  Neoclassical realism theorists, for example, have come 
up with numerous state behaviour patterns with regard to small-to-medium powers’ relations 





Neoclassical realism also has a degree of compatibility with other mid-range theories. 
A demonstration of such compatibility can be seen in the similarity between Robert Putnam’s 
“Two Level Game” theory and classical realism’s emphasis on the influence that decision-
makers or leaders have in policy making since neoclassical realism’s emphasis on the role of 
statesmen and leaders in policy making was originally derived from classical realism 
perspective. Here, Morgenthau, as a classical realist, assumed statesmen or leaders think and 
act in terms of interest defined as power and their policy option is rationally considered based 
on such conception of interest.
82
 Likewise, Putnam also assumed that national leaders, during 
international negotiating processes, pursue policies which serve their own interest in securing 
domestic power for leadership as well as their country’s national interest.
83
 In this regard, 
whereas classical realists merely see leaders as power seekers in general terms, Putnam 




   
 In this sense, “Two Level Game” theory complements neoclassical realism analysis 
in trying to understand when and how leaders reason between domestic and external 
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imperatives. Whereas neoclassical realist acknowledges the dominance of external drive in 
affecting policy outcome within the linkage of states’ external and internal environments , 
Putnam’s “Two-Level Game” theory treats both (external and internal) conditions with equal 
importance and thus it is able to capture the interplay between the two which still revolves 
around the concept of power and interests.
85
 In other words, according to “Two Level Game” 
theory logic, shifts or continuation of policies could be analysed through both domestic 
causes and international effects (Second Image), and international causes and domestic 
effects (Second Image reversed), or could be caused by both as captured in Robert Putnam’s 
two-level game analysis.
86
  Putnam hypothesised that, at the national level, domestic groups 
pursue their interests by pressuring the government to adopt favourable policies, and 
politicians or leaders seek power by constructing coalitions among those groups. At the 
international level, national governments each seek to maximize their own ability to satisfy 
domestic pressures, while minimising the adverse consequences of foreign developments. 
Neither of the two games can be ignored by central decision-makers, so long as their 




According to Putnam’s “Two Level Game” metaphor, each national political leader 
appears at both game boards.
88
  Across the international table sit his or her foreign 
counterparts, and on the same side sit diplomats and other international advisors (as 
negotiators).  Around the domestic table behind him or her sit party and parliamentary 
figures, spokespersons for domestic agencies, representatives of key interest groups and the 
leader's own political advisors.  Any key player at the international table who is dissatisfied 
with the outcome may upset the game board and, conversely, any leader who fails to satisfy 
their fellow players at the domestic table risks being evicted from their seat. The aim of the 
two-level game, if possible, is to aim for an acceptable equilibrium in which the objective of 
policy can be met both by the domestic actors and the international community or to arrive at 
a condition which Putnam refers to as a “Synergistic Linkage”.
89
 A win-set, therefore, 
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according to Putnam, relies heavily on the strategy and the discussion that takes place during 




However, in trying to achieve such a win-set, irrationality is often involved in policy 
making. Such possible irrationality is accommodated both in neoclassical realism as well as 
Putnam’s “Two Level Game” theory due to the emphasis that both approaches put on the role 
of leaders and domestic power structre as crucial domestic intervening variables in affecting 
policy outcome. Due to the importance of leaders, hence the possible irrationality in policy 
making, according to neoclassical realism claim, is because of limited information received 
by leaders, misperception or the need to control domestic support or resource for policy 
which may impair the rationality of the policy itself.
91 
Meanwhile, Putnam’s “Two Level 
Game” theory complements such neoclassical realism stand by stipulating that what is 
rational from a domestic perspective may be irrational or “impolitic” from foreign 
perspective and vice versa.
92
 This makes irrationality as argued by neoclassical realism and 
Putnam’s “Two Level Game” theory to potentially act as a foil to neorealism assumption. As 
a result both approaches rely on the investigation of foreign and domestic contexts in order to 
better understand the anomalies of policy choices taken by leaders. 
 
Despite these strengths, however, there are a number of limitations that can be 
inferred from neoclassical realism’s method of analysis. Some argue that one of the 
limitations of neoclassical realism is that it is not consistent with realist theories that assume 
states will act rationally and unitarily in responding to systemic pressure. By opening the 
“black box”, perceptions of leaders and elites began to matter and interests other than the 
states are parts of the equation that needed to be considered. As a result, irrationality or 
misperception is likely to occur. While neoclassical realists maintain that irrationality and 
misperception are mostly due to “bounded rationality” or limited and incomplete information 
provided to decision-makers and, hence, render mistakes in policy, the line gets blurry once 
neoclassical realism discusses abstract concepts such as the decision-maker’s ideas, beliefs or 
intents which have a significant impact on policy choices.
93
 Hence, neoclassical realism is 
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considered by some to be more of a hybrid in which constructivist elements are inserted into 




  Secondly, neoclassical realism’s insertion of possible intervening variables from 
domestic politics has been considered as more consistent with a liberalist approach rather 
than a realist one.
95
 Realism’s domain, particularly neorealism’s emphasis on the system level 
of analysis, would appear to have been compromised with liberalism’s domestic emphasis. 
The incorporation of variation in underlying domestic preferences, according to Jeffrey W. 
Legro and Andrew Moravcsik (1999):   
 
…undermines (if not eliminates) the theoretical distinctiveness of 
neoclassical realism as a form of realism by rendering it indistinguishable 




  Thirdly, as there is still no academic consensus as to which intervening variables 
should be included in or excluded from the framework; the neoclassical realism approach 
employs a number of possible models in accordance with the different objects or contexts of 
analysis and different research questions asked. As a result, neoclassical realism is often 
accused of reductionism from neorealism assumptions by trying to explain the variation in 
the properties and characteristics of the system, such as states and power relations, not by 
looking at the whole picture but rather by breaking it down into specific cases in which state 
foreign policy is analysed in relation to other states within the system.
97
 In this regard, 
neoclassical realism is considered to lack theoretical rigour, in contrast with neorealism’s 
“determinism”. Such a condition downgrades neoclassical realism’s status to a theory of 




2.7 Human Rights in Realism 
 
  After discussing the evolution of realism as a tool of analysis, the issue of human 
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rights in realism also needs to be explained. Although the issue of human rights, as argued 
earlier, has not been realism’s main area of focus, it is crucial for this research as it seeks to 
analyse the transformation of Indonesia’s human rights policy. In this section, human rights 
firstly will be introduced as a politically recognized concept in IR. Then human rights will be 
discussed as a policy option which can be practised and pursued by both the opressors and the 
oppressed. Later on, this section also presents a discussion on the ongoing debate for 
supremacy between human rights and state rights and how the two can be perceived to be 
compatible or incompatible with each other. 
 
2.7.1 Human Rights as Politics 
 
  Human rights, as understood today, are the rights of human beings who have been 
granted protection by international law, particularly the ones that have been enshrined in the 
1948 UN UDHR. The UN human rights regime was further strengthened by human rights 
conventions such as the ICCPR, the ICESCR, the CAT, the Convention on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child 
(CROC) and others. The definitions of human rights, though diverse, seem to be dominated 
by the liberal conception of rights, which states that human rights are those rights that one has 
because they are human and that they are necessary to live a life of dignity. They are thus 
considered to be universal and inalienable.
99
 In terms of human rights, there also seems to be 
a consensus that their promotion is obligatory for all states, particularly member states of the 
UN, as violation of such rights may entail repercussions such as “naming and shaming”, 
sanctions and even humanitarian intervention.
100
 The dominance of the human rights concept, 
in this regard, has even challenged state sovereignty.  
 
This research, however, employs a realist definition of human rights that considers 
such rights as merely value claims.
101
 This certainly differs from the liberal conception of 
human rights which views human rights as a taken-for-granted universal set of values which 
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serves as a common ground for all humanity.
102
 Such a liberal definition, according to the 
realist view, is misleading because the universal aspiration of human rights is itself double-
sided.
103
 For example, during the early development of human rights, only a small group of 
white and wealthy European males constituted being “human” in most Western 
Enlightenment conceptions of human rights. This makes the original concept of human rights 
a Western concept that was formed to suit the Western social context and to benefit the 
interests of Western white males, as can be seen in the human rights justifications made for 
Western countries’ colonial practices and patriarchal systems.
104
 However, the invocation of 
human rights has also been utilised as a universal tool for the oppressed in almost all parts of 
the world in their struggles against forms of oppression such as imperialism, colonialism and 
authoritarian rule. Thus, such elaboration renders human rights as a concept that is inherently 
political, since the usage of human rights can involve a number of possible interests (the 
oppressor’s and the oppressed’s interests) and the understanding of the politics which 




From a realism perspective, such a restricted definition of human rights as mere value 
claims is certainly applicable in Schweller’s conception of ‘balance of interests’ to 
demonstrate the politics or the possible interests at play.
106
 Schweller argues that states tend 
to balance their interests and those interests could be either to defend existing values or to 
extend them.
107
 For example, based on Schweller’s state categorisation, if we portray 
Indonesia as a “lamb” state, then, Indonesia is limited in its capacity to defend or to extend its 
values and, as a result, will become prey to other powerful states belonging to the “lion” or 
“wolf” state categories.
108
 Indonesia fits the category as a “lamb”state since it is a third world 
state which possesses relatively few capabilities and suffers from poor state-society relations 
for a variety of reasons: its elites and institutions may lack legitimacy with the masses; it may 
be internally divided along ethnic, political, class, religious or tribal lines; and the state’s 
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ideology may conflict with and be imposed upon the popular culture.
109
 As a result, if we 
consider human rights as a values claim, then based on “balance of interests” logic, Indonesia 
shows limited effort to defend its own version of human rights values against the spread of 
the dominating force’s influence, which tries to extend its values, namely the Western 
powers’ imposition of their values in South East Asia as part of the Washington Consensus or 




Realist understandings of human rights consider them as merely a set of values that 
express the subjective political convictions and aspirations of a particular group of people 
under the pretext of promoting national interests. For example, according to realism, the issue 
of human rights does not revolve around the question of whether human rights are compatible 
with other traditions or beliefs, but it revolves around the question of whether one endorses 
the values expressed through human rights or the values that might conflict with human 
rights. According to realism, states’ willingness to make human rights their priority national 
interests is based on rational calculation. The US and PRC’s stances on human rights could 
be indicative of such an interpretation. Dunne and Hanson argue that the US used human 
rights and democracy as ways to strengthen its hegemony after the Cold War, whereas 
Madison Condon argues that the PRC took full advantage of establishing relations with 
countries that tended to violate human rights, consistent with its preference for non-
interference with internal matters including human rights practices.
111
 Similarly, John J. 
Mearsheimer clearly captures great powers behaviour towards the issue of human rights. He 
states that great powers pursuance of non-security goals (namely to promote or protect human 
rights) is only done if it does not in any way conflict with balance-of-power logic or their 
prospect for survival.
112
 At times, pursuing these non-security goals may even complement 
their hunt for relative power.
113
 However, if it does conflict with balance-of-power logic or 
their security is at risk, then, in accordance with the hierarchy of state goals, great powers are 
more likely to behave according to the dictates of realism.
114
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2.7.2 Human Rights as Power and Policy 
 
  In relation to power, human rights can be understood as both “power of rights” and 
“rights to power”.
115
 The “power of rights” refers to a liberalist understanding of human 
rights in which human rights is commonly perceived as a concept of liberation with the 
potential to lead to the emancipation of humans from a condition of suffering. According to 
the liberal internationalist view, though human rights may be understood as a form of power, 
ideally it is designed to limit states’ power since human rights aims to reduce suffering by 
keeping state power in check.
116
 Once institutionalized, human rights have the potential to 
demonstrate its emancipating-coercive mechanism, as shown in the emergence of an 
International Criminal Court which aims to indict human rights violators for genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes, and the act of aggression.
117
 Another example, according to the 
latest development of international law, the failure of states to comply with the “responsibility 
to protect” (R2P) may result in international military intervention as according to the 
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) report the task to 
protect people from grave human rights violation can be overtaken by the international 
community if their state is “unable or unwilling” to do so.
118
 Here, the acknowledgement of 
R2P by the UN and international community has therefore fostered three types of 
responsibilities namely 1) responsibility to prevent (grave human rights violations) 2) 
responsibility to react (sanctions and international intervention) and 3) responsibility to 
rebuild (post-intervention).
119
 As a result the R2P concept indeed undermines state 
sovereignty and state rights namely non-interference as according to the report “the principle 
of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect”.
120
 Liberals, however, 
admit there are significant limitations on the exercise of R2P. In particular, the permanent 
members of the UN Security Council can veto any attempts to intervene into the internal 
affairs of states, should they wish to do so. Thus human rights advocates often need to 
interact with state power and lobby for action in order for rights’ emancipatory aims and the 
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enforceability of their mechanisms to be realized.  
 
Meanwhile, “rights to power” refers to the realist argument that a concern for human 
rights is only articulated by powerful states to exert influence on other states if it matches 
their geopolitical interests.
121
 Falk argues that “rights talk is excluded from public 
consciousness, or artfully manipulated, whenever it gets seriously in the way of the rights to 
power”.
122
 Mainly this is due to the fact that in practice many powerful states which had 
blatantly violated human rights were not the main concern for the global promotion or 
protection of human rights.
123
 Hence, human rights can be construed as an instrument of 
power, regulation, or even domination.
124
 In this vein, human rights could be thought to 
maintain a “secret solidarity” with powerful states.
125
 Human rights advocates, therefore, 
need to carefully distinguish between the emancipatory and hegemonic power of human 
rights since they themselves could become agents which promote hegemonic international 
law.
126
 Failing to appreciate the distinctions between human rights emancipatory power and 
human rights hegemonic power weakens the universal claim of human rights.  
 
For the purpose of this research, human rights is understood as Falk’s “rights to 
power” definition, and human rights policy can thus be seen as a political tool for states to 
promote their external and internal interests.  Like great powers usage of human rights 
discourse to justify their hegemonic rule externally as well as to consolidate their domestic 
position internally, Indonesia, as a small-to-medium power, has also used human rights 
discourse in several periods of its history either to contest or to conform to universal human 
rights standard (or Falk’s definition of “power of rights”) in its bid for state power. 
Contestation is done through the articulation of a distinctive set of Indonesian traditional 
values which has a close resemblance to the values set forth in the “Asian Values” argument 
such as family values, consensus and respect for authority in order to maintain Indonesia’s 
influence, be it internally or externally while conformation is simply by adhering to the 
hegemonic human rights norm.  
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Such a definition is necessary since, if applied in Indonesia’s case, domestically, 
human rights issues are invoked to strengthen state power through mobilizing societal 
resources or simply retaining leader’s legitimacy and authority. Meanwhile, externally, 
human rights can be interpreted as a foreign policy or political behavior of a state in relation 
with other states based on their  relative distribution of power within the international system. 
Such definition is in accordance with classical realism analysis which states that all politics is 
power politics and this includes moral politics and utopian ideas as they could be considered 
as means to obtain power.
127
 Such a realist definition allows analysts to interpret Indonesia’s 
human rights policy not simply as “morally” right behavior for a state but rather as a possible 
instrument to engage the dominant power (balancing or bandwagoning) in accordance with 
Indonesia’s own interests as a small-to-medium power and perception of threat as will be 
argued in the case-study chapters.  
 
2.7.3 State Rights versus Human Rights  
 
According to the realist perspective, the most common concept embodying state rights 
is state security and sovereignty.
128
 Here, state security relates to a state’s perception of the 
condition in which it is facing internal or external challenges, hence a possible threat.
129
 In 
response to such perception of threat, states which have the ability to justify the credibility of 
threats or challenges faced, as well as the ability to attain international legitimacy for the 
handling of such threats or challenges, can activate one of the oldest international norms, 
known as sovereignty.
130
 This is because, within the concept of sovereignty, as acknowledged 
by international law, states have certain exclusive rights such as the right to maintain 
territorial integrity, to a monopoly on the use of violence (that is, the use of physical force by 
the military and police to maintain security and order), and to determine internal policies as 
well as forms of governing.
131
 However, human rights, according to realist scholars, are 
considered a newly established international norm that could lead to a condition where states 
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are forced to forfeit their exclusive rights, as outlined earlier.
132
 Thus human rights can be 
understood as providing a challenge to states’ rights to sovereignty. 
 
 The current discussion on state rights versus human rights among realist scholars is 
ongoing. Stephen Krasner seems to suggest that sovereignty, particularly domestic 
sovereignty, is inviolable in any circumstances.
133
 He argues that any attempts to weaken the 
sovereignty of the state by reasoning, such as highlighting human rights violations, would 
only point out the weaknesses and hypocrisy in international law.
134
 Such a point is also 
strengthened by the fact that, with regards to human rights violations, a sovereign entity that 
is strong in terms of power within the international system is always an exceptional case for 
humanitarian intervention, while a sovereign entity that is weak in terms of the state power 
distribution is more vulnerable to humanitarian intervention.  
 
Meanwhile, Jack Donnelly suggests that human rights have a place within the 
sovereignty of the state.
135
 He argues that human rights actually are embedded within 
sovereignty and do not in any way reduce state sovereignty.
136
 For example, when it comes to 
human rights protection, the international human rights obligations of states are solely to their 
own nationals and, thus, states have neither a right nor a responsibility to implement or 
enforce the human rights of foreigners on foreign territories.
137
 In this regard, the 
construction of international human rights seems to co-exist and is compatible with the 
concepts of sovereignty, albeit that human rights here are only considered to apply to state 
nationals. Another argument is that the development of human rights needs the function of 
the state in order for human rights to thrive. Mainly, this is because “states actually define, 
delimit, and contain those rights, thereby domesticating their use and affirming the authority 
of the state as the source from which such rights spring”.
138
  Hence, the important point is to 
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From the arguments presented above, it is clear that human rights can be seen as 
either compatible or incompatible with the system of states in international relations.  Both 
arguments are valid and can therefore be utilised by influential leaders from powerful or 
weak states alike to choose the manner in which they want to either advocate or violate 
human rights in their policies. In this way, analysts can safely assume that such ongoing 
arguments have also become part of states’ strategies to incorporate or to deny human rights. 
In the case of Indonesia, it also tries to astutely choose between the two sides of debate in 
responding to systemic pressures. The side that Indonesia will be on, as will be investigated 
in the upcoming case study chapters, is assumed to be greatly influenced by the external 
environment as well as domestic politics.  
 
  
2.8 The Neoclassical Realism “Leader’s Perception-Domestic Structure” Model 
for Indonesia 
 
 As already outlined, neoclassical realism has the potential to shed light on Indonesia’s 
human rights policy. As in any neoclassical realist analysis, the starting point in this thesis is 
the system level and this will be considered the independent variable. As with neorealism, 
neoclassical realism assumes that systemic constraints have significant influence on states’ 
behaviours. In analysing Indonesia’s case, this thesis will explore multiple independent 
variables or systemic constraints which have significantly impacted the course of Indonesia’s 
policy-making, from Indonesia’s 1945 independence to the present time. The reason for the 
use of multiple independent variables is mainly because this neoclassical realism research 
also utilises a history-grounded approach and, thus, patterns of the systemic constraints faced 
by Indonesia differ over time. 
 
Whereas neorealism simply divides states’ behaviours into strict “black or white” 
dualism by assuming that any states that defy the ideals of neorealism
140
 would be punished 
while those states which follow would survive, neoclassical realism would instead 
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problematise such an assumption based on a state’s chosen behaviour.
141
 Neoclassical realism 
may thus provide an alternative explanation of why states have chosen certain behaviours or 
policies, which defies the logic of neorealism. Neoclassical realism may provide a greater 
understanding of the reasons behind states’ policy choices through the employment of a 
number of possible intervening variables within Indonesia’s domestic context that may be 




In analysing Indonesia’s state behaviour, in this thesis, two domestic level variables 
are included as intervening variables in the application of neoclassical realism: 
 
1) Leaders’ perceptions. Perceptions of leaders matter in neoclassical realist analysis 
and can be considered as an important intervening variable for Indonesia’s case. 
Mainly, this is because neoclassical realism questions neorealism’s assumption 
that a state is a unitary and rational entity that can perceive its relative distribution 
of power and adopt logical policy responses.
143
 The main reason is the fact that 
the state is made up of individuals who construct systems, institutions and 
bureaucracies; individuals who lead and follow and individuals who make 
decisions.
144
 Hence, the incentives/constraints imposed by the structural 
environment are considered by neoclassical realism as blurry and need to be firstly 
interpreted by “flesh and blood officials”. 
145
 Neoclassical realism assumes that 
such unclear signals exist because leaders and the military have tendencies to 
overestimate the hostility of adversaries, exaggerate the potential gains from 
expansion, or mistakenly believe others will bandwagon with them in their 
conflicts.
146
 Thus governments, in addition to other foreign policy actors, translate 
these unclear external messages into policy outputs through a system of 
“filtering”. Meanwhile, in Indonesia’s case as a newly independent state, personal 
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idiosyncrasies of the top leadership can be a determining factor in shaping 
policies. The reason for this, according to Weinstein, is that “new states are 
usually “reckless” in their conduct on the basis of almost random pressures and at 
times policy can be because of accidents, whim or emotions”.
147
 In this sense, 
neoclassical realism considers the process of how political actors perceive threats 




2) Domestic power structure. Here, what is referred to as the domestic power 
structure is the internal power structure of the state. In such a context, neoclassical 
realists assume that, despite the fact that leaders’ choices of policies are influenced 
by their perceptions and ideas, enacting a policy does not rest solely on the 
leader’s discretion alone. Analysts, according to neoclassical realism, should 
investigate state-society relations in determining the possibility of extracting 
resources for power from their domestic environment in order to pursue 
policies.
149
 Fareed Zakaria’s “From Wealth to Power” thesis clearly outlines the 
significance of domestic power structure in a neoclassical realism analysis. He 
argues that, if the state power is weak, as characterised by fragmentation in the 
government, while there exists the strengthening of other competing domestic 
institutions, then such a condition may hinder certain policy options that can be 
pursued by the state despite the existence of systemic opportunity.
150
 Thus, this 
research investigates state power such as the state’s ability to mobilise resources, 
state apparatuses and domestic institutions, as well as the impact that these 
elements of state power make upon policy choices. 
 
The last variable of the neoclassical realism analysis is the dependent variable and it is 
the policy chosen by states or the outcome of the policy-making process. In Indonesia’s case, 
such a dependent variable is demonstrated in Indonesia’s choice of human rights policy from 
1945 to the present.Thus, it can be inferred from the explanation above that neoclassical 
realism is an attempt to bridge IR and foreign policy analysis. Such attempt can be further 
explored by analysing the similarities and differences between neoclassical realism “domestic 
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power structure-leader perception” model and Graham Allison’s three models of decision 
making. If compared with Allison’s models of decision making, the domestic variables used 
in realism, particularly neoclassical realism “domestic power structure-leader perception”, 
has a number of similarities. 
151
The reason is because, like in any realism theory, Allison’s 
rational actor model views the state as a unitary entity which, like an individual, behaves and 
think rationally in terms of national interests and power. Meanwhile, Allison’s organisational 
process model looks instead at the role that domestic agencies play in the shaping up of 
policy according to state’s hierarchy of authority, control and “standing operation procedure 
(SOP)” which may cause the state to behave irrationally. The last model, which is Allison’s 
government politics model, puts much emphasis in the lobby process by competing domestic 
agencies rendering a policy which is not rational but rather determined by the influence 
which had dominated over others as a result of the compromises and consensus reached. In 
this regard, just like the variables used in neoclassical realism “domestic power structure-
leaders perception” model, the domestic intervening variables found in Allison’s 
organisational process and the government politics model offer possible explanations 
(bureaucratic authority and government compromises) in determining policy deviations from 
realism’s emphasis on rationality, power and national interests.  
 
 Yet, the differences between neoclassical realism and Allison’s three models are also 
significant. First, the main difference lies in neoclassical realism emphasis on external factor 
as the primary determinant of decision making. Unlike Allison’s arguments, neoclassical 
realism (IR) presumes that systemic factors determine state behaviour. But decision-making 
by policy executives simply cannot be inferred from the grand level. And hence historical 
process-tracing is the preferred methodology of neoclassical realism. Also, only if there is a 
deviation from external constraints as postulated by neorealism that neoclassical realist begin 
to investigate the domestic process and possible domestic intervening variables. Second, 
neoclassical realists do not provide a set of fixed “intervening variables” which vary from one 
scholar to another and neoclassical realist scholars may choose from a range of possible 
intervening variables, or a combination of them, in trying to best explain a certain 
phenomenon. Third, neoclassical realism “domestic power structure-leadership perception” 
model allows a possible interplay between the different level of politics (system level, state 
level and individual level) whereas Allison’s three models are monolithic and parsimonious 
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and hence are incompatible with each other in explaining a certain political phenomenon or 
deviation of policies. 
 
   
2.9 Conclusion 
 
To conclude, the “domestic power structure-leader’s perception” model of 
neoclassical realism could potentially be the most useful in explaining Indonesia’s changing 
policies with regard to its human rights policies. This is because neoclassical realism has the 
potential to take into account the role that intermediate powers, and a third world state like 
Indonesia, can play in their relations with the greater powers. Neoclassical realism is also not 
a grand theory of politics which predicts a long term view of political phenomenon but rather 
a theory of policy analysis in which its usage is suited to specific times and places, such as in 
Indonesia’s change of policies from the period of 1945 up to the present time. Finally, the 
flexibility found in neoclassical realism analysis in choosing the most influential intervening 
variables, such as domestic power structures or leaders’ perceptions, allows it to have the 
potential to explore Indonesia’s specific context. In the following chapters the three variables 
(independent, intervening and dependent) of neoclassical realism will be used to analyse 
Indonesia’s human rights policies at four stages within the periodisation of post-WWII 











This chapter is the first historical case study of the development of Indonesia’s human 
rights policy during the early stages of post-World War II (post-WWII) Indonesia, with 
special reference to the applicability of neoclassical realism “domestic power stucture-
leader’s perception” model to Indonesia’s policy-making. This chapter presents a historical 
survey of Indonesia’s Sukarno period to test the model in analysing Indonesia’s human rights 
policy. It questions why Indonesia seemed to attach great importance to Western democracy 
and human rights discourse in its early inception, particularly during early 1945 to 1955 and 
why Indonesia then denounced Western democracy and human rights discourse during the 
period of 1956 to 1966. To explain the possible shift posed in the questions, this chapter will 
firstly discuss the neoclassical realism model. Then it will proceed to apply neoclassical 
realism in this case study followed by a conclusion. The case study presented in the form of 
historical survey can be divided into two phases of Indonesia’s policy transformation: the 
national struggle between 1945 and 1950, and Indonesia’s practise of democracy from 1950 
to 1966.  
  
In the first phase (1945-1950), a brief explanation of the external environment will be 
presented to assess the constraints and opportunities for Sukarno’s leadership during the early 
stage of Indonesia’s independence as well as the foundation of Indonesia’s human rights 
policy. Given the limitations of neorealism to provide a full explanation of Indonesia’s 
foreign policies with human rights implications in this phase, neoclassical realism will be 
explored through the intervening variables of “domestic power structure” and “leader’s 
perception”. The last discussion will provide an assessment of the applicability of 
neoclassical realism in Indonesia’s case during this phase.  
 
The second phase (1950-1966) explores the changes in Indonesia’s external 
environment and the interactions with domestic politics, as well as the implications for 
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Indonesia’s human rights policy. This part of the chapter analyses Indonesia’s chosen policy 
and the implications of the interactions between the independent variable (external 
environment), and the intervening variable (domestic environment) for the outcome of 
Indonesia’s external human rights policies during the period when Indonesia as an 
independent state already had a functioning policy under “Parliamentary Democracy,” and  
“Guided Democracy”.  It also explains the reasons behind Sukarno’s denunciation of Western 
human rights discourses after Indonesia had previously implemented them. 
 
3.2 Neoclassical Realism “Domestic Power Structure-Leader’s Perception” 
Model 
 
In this chapter, the neoclassical realism model will be used to explore: 1) why 
Indonesia, in the beginning, decided to embrace the Western discourse on human rights; 2) 
why, from 1955, it chose to introduce a third world version of human rights despite the 
existence of the 1948 UDHR; and 3) why Sukarno’s human rights policy seems to be at odds 
with the Western discourse on human rights, particularly during the 1957-1965 period. Such 
questions are crucial as Indonesia, though initially adhering to the UN 1948 UDHR, had not 
previously indicated strong human rights roots as understood in the Western sense. The 
research explores the extent to which these policy developments can be explained by the 
interplay of Indonesia’s external and internal environments, as expected by neoclassical 
realism. 
  
As in neorealism analysis, the external/structural constraints and opportunities faced 
by Indonesia at the time will be the primary focus. The constraints and opportunities here can 
firstly be seen in terms of the relations among major powers:  the UK and US’ relations with 
their allies, namely the Netherlands, and the rivalry between the US, PRC and USSR. 
Secondly, it can be seen in the changing relative power capabilities of the major powers: the 
demise of the British Empire, the establishment of the US and USSR as superpowers, and the 
rise of the PRC. Finally, constraints and opportunities also can be found in the relations of the 
major powers with Indonesia: the UK and the Netherlands’ non-compromising behaviour 
towards Indonesia, the US’ changing positions towards Indonesia at various times, and 
Indonesia’s relations with the USSR and PRC. 
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Unlike neorealism, neoclassical realism does not assume that external constraints or 
opportunities directly translate into policy but, rather, they are first filtered by domestic 
(internal) and individual variables. Here, domestic variables are comprised of domestic power 
structure and leaders perceptions as the possible intervening variables. Domestic power 
structure can be conceived as the internal structure in which state institutions, elites and 
societal actors within society operate in affecting policy choices. In complementing the 
domestic power structure variable, the perceptions of leaders, especially those leaders who 
managed to become the most influential figures in Indonesia’s domestic power structure, also 
will be presented. Consequently, in contrast to neorealism, neoclassical realism allows for an 
explanation of policy choices that takes into account the role of domestic power structures 
and leaders’ perceptions in interpreting external factors.  
 
In this regard, neoclassical realism theory may be useful in explaining whether 
Indonesia’s behaviour displays an anomaly or a deviation from neorealist assumptions. 
During the first phase (1945-1950), if seen from neorealism’s perspective, Indonesia’s 
nationalist group, as a political entity, was faced with high external pressure from Western 
powers (as part of the systemic constraints of a pro-colonial international system dominated 
by Western powers) to accept its pre-WWII status as a Dutch colony in the East Indies. This 
means, according to neorealist assumptions, Indonesia should remain as a Dutch colony, a 
position endorsed by a majority of Western powers at the time, despite Indonesia’s 
proclaimed de-facto independence, and such a condition can be interpreted as Indonesia’s 
nationalist group’s bandwagoning behaviour with the Western powers should Indonesia have 
chosen to do so. Yet, Indonesia’s history showed that Indonesia’s nationalist group displayed 
behaviour which was against such assumptions of neorealism and pursued, instead, a creative 
balancing strategy against the Western powers and their allies through the instrumental usage 
of democracy and human rights discourse for its national struggle and recognition of its 
independence cause. Here, the reason for Indonesia’s anomalous/deviant behaviour, 
neoclassical realism posits, could be due to the effect of internal variables (domestic power 
structure and leader’s perception) in affecting policy choices in response to its external 
constraints, hence validating neoclassical realism. 
 
In the second phase (1950-1966), Indonesia as an independent state had faced a more 
balanced external environment during the Cold War. In this regard, after Indonesia gained its 
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full independence and was recognised by major powers in 1949, the battle for influence by 
the major powers during the Cold War had also been influential in Indonesia’s policy 
choices. Indonesia, at this stage, faced a perplexing policy choice as Indonesia seemed to 
have expediently moved from bandwagoning with the Western bloc, symbolised by its pro-
Western democracy practice and respect for human rights during 1950-1955, to balancing the 
Western bloc, as seen in its anti-Western democracy and human rights violations during 
1956-1966. According to Indonesia’s behaviour at this stage, Kenneth Waltz’s claim that 
neorealism is a theory of international politics and not of foreign policy is most pertinent and 
highlights its shortcomings to providing a useful explanation.
1
 Neorealism is restricted to 
“shape and shove” analysis since, despite the prominence of an external imperative, the 
actual policy choices are made by the states themselves and entail systemic punishments 
should those states wrongly choose policies.
2
 Such a premise clearly shows neorealism’s 
limitation in analysing Indonesia’s abrupt shift in terms of policy choice. Neoclassical 
realism is more appropriate as a tool of analysis to discern Indonesia’s policy shift as it 
allows for attention to be given to Indonesia’s internal domestic power structure and its 
leaders’ perceptions, which may have been influential in affecting Indonesia’s abrupt shift in 
human rights policy. Accordingly, Indonesia’s defiant behaviour during “Guided 
Democracy” to go against the Western powers and to confront their spread of “free world” 
democracy and human rights can, again, be traced through the neoclassical realism approach. 
 
3.3 1945-1950: National Struggle and the Foundation of Indonesia’s Human 
Rights Policy 
 
This section explores Indonesia’s external and domestic environment which was 
perceived and interpreted by decision-makers during the national struggle and state-making 
stage. It examines the systemic constraints faced by Indonesian nationalist leaders and how, 
during the post-WWII period, leaders developed their conception of the state and their early 
understanding of human rights. It also discusses the adjustment process after contact had been 
made with the external version of human rights that was foreign to Indonesia. Then it will 
explore the historical narrative from the neoclassical realist perspective and consider whether 
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the interplay between the external and internal factors indeed explains Indonesia’s policy 
shift or continuation.  
 
3.3.1 The State Making Process  
 
After the Japanese surrendered in August 1945, the international system was in a 
transitional phase from a colonial structure to a decolonised one and this continued from the 
ending of WWII to the beginning of the Cold War.
3
 The allied forces, at this stage, began 
reclaiming Japanese-occupied territories inclusive of the previously occupied Dutch-Indies 
by disarming the Japanese troops in the area.
4
  In South East Asia this process was assigned 
to the British forces under Admiral Mountbatten of the South East Asian Command (SEAC).
5
 
Here, great colonial powers seemed determined to retain their colonies.
6
 Yet, former colonies 
were also provided with an opportunity for their national struggles within the Cold War’s 
ideological battle (communist versus non-communist) in the sub-region, symbolised by the 
first Indo-China war in Vietnam.
7
 As Indonesia was a former Netherland’s colony, only to be 
replaced by a brief period of Japanese military rule (1942-1945), the Japanese defeat had 
opened up an opportunity for the Indonesian nationalist group to pursue its right to self-
determination against the return of colonial power.  
 
In this context, Sukarno, as the most revered figure in Indonesia’s nationalist struggle, 
alongside a group of nationalist leaders at the time, used the opportunity to initiate 
Indonesia’s proclamation of independence from its former status as a Dutch colony on 17 
August 1945. Sukarno’s charisma and influence rose above the rest because his qualities are 
vital for Indonesia’s struggle especially as Indonesia during the period relied heavily on the 
“solidarity makers” type of leaders instead of the “administrators” to cultivate a sense of 
unity and nationalism.
8
 Soon after, Indonesia’s organisation of the state was established based 
on UUD 1945. Sukarno was unanimously appointed by the Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat 
(KNIP) as the first President of the Republic of Indonesia and Muhammad Hatta, a Dutch 
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educated scholar as well as Sukarno’s close adviser, became Indonesia’s first Vice President.
9
 
The KNIP was a body that originated from Japanese’s sponsored body known as Badan 
Penyelidik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPUPKI) or Dokuritsu Junbi Chōsa-
kai and it was a symbol of Japanese collaboration with Sukarno and Hatta.
10
 The BPUPKI, a 
body set up to prepare for the possibility of Indonesia’s independence, facilitated a number of 
Sukarno’s views and perceptions, such as the formulation of Pancasila (national ideology) 
and Sukarno’s input on the formulation of UUD 1945 as Indonesia’s first state constitution. 
Later, the BPUPKI was transformed into Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI) 




In formulating the UUD 1945, the July 1945 session of a BPUPKI meeting showed 
the two main streams of opinion which had surfaced with regards to human rights. The first 
stream was Sukarno and Raden Supomo’s line of argument which favoured an 
‘integralistic/organic’ concept of the state for Indonesia. Supomo was a legal expert who later 
became the appointed Minister of Justice within Sukarno’s presidential cabinet in 1945. In 
their traditionalist view, the Indonesian state-society-individual relationship should be 
harmonious since the state is viewed as a natural extension of society, and the society is a 
natural extension of the individual. Hence, the state, society and individual are not viewed to 
be in conflict with each other as one does not violate the other and, thus, individual protection 
is not deemed necessary.
12
 Sukarno and Supomo also argued that the unitary state should be a 
centralised one and the practice of democracy and respect of human rights should also take 
into consideration the importance of indigenous norms. According to them, this could be 
done through the incorporation of the traditional/cultural concepts of Kekeluargaan (family 
values), Musyawarah (consensus/deliberation) and Gotong Royong (traditional concept of 
working together to attain a certain goal) within the democratic framework of the republic 




The second stream was Hatta and Muhammad Yamin’s more westernised opinion. 
Like Supomo, Yamin was another legal expert who would later serve as Minister of Justice. 
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Yamin was more vocal than Hatta in the debate as he said that the constitution (or the UUD 
1945) needed to have an explicit guarantee of human rights.
14
 The absence of such a 
guarantee, according to Yamin, would be a “Grondwettelijke fout” or mistake in the basic 
norm (constitution) and this would be a grave sin for the Indonesian people as they had 
suffered in their struggle against colonialism in order to have their rights acknowledged.
15
 
Hatta, like Yamin, stressed the importance of at least an article in the UUD 1945 which 
would accord people the right to voice their aspirations.
16
 According to Hatta, the 
government established in Indonesia should have a limitation of authority over the executive, 
a more decentralised government and a more explicit individual human rights guarantee to be 
inserted in the UUD 1945.
17
 Hatta was also critical in his perception of the political rights of 
the Indonesian citizens by stating that every individual was equal in rights and they should be 




This resulted in the compromise where human rights were implied in the UUD 1945 
but with the domination of Sukarno and Supomo’s line of arguments which favoured a 
feudalistic-authoritarian governing system.
19
 It is important to note that Sukarno had an anti-
Western tone, especially towards the inclusion of individual protection of human rights, 
particularly civil and political rights, in Indonesia’s UUD 1945 constitution. Sukarno held the 
view that a state based on family values such as cooperation and harmony would be 
preferable for Indonesia.
20
 For example, Sukarno stated that:  
 
Respectable gents! We demand social justice….if we want to truly make the 
foundation of our state rested on family values, the service of one another, 
gotong royong ideology, and social justice then abolish each thought, each 
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Consequently, the human rights clauses and protections included in UUD 1945 
appeared to be symbolic as a result of the compromise reached earlier and the urgent manner 
in which the constitution was formed.
22
 For example, human rights for Indonesian citizens 
were mentioned in the UUD 1945 from Articles 27 to 34, encapsulating freedom of religion, 
rights to associate and assemble, educational rights, rights to equal treatment, economic rights 
and others.
23
 However, according to UUD 1945, only rights which were considered to benefit 
the collective or society in general would be granted protection by the state. This left liberal-
individualistic rights to be regulated by weaker legal institutions such as the parliament or the 
government, or simply to be rejected. Article 28 of the original formulation of the UUD 1945 
was illustrative of such points, including freedoms of expression, assembly and association, 
which were rooted mainly in the Western tradition. However, they would not be granted 





Also important to note is that, due to the domination of Sukarno and Soepomo in the 
original formulation of the UUD 1945 and the warring condition in which the state was 
formed, Indonesia was initially a unitary state with a strong presidential system that was 
derived from an “integralistic/organic” state concept which embodies the President as the 
father-figure of the nation. This means that, although there were democratic institutions and 
the separation of powers of the executive, the legislative and the judiciary, the President’s 
position, according to UUD 1945, was privileged with an overriding dominance over other 
state apparatuses and institutions in order for the President to have complete manoeuvrability 
over state decision-making processes in a state of emergency.
25
 Thus, based on the UUD 
1945, the making of policies was exclusively at the President’s disposal with almost no 
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3.3.2 The Contact with the Western Powers  
 
In spite of Indonesia’s unilateral proclamation of its independence and the early 
development of Indonesia’s domestic politics, the Netherlands and the major powers (the UK 
and US) initially did not recognise Indonesia’s sovereign status or its leaders. Indeed, after 
the August 1945 proclamation, UK forces arrived in the East Indies in September 1945 to 
reinstate colonial authority.
27
 Although the UK managed to carry out its mission to dismantle 
the Japanese troops and release the prisoners of war with considerable success, they failed to 
maintain an orderly transition for the Netherlands to reinstate its East Indies colony.
28
 When 
the UK finally transferred control to the Netherlands under the Netherlands Indies Civil 




In order to curb the situation, NICA had to apply two “policing” actions against the 
Republican forces: one in July 1947 and another in December 1948.
30
 The “policing” action 
was a way for NICA to launch a covert military campaign against the Republican forces to 
avoid any external interference. Hence, the term “policing” was used to make the world 
community believe that the clash between NICA and the Republican forces was an internal 
civil-strife situation within the Netherlands’ colony and an internal NICA matter which could 
be solved through NICA’s police institution. The real reason for such “policing” actions, 
however, was to annihilate the republican–nationalist forces and to force the Indonesian 




In accompanying such a strategy, NICA also declared to the international community 
that the new Republic of Indonesia was a Japanese puppet state while its leaders were 
Japanese collaborators and, hence, Indonesia’s self-proclaimed independence should not be 
recognised by the international community.
32
 According to such accusations, recognising the 
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Republic of Indonesia’s independent status would be counterproductive to the interests of 
Western powers in the region as Indonesia was prone to becoming a fascist regime.
33
 Such 
accusations managed to influence the UK and US to become the Netherlands’ main allies as 
demonstrated in their refusal to engage Sukarno and Hatta in negotiations.
34
 In 
complementing such a strategy, NICA also attempted to create its own puppet federal state 




At first, Indonesia tried to maintain its sovereignty through military means. However, 
as the combined military power of the UK and the Netherlands was overwhelming for 
Indonesia’s sporadic guerrilla attacks, Indonesians began focusing their strength on 
negotiating strategies. In this regard, Sutan Syahrir became an important figure for 
Indonesia’s nationalist struggle. Syharir was a Dutch-educated intellectual, anti-Japanese and 
the initiator of the Partai Sosial Indonesia (PSI).  Syahrir, who had a sympathetic perception 
of Western powers, for example, managed to persuade Sukarno and Hatta that Indonesia had 
to cater to some extent to the Netherland and Western power interests as Syahrir was once 
noted to have said “Without allies we in Indonesia cannot maintain our existence…This is 




Thus, in order to negotiate with NICA, Syahrir recommended that the presidential 
cabinet headed by Sukarno and based on UUD 1945 be disbanded and that KNIP should form 
its own cabinet with the head of KNIP (Syahrir himself) as the head of government to lead 
the negotiation process. 
37
 Sukarno and Hatta, as the appointed President and Vice President 
within a presidential cabinet system and the central power holders based on the UUD 1945, 
agreed to Syahrir’s demand since Syahrir was the acceptable figure for negotiations for NICA 
and the major powers. This agreement resulted in crucial domestic changes.
38
 In agreement 
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with Syahrir, Sukarno said that “we set up the Republic because we love democracy…in that 
we raise our voice to the democracy-loving nations and to nations which have the 
responsibility in world peace, so that the Republic can be recognised.”
39
Hatta and Syahrir 
then remodelled Indonesia’s domestic environment based on Western democratic systems 




Hatta and Syahrir advocated for the establishment of democratic institutions through 
two crucial political manoeuvres which would alter Indonesia’s domestic power structure by 
establishing a parliamentary cabinet, headed by Syahrir, to replace the presidential cabinet 
headed by Sukarno. The first was a presidential decree known as Maklumat X signed by 
Muhammad Hatta in October 1945, in Sukarno’s absence. The decree indicated the 
government’s approval of party politics and party dynamics in the parliament and encouraged 
the creation of new parties.
41
 The second was Syahrir’s “silent coup” in November 1945 
which suggested that the members of the parliament of Indonesia should no longer be 
appointed by the President but they should, instead, be proposed by the parties and thus 
would provide the parliament with legislative powers.
42
 This manoeuvre also catapulted 
Syahrir’s position as the head of the parliament (KNIP) above Sukarno and Hatta, as he 
would then be appointed as the first Prime Minister (a government position that was not 
mentioned in the UUD 1945), to spearhead negotiations with the Netherlands and Western 
powers. 
 
As Prime Minister, Syahrir’s perception was influential at this stage. Regarding the 
major powers, Syahrir said: 
 
Indonesia is geographically situated within the sphere of influence of Anglo 
Saxon capitalism and imperialism… [There exists] the possibility for us to 
obtain a new position which fits in with the wishes of the mighty Pacific 
power of the USA.
43
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The US had provided the Netherlands with $US506 million assistance as part of the Marshall 
Plan.
44
 In contrast to the UK’s declining major power status, the US Marshall Plan, in 
supporting post WW-II Europe in general and the Netherlands in particular, indicated the 
increasing power status of the US and its influence worldwide. Syahrir’s decisions brought 
Indonesia closer to the interests of the colonising powers and the major powers. 
 
In response, a number of leftist Indonesian leaders viewed such pro-West concessions 
given by Sukarno, Syahrir and Hatta as a betrayal of the Indonesian revolution by conceding 
too much to the colonial powers’ demands. Tan Malaka, a leftist figure who revived the 
Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) after the party was heavily suppressed during Netherland’s 
rule, wanted the newly born republic to avoid any collaboration with the imperialist and 
capitalist Western Bloc states, and instead encouraged and invited the support of Eastern Bloc 
states for Indonesia’s independence.
45
 He then created the Persatuan Perjuangan (United 
Struggle Front/popular front) to challenge the central government in 1946 by demanding that 
Syahrir, as the Prime Minister, step down. Tan Malaka, for example, was quoted to have said 
that “...the struggle until the departure of the last enemy was replaced by a tactic of 
concessions in order to make peace with the enemy.”
46
Tan Malaka’s strong resistance, 
though subdued, ultimately led to Syahrir’s stepping down as Prime Minister in 1946.  
 
Later on, when Hatta served as Prime Minister in 1948 after Amir Syarifudin’s 
resignation (Amir Syarifudin was the successor of Syahrir as Prime Minister), another leftist 
figure named Musso, as the head of PKI, would further pose challenges to Hatta’s policy by 
making the Madiun city in East Java “Indonesia’s Moscow”.
47
 Such a move was viewed as 
the movement’s preference for Indonesia to align itself with the USSR. Musso demanded that 
Sukarno and Hatta, who he referred to as “slaves of Japanese and Americans,” should step 
down, only to be replaced by him as the President and Amir Syarifudin as Prime Minister. 
However, the movement was unsuccessful as Hatta, who was the Prime Minister after 
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Syahrir, ordered a military crackdown to neutralise the rebellious movement and Musso was 
killed during the process.
48
   
 
 
3.3.3 The Success of Maintaining Independence and Human Rights  
 
Such domestic developments within the republic had tremendous repercussions for 
the policies of Western powers as the US would now view Indonesia’s domestic adherence to 
Western human rights and democracy discourses as legitimate and began to view Indonesia 
as a potential democracy and ally which needed to be defended against the Netherland’s 
aggression.
49
 This can be seen in the Congress of Industrial Organisation (CIO)’s letter to the 
US State Department in referring to Indonesia’s national struggle as a “quest for democratic 
self-rule”.
50
 Meanwhile, US Congress also began pressuring the White House to sanction the 
Netherlands’ aggression against the republic. US Congressman, Senator Morse, pressured the 
Netherlands on the grounds that: 
 
We necessarily thereby have been helpful to the Dutch government in 
carrying out its violations of what I consider to be one of the most basic 
principles of the UN Charter, the pledge that we would seek at least to 
protect the interests of the people in the world who sought to make a fight 




Meanwhile, during the period of 1946-1949, the US government was also applauding 
Indonesia’s nationalist movement successes in subduing the leftist movements of both Tan 
Malaka and Musso. After the nationalist group’s ability to overcome the leftist movements 
and after the second NICA’s policing action in 1948, the US began to think that if they had 
not sided with the Indonesian nationalist group then there would have been an open 
possibility for Indonesia to fall to communism, as had happened in Vietnam. 
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Yet at almost the same time, in December 1948, the UDHR was established by the 
UN in an attempt to prevent the repetition of the human tragedy of WWII.
52
 The UN 
declaration was an important document because its existence had made Indonesian leaders 
also consider the issue of human rights as a means to an end.
53
 For example, Sukarno and 
Soepomo had changed their perception of human rights after the establishment of the UDHR. 
Sukarno and Soepomo saw this as an opportunity for Indonesia’s independence to be 
acknowledged by the world at large and thus they had become more progressive in accepting 
such human rights.
54
Such a change in perception had also strengthened Syahrir’s negotiating 
and compromising strategy with the Netherlands and Western powers because Indonesia was 




As a result, by late 1948, after the second NICA policing action, Indonesia’s domestic 
manoeuvres had successfully facilitated the US position to become favourable towards 
recognising Indonesian sovereignty. This could be seen in Indonesia’s rising status as an 
independent and sovereign entity, which was increasingly being recognised by the colonial 
powers, as demonstrated by the agreements held between the Netherlands and Indonesia with 
Western powers’ involvement.
56
 Under heavy pressure by the international community, 
including the US, the Netherlands was finally forced to transfer sovereignty to the nationalist 
group.
57
 In 1949, for example, the US was making significant reductions to the amount of 
financial aid provided to the Netherlands, and the Netherlands had little choice but to agree to 




However, despite Indonesia’s rising status and the possible transfer of sovereignty, 
the Netherlands managed to influence Indonesian leaders to formally abandon its original 
UUD 1945 and such influence was cemented in 1949 through the Round Table Conference 
(RTC) Agreement in The Hague.
59
 Such continuing external influences manifested in the 
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 The  writing of Indonesia’s 1949 RUSI Constitution in light of the Round Table Agreement had maintained the 
UDHR 1948 articles almost in their entirety (p.98) and the reasoning was for practical ends by which it was 
expedient for Indonesia at the time to adopt a Western constitutional form in Feith, 1962, op.cit., p.43. 
56
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57







Netherland’s push for the creation of a combined government structure between the Republic 
of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands known as “Uni Indonesia-Netherland”.  
This resulted in a condition where Indonesia must agree that its constitution be approved by 
both sides as part of the transfer of authority requirements mentioned in the 1949 RTC 
Agreement. Once again, Indonesia under Prime Minister Hatta agreed to the granting of 
domestic concessions to the Netherlands and Western powers. This is shown in Indonesia’s 
formal abandonment of its UUD 1945 and the introduction of the new UU RIS 1949, or 





As Indonesia’s further concessions demonstrated, the Netherlands was able to 
influence the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia in two ways.
61
 Firstly, as part of the 
1949 RTC Agreement, the Netherlands forced the Republic of Indonesia to incorporate a 
form of federalism and a Western-democratic system into the sovereign entity of Indonesia.
62
 
This was exemplified in Indonesia’s agreement to make a change in the structure of the state 
from the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, based on UUD 1945, to the Republic of 
the United States of Indonesia (RUSI) as a form of federalism and part of the consequences in 
adopting the UU RIS 1949.
63
 Secondly, the Netherlands left the issue of West Papua (also 
known as Western New Guinea by the Netherlands and UK) to be settled in due course, 
which implied that not all of the former Netherland-East Indies territory was immediately 
given to the RUSI. The agreement stated that New Guinea would remain status quo (under 
the Netherland’s rule) and the Netherlands and Indonesia would settle the matter peacefully 
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By agreeing to such terms, Indonesia’s domestic human rights policy was 
significantly changed. In particular, the 1949 RIS constitution was equipped with significant 
provisions based on Western individual protection of human rights as part of the Netherlands’ 
de facto and de jure recognition of the RUSI. This created the first shift in Indonesia’s human 
rights policies from the ones sourced by the UUD 1945 to the ones based on the new UU RIS 
1949 which was more democratic and liberal, with a constitutional guarantee of civil and 
political rights protection as understood in the Western sense. In practice, due to the 
abandonment and, later, replacement of UUD 1945, human rights during the 1945-1949 
period was highly respected because Sukarno (as the President) and Syahrir, Amir 
Syarifuddin and Hatta (as consecutive Prime Ministers) were endorsing Indonesia to become 
a democracy. This can be seen in their concerted efforts for the establishment of numerous 
political parties during the period, with freedoms of association, expression and to demand 




3.3.4 Neorealism and Neoclassical Realism Analysis 
 
During this phase, according to neorealism assumptions, the external constraints 
provided mostly by hegemonic powers would be translated automatically to foreign policy 
because domestic environment was treated as a “black box”.
66
 This means that the national 
interests of states are determined by the systemic structure, since the primary interest of states 
will be to seek ways to survive within the given power structure of the system. Neorealism 
also assumes that states, as a unit, behave in a logical and rational manner and that, even 
though states are left to their own discretion in deciding policy options, namely to balance or 





However, Indonesia’s state status at the time fitted with the characteristics of the 
state-building stage of a third world country and former colony due to the “unstable, 
dangerous, and often fatal nature of the international and domestic political environment”
68
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that it faced. In this environment, “the state is especially vulnerable because many different 
groups and individuals seek to control it”.
69
 Hence, neorealism’s assumption that states 
behave rationally and as a unitary actor was challenged by the existence of severe divisions 
and groupings in the East Indies territory, between Indonesia’s republican-nationalist group 
on the one hand and the Dutch colonial state on the other which were still competing in terms 
of authority, legitimacy and the monopoly of violence.
70
 In this respect, neoclassical realism 
is more applicable to Indonesia’s condition as it has the potential to analyse the state in its 
formation stage through the opening of the “black box” in its analysis, as well as retaining a 
strong focus on the importance of external factors. Thus neoclassical realism can 
accommodate a third world state’s condition in which third world leaders not only face 




In short, within the given external power structure, neorealism can only suggest that 
Indonesia could either accept its status as a Netherlands colony (by bandwagoning), as in the 
cases of Malaya and Singapore as UK colonies, with the hope that independence will be 
gradually given, or pursue its independence cause against the UK and Netherlands’ colonial 
forces (by balancing) which would bear heavy consequences. The consequences of 
Indonesia’s early balancing act was disastrous, as demonstrated by the republic’s military 
defeats shown in the UK-republican military clashes of 1945-1946 and the two Netherland-
republican military clashes in 1947 and 1948. Yet, Indonesia seemed to engage in another 
balancing strategy to maintain its independence and was not punished by the system but 
instead rewarded with independence recognition in 1949. 
 
By incorporating neorealism’s emphasis on systemic constraints, neoclassical 
realism’s “domestic power structure-leader’s perception” model and Steven David’s 
“omnibalancing” analysis provide more insightful approaches to the Indonesian context. 
Here, the external constraints faced by Indonesia at the time were the military pressures of 
Western powers and NICA to force Indonesia to accept its status as a colony of the 
Netherlands and their accusation of Indonesia’s potential as a Japanese puppet state should 
independence be pursued. In responding to such constraints, a combination of bandwagoning 




 Ayoob, 2002, op.cit., pp.42-5  and 1991, pp.266-7.  
71
 Lobell, 2009, op.cit., pp.43-4. 
74 
 
and internal balancing seems to have been applied through Indonesia’s appeasing and 
emulating strategies, rather than a simple bandwagoning behaviour as normally displayed by 
weak states in dealing with great powers. Appeasing/aligning refers to the condition where 
the “state brings its policies into close cooperation with another state in order to achieve 
mutual security goals”
72
 while emulating a means to voluntarily imitate the governing 




This resulted in a form of internal balancing behaviour through appeasement of a 
secondary threat (the US) so that Indonesia could focus its resources on its primary threat 
within its domestic environment (NICA) in order to acquire independence recognition.
74
 This 
can be seen in Indonesia’s attempt at disassociation from the Japanese, intended to show that 
Indonesia was indeed a democracy-in-the-making. This was also demonstrated by the 
abandonment of the UUD 1945 and the establishment of a parliamentary cabinet with the 
position of Prime Minister, the crushing of two domestic communist movements, and the 
giving of concessions in the RTC agreement which were favourable to the Western powers’ 
interests, particularly the US.
75
 Indonesia’s behaviour was also in line with Stephen Walt’s 
neoclassical realist “balance of threat” argument where states do not balance against the most 




From the perspective of neoclassical realism, such a deviation in Indonesia’s domestic 
power structure (from a presidential cabinet system with less concern for human rights to a 
Western parliamentary system with more concern for human rights) can be understood as a 
deliberate domestic policy in response to external constraints that targeted an international 
audience to serve Indonesia’s independence recognition interests. Such a strategy resulted in 
the first shift of Indonesia’s human rights policy, as demonstrated by the abandonment of 
UUD 1945 to the adoption of the UU RIS 1949, especially as the UUD 1945 formulation 
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The reason that Indonesia pursued such a strategy can be traced using neoclassical 
realism’s “leader’s perception-domestic power structure” analysis. By analysing the condition 
of Indonesia’s domestic power structure at the time, the research finds that the Indonesian 
state apparatus and institutions, party coalition and other domestic societal forces were not 
yet developed and were very loose, due to the early stage of Indonesia’s post-colonial state 
formation, the imperfection of the UUD 1945 formulation (which was written in a hurried 
manner) and the existence of the state of emergency. Such domestic condition places 
whoever holds the top seat of the executive, either as the President or Prime Minister, in the 
driving seat of the whole state affairs, such as deciding on the forms of government and 
interpreting external constraints. This can be seen in Sukarno’s preference for a Presidential 
cabinet to deal with the Japanese forces and Syahrir and Hatta’s preference for a 
parliamentary cabinet to deal with the Netherlands forces. As a result of such personalised 
rule, leaders’ figures and perceptions, particularly within the executive branch, became 
crucial intervening variables in deciding which policy to pursue, and the leader’s perception 
of the state’s relative power distribution within the state system and their personal view of 
human rights were the ones that mattered the most. Thus, Indonesia’s human rights policy as 
part of Indonesia’s strategy to engage the Western powers at the time was heavily reliant on 
the leaders’ perceptions of whether the state was strong or weak in terms of relative power 
distribution, as well as the perceptions of leaders in endorsing traditional or pro-West human 
rights policy. 
 
Such research findings are also reinforced by the tremendous impact of external 
constraints on Indonesia’s loose domestic power structure and the formation of its leadership. 
For example, the success of the Netherlands in influencing Western powers to believe that 
Indonesia was a fascist state and Japanese puppet caused Sukarno’s top position within the 
domestic power structure, as guaranteed by UUD 1945, to be severely weakened. This 
condition allowed the rise of Western-oriented figures such as Syahrir and Hatta to easily 
claim the head of government position as Prime Ministers, as Syahrir and Hatta were the 
acceptable democratic figures for the Netherlands and Western powers to negotiate with. This 
resulted in the dominance of Syahrir and Hatta’s perceptions (inclusive of their human rights 
and democracy perceptions) over Sukarno in policy-making and it was their perceptions 
which mattered at this stage in deciding Indonesia’s balancing or bandwagoning behaviour. 
Based on their perceptions, which were more Western-oriented than Sukarno, Syahrir and 
76 
 
Hatta then decided on an ‘appeasement and emulating’ strategy in engaging the Western 
powers. 
  
Thus, it was mainly due to a combination of external and internal concerns and the 
existence of the UDHR that the concept of human rights, as understood in the Western sense, 
was utilised by the nationalist movement to serve the independence cause and was cemented 
in the adoption of the UU RIS 1949 to replace the UUD 1945.
78
 This resulted in Indonesia’s 
short fling with Western human rights discourse, as demonstrated by the liberal democratic 
system and human rights clauses of the UU RIS 1949. Hatta and Syahrir’s chosen strategy 
also meant a victory for the rightist movements over the traditionalist and leftist proponents, 
and a victory over Sukarno’s strong presidential model as stipulated in the UUD 1945.  
 
3.4 1950-1966: The Shift from Liberal to Guided Democracy 
 
  This section discusses Indonesia’s practice and later suspension of democracy during 
the 1950s and 1960s. The historical survey explores the changes in Indonesia’s external 
environment and domestic politics as well as their implications for Indonesia’s human rights 
policy. This section focuses on the interactions between the independent variables (of the 
external environment), and the intervening variables (of the domestic environment) and how 
they influenced Indonesia’s human rights policies during the period of Parliamentary 
Democracy and Guided Democracy. 
 
3.4.1 A Liberal Indonesia 
 
 After Indonesia gained complete independence, the most significant turn of events in 
Indonesia’s external environment to have a direct impact on Indonesia was Mao Zedong’s 
success in establishing the PRC in October 1949. This event resulted in the rising PRC 
influence as well as the strengthening of the Communist Bloc’s presence in the region, with 
the PRC confirming its alliance with the USSR through a signed agreement in February 
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 The ramifications of such an arrangement could be immediately felt in the region as 
the proxy wars of the Cold War between the two blocs ensued. This is demonstrated by the 
Korean War (1950-53) and the first Taiwan crisis (1954-55).
80
  At this stage, Indonesia’s 
strategic importance to China was mainly due to Mao’s perception of Indonesia as an 
“intermediate zone” (zhongjian didai) or part of a buffer between the two superpowers 
comprising of “many capitalist, colonial, and semi-colonial countries in Europe, Asia, and 
Africa”.
81
 Sensing that the Communist Bloc might be strengthened by the PRC’s 
establishment, the US under President Eisenhower decided to contain the spread of the 
communist influence in the region by applying “the containment policy” as stipulated in the 
Eisenhower Doctrine for South East Asia. 
82
 The implementation of this policy was 
exemplified in a series of bilateral treaties and multilateral arrangements for security, namely 
the Australia, New Zealand and United States (ANZUS) treaty and the South East Asia 
Treaty Organisation (SEATO), with allies or potential allies in South East Asia and the 
Pacific siding with the US. 
 
Such circumstances increased Indonesia’s strategic position in the eyes of major 
powers. Following Indonesia’s entrance to the UN, the battle of influence between the major 
powers (US and USSR) and the emerging power (PRC) also impacted on Indonesia’s 
‘liberal’ democracy which had begun in 1949 as the direct result of the RTC. As stated 
earlier, the concessions given by Hatta in the RTC agreement led Indonesia to adopt the 
Western-style UU RIS 1949 which was later changed to become the Undang-Undang Dasar 
Sementara 1950 (UUDS 1950). The UUDS 1950 was basically a symbolic replacement of the 
UU RIS 1949 as a sign of the Republic’s discarding of the Netherlands’ colonial influence on 
its constitution. The UUDS 1950, like the UU RIS 1949, was similarly adopted from the 
Western-European constitutional model with significant protection of individual human 
rights, particularly civil and political rights, and thus the Western human rights elements 
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Under the 1950 UUDS Constitution, political parties and civil society in general 
enjoyed significant freedoms to associate, assemble or express their opinions and views, 
while protection of individual freedom and human rights was also guaranteed.
84
 During this 
period civil society was blooming as the number of interest groups and independent 
associations was higher than in any other period in Indonesia’s history.
85
 The emergence of 
the multi-party system also allowed major parties to claim the parliament and major party 
figures to form cabinets. In such a new domestic power structure, Sukarno and Hatta, as the 
President and Vice President under the 1950 UUDS Constitution, respected the democratic 
“rules of the game” by not using coercive means to influence domestic political outcomes.
86
 
During the early developmental stage of liberal democracy, even the Muslim-dominated 
Majelis Syuro Muslim Indonesia or Masyumi party, as well as the PKI, had condoned the 
Western style of ‘parliamentary’ democracy since such a democratic system allowed them to 




In further developments, however, as Indonesia was a democracy and a possible ally, 
the US tried to entice Indonesia’s parliaments and cabinets to support the US’ “communism-
containment” policy in Korea and Indochina.
88
 Such attempts were particularly marked 
during the period of 1951-1952 through aid schemes. Firstly, there was the US-sponsored 
Japanese Peace Treaty incident where the cabinet under the leadership of Prime Minister 
Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, a figure from the Masyumi party, on behalf of Indonesia signed the 
treaty in 1951.
89
 Secondly, there was the Mutual Security Act (MSA) in 1951. The MSA was 
basically a change of emphasis by the US in providing aid for defense support instead of 
economic aid for recovery to South East Asian nations. Covertly, Ahmad Subardjo, as 
Indonesia’s foreign minister at the time, committed Indonesia to such an agreement.
90
  The 
treaty required nations to commit themselves to the expansion of the democratic values and 
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communist containment if they wished to receive economic aid from the US.
91 
Simultaneously, Prime Minister Sukiman’s pro-West foreign policy was coupled with strong 
anti-communist domestic policy, exemplified by his government’s cracking down on the PKI 
movement and the PRC embassy in Jakarta, based on dubious allegations of a coup plot, as a 




At the same time, the USSR and PRC also exerted their influence in Indonesia. This 
influence appeared to be underestimated by Indonesia’s rightist leaders until the PKI started 
to rise again in the 1950s.
93
 The influence of the USSR and PRC was largely manifested in 
the “two stage revolution” approach taken by the leader of PKI, Dipa Nusantara (D.N.) 
Aidit.
94
 With regard to his two stage revolution, Aidit said “the task of the Indonesian 
revolution is to create a people’s government which is not to carry out socialist changes but 
democratic changes.”
95
 Whereas the USSR heavily influenced Aidit’s preference for the PKI 
to strive for a national democracy agenda rather than a socialist one, the PRC would influence 
Aidit’s PKI to seek temporary alliances with nationalist parties against other right wing 




The impact of PKI’s dominance can be clearly seen in a number of government 
policies. For example, the government’s decisions to increase the minimum wage and the 
establishment of a pension scheme, as well as social security for workers, were mainly due to 
PKI support for labour’s right to free speech and the right to associate and organise in 
demanding fairer wages.
97
 This was made possible as the PKI had successfully commanded 
the Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia (SOBSI), the strongest labour union in 
Indonesia at the time with 800,000 to 850,000 members, to oppose a number of the 
government’s initial pro-capitalist labour and wage policies through demonstrations, strikes, 
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blockades and sabotages of strategic industrial sectors. This contributed to the fall of pro-
Western cabinets.
98
 On this note, the PKI stood up as a direct opposition to the pro-Western 
policy of the early cabinets. Aidit stated that: 
 
The first type of ‘neutral’ or ‘independent’ attitude is consciously put 
forward to deceive the people by the agents of imperialism such as the 
right-wing socialist leaders [referring to Syahrir] and the leaders of the 
Masyumi Party [referring to Natsir and Sukiman]. They know that they 
would meet with very strong opposition from the people if they openly 
agreed to war and sided with America. That is why they put on the mask 
of ‘neutrality’ or ‘independence’. In the same way, too, the right-wing 
socialists also speak empty phrases about a ‘neutral’ policy, an 
‘independent’ policy or a ‘third force’ policy in order to conceal their 




At this stage, the seeds of conflict between the major parties, namely the PNI, 
Masyumi, and PKI, began to appear due to external influences. Although at the beginning the 
democratic system had performed relatively well, due to the major powers’ involvement in 
Indonesia’s domestic politics as mentioned earlier, the downturn of the parliamentary 
democracy became evident. This can be detected from the parties’ orientation. For example, 
if seen from PNI’s perspective at the time as a pro government party, the PNI could be seen 
to be representing Indonesia’s middle-nationalistic stand, the Masyumi as representing 
Washington’s stand and the PKI as representing Moscow’s stand.
100
 If this was assumed true, 
then criticisms of the working governments were mostly carrying foreign agendas which, in 
the end, created tension, volatility and a short life span for cabinets (mostly less than a 
year).
101
 This can be seen in the bringing down of the cabinets of Natsir, Sukiman and 
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In spite of the ongoing domestic political rifts among the major parties, the true 
picture of Indonesia’s domestic power structure was drawn in 1955 as Indonesia, under Prime 
Minister Ali Sastroamijoyo, was able to hold its first democratic general election to elect the 
members of the parliament in 1955. The result, however, was unfavourable to the US since, 
despite the fact that the US had poured millions of dollars into supporting the Islamic 
Masyumi party to oppose Sukarno’s nationalist PNI party and the communist PKI party, the 
Masyumi party failed to win the election.
103
 The PNI topped the list, while the PKI 
successfully made it to the first four for the first time in Indonesia’s history. The Masyumi 
party slippage to second place after previously having the majority of seats in the parliament, 
and Syahrir’s PSI party slippage to number five, was indicative of a change in the domestic 
power structure which allowed Sukarno, the PNI and the PKI to exert much more influence 
on the parliament. 
 
3.4.2 Indonesia’s Third World Human Rights Policy  
 
With the major powers’ battles for influence unfolding within its domestic politics, 
Indonesia at the time was also facing a rise in the PRC’s influence and possible major 
powers’ direct military intervention in its immediate neighbourhood, namely Indochina. The 
PRC, meanwhile, seemed to be interested in engaging non-communist third world states such 
as Indonesia after Stalin’s death in March 1953 and the armistice of the Korean War in July 
1953, creating uneasiness for the US.
104
 In response to the major powers’ engagement in 
Indochina, Ali Sastroamidjoyo (as Prime Minister in 1955) managed to create a temporary 
reconciliation between conflicting parties by not dwelling too much on domestic political rifts 
but rather focusing on Indonesia’s external environment. Unlike Hatta and Syahrir, who 
chose to pacify Sukarno, Ali would instead invite Sukarno’s support for his cabinet to ensure 
its survival since the cabinets of his predecessors, namely Natsir, Sukiman and Wilopo, 
without Sukarno’s support, collapsed amid extreme opposition.
105
 After being isolated from 
                                                          
103
 See Pease, 1966.  
104
 Feith, 1962, op.cit., p.385. 
105
 Ibid. The President became the vanguard of the cabinet, as cabinets without presidential protection were 
exposed to extreme oppositions within the parties and were brought down consecutively.  
82 
 
the domestic political power structure since 1946, Sukarno came back to the political scene 




  With Ali and Sukarno’s initiatives, Indonesia began projecting its non-aligned policy 
to deal with the major powers’ involvement in the region. Indonesia’s choice of not siding 
with any of the powers was also due to its domestic experience in entertaining both sides of 
hegemonic power.
107
 The impression left to most of the Indonesian leaders at the time was 
that, if Indonesia leaned too far to the right, domestic oppositions would bring the 
government down (as seen in Natsir and Sukiman’s cabinets), but if it leaned too far to the 
left, a possible coup d’ etat would ensue (namely Tan Malaka and Musso’s attempts to 
overthrow the government).
108
 With support coming from the PKI while Sukarno’s PNI party 
held the majority seat in the parliament, Ali Sastroamijoyo would thus manage to secure such 
non-aligned policy with minimum opposition.  
 
The implementation of Ali’s policy was later initiated at the 1954 Colombo 
meeting.
109
  The meeting indicated that states such as Indonesia, Burma, India, Sri Lanka and 
Pakistan seemed to be more attracted to non-aligned behaviour for their own interests rather 
than in choosing a side in the Cold War. In 1955, these five states invited a number of others 
from Asia and Africa to hold a high-level conference in Bandung, Indonesia, known as the 
Asia-Africa Conference. This conference resulted in a strategic understanding among third 
world leaders in fostering solidarity among third world states to support each state’s right to 
self-determination in the wake of colonialism while affirming the importance of the non-
interference principle in the internal affairs of statehood.
110
 At the same time, the conference 
was used by Indonesia as a venue to promote its depiction of third world rights, which 
elevated state rights over human rights. According to Sukarno: 
 
Completely should the right to self-determination be applied to all 
nations…after the existence of the Atlantic Charter and the UN Declaration of 
Human Rights, colonialism is thus an eye catching anomaly, an anachronism 
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which causes sufferings of millions of mankind. Colonialism is truly human 




In support of Sukarno’s view, Ali Sastroamidjoyo, who was also the President of the 
1955 Asian African Summit in Bandung, claimed that: 
 
The prerequisite of this [peace] is a willingness and determination to live 
together as neighbours, irrespective of each other’s political, social or 
religious ideologies, on the principle of mutual respect of each other’s national 
and each other’s territorial integrity; abhorrence of aggression; non-
interference in each other’s internal affairs; and equality and mutual 
benefit…among the main causes of present day tension is colonialism...in 





The result of Indonesia’s success in exporting Indonesia’s version of third world 
rights to its external environment could be seen in “Dasasila Bandung” as one of the 
important outcomes of the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference. The ten points achieved in the final 
communique of the 1955 Asian-Africa Conference in Bandung showed the third world 




1. Respect for fundamental human rights and for the purposes and principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations. 
2. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all nations. 
3. Recognition of the equality of all races and of the equality of all nations large and 
small. 
4. Abstention from intervention or interference in the internal affairs of another country. 
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In this sense, the conference in Bandung clearly showed Indonesia’s attempt to 
reconstruct the idea of human rights and to combine it with anti-colonial principles.
114
 It also 
strengthened Indonesia’s West Irian claim against the Netherlands’ claim as the issue of West 
Irian had been acknowledged as a colonial residue that needed to be resolved in Indonesia’s 
favour.  At the same time, while the US treated the summit and movement with caution, the 
PRC strategically used its presence at the conference to build its third world credentials and 
to gain affirmation for third world support of its One China policy.
115
 This puts the PRC on a 
strong footing with the Third World, inclusive of Indonesia. Sukarno’s decision to come back 
to Indonesia’s domestic scene also explains Indonesia’s increasingly cordial relations with 
the PRC. In 1955, the PRC’s sympathetic view towards Sukarno’s initiative of fostering the 
Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung was greatly appreciated and the PRC’s behaviour 
throughout the summit seemed supportive of Sukarno’s ideals, inclusive of his “West Irian” 
claims.
116
 In 1956, Sukarno returned the favour by visiting the PRC and, after he returned, 
Sukarno seemed to be idolising the Chinese political system over Indonesia’s parliamentary 
democracy system.
117
   
 
3.4.4 Guided Democracy  
 
After the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung, the Western powers became 
increasingly hostile towards Indonesia and they secretly tried to remove Sukarno from power, 
starting in the late 1950s.
118
 Dwight Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, for example, viewed 
that Sukarno’s choice of a non-alignment policy was “immoral” and, hence, the US 
government labelled the Indonesian government at the time as communist sympathisers. 
According to the US government’s position, Indonesia needed to be “evaluated and 
actioned”.
119
 An attempt at this was demonstrated by US covert support for the Pemerintahan 
Revolusioner Republik Indonesia-Perjuangan Semesta (PRRI-PERMESTA) rebellion in 
1957-1958, which revolved around the domestic conflict of interests between the central 
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government in Java and the outer islands, such as Sulawesi and Sumatra, which turned into a 
full scale secessionist movement. For example, there was covert US military assistance to the 
rebellious movement and this was followed by UK, Taiwan, South Korea,  the Philippines 
and organized support from political entities in the Malayan Peninsula including from areas 
that would later on become Singapore.
120
 To solidify the proof further, an American ‘soldier 





The impact of such direct external interferences in Indonesia’s domestic politics was 
that many of the former “right-wing” nationalist leaders, mainly from the Masyumi and PSI 
parties, were implicated in the secessionist movement.
122
 This caused the parliament and a 
majority of the big parties to lose credibility in the eyes of the Indonesian citizens because 
many of their members and figureheads were allegedly supporters of the rebels.
123
  The army 
enacted a state of emergency due to the full scale PRRI-PERMESTA secessionist movement 
and such a move managed to strengthen the army’s position in the central government and 
the region.
124
 In this regard, General Abdul Haris Nasution, as the army’s chief of staff, stated 
that parliamentary democracy and the party system would only create instability and 
secession attempts, or as Nasution put it, “chaos”.
125
 Earlier, on 17 October 1952, Nasution 
was also known to have staged a military showdown to dissolve the parliament in Jakarta, 
only to be denied by Sukarno himself.
126
 By the late 1950s, rather than reinstating Indonesia’s 
democracy, Nasution had hinted to the Western powers that he preferred to use the military to 




Another problem faced in terms of human rights development at the time was 
concerning the dysfunctionality of the Konstituante. Initially, the parliament and Sukarno had 
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endorsed the formation of a democratically elected Konstituante as the body responsible for 
drafting a new constitution.  However, the members of Konstituante had been extremely 
divisive in deciding what to include and what not to include in the formulation of human 
rights provisions, as Islamists, Liberalists, Communists, Nationalists and 
Traditionalist/Collectivists were instead engaged in a battle of influence among themselves in 
formulating the rights of Indonesian citizens.
128
 Such heated debate lasted for almost two 
years with no results and, hence, delayed the much-needed human rights protection which 




Sensing that US interference in Indonesia’s domestic politics had increased 
significantly and the Konstituante could not provide a timely constitutional solution for 
Indonesia’s fragile democracy, Sukarno launched a Presidential Decree in July 1959 as to 
what he believed to be a way of salvaging the republic from becoming a failed state. The 
decree suggested that, due to the incapability of Konstituante to formulate a new constitution 
in a timely manner and the state of emergency, Indonesia would re-enact its UUD 1945. 
According to Sukarno: 
 
Liberalism poisons our social conscience…individualism fractures and 
distances the cohesiveness of all our unity…I do not regret that on 5 July 1959 
I issued a Presidential Decree…Guided Democracy is a family-value 





This would also serve as a sign of the second shift in Indonesia’s human rights policy from a 
policy based on the UUDS 1950 as a precursor to Western liberal democracy back to the one 
based on the UUD 1945 as an entry point to Guided Democracy. 
 
  Accordingly, Sukarno began to make domestic reforms. Instead of being nominated 
by parties, members of the House of Representatives (DPR) and the People’s Consultative 
Assembly (MPR) would now be appointed by the President, in favour of the PKI and the 
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 Party politics also were replaced by Sukarno’s preferred “functional groups” 
through the appointments of farmers, teachers, trades people and military personnel into 
Sukarno’s “National Council” or Dewan Nasional.
132
 The return to the UUD 1945 also 
suggested a return to a strong presidential system, as the President would ‘guide’ almost all 
aspects of statehood and the democracy himself. One example of this strong presidential 
position was the fact that Sukarno’s 17 August 1959 “Rediscovering Our Revolution” speech, 
in which he elaborated on “MANIPOL/USDEK” and his 1960 United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) speeches, was immediately chosen by the Guided Democracy parliament 
to become the Garis-garis Besar Haluan Negara (GBHN) or the national guidelines for the 
trajectory of all Indonesia’s policies.   
 
As a result, the three remaining power holders in Indonesian politics during the period 
consisted of the President, the military and the PKI.
133
 Nasution, who was the army’s chief of 
staff, also supported Sukarno’s Guided Democracy as he said: 
 
The military men are now not only [part of the] State apparatus technically but 
also are functional groups. They can become ministers. [The] Armed Forces 
must know clearly the difference between [being part of] the State apparatus 
and functional group[s]...The Armed Forces' functional group cooperates side 
by side with political groups, functional groups in the field of religion, 




The PKI support for Guided Democracy was demonstrated in Aidit’s speech: 
 
The PKI felt that the only way to save the country from the disaster of a 
further split in the national forces was for President Sukarno to issue a Decree 
restoring the 1945 Constitution in the name of the majority of the Indonesian 
people...The PKI and the Indonesian working people welcomed the Decree 
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issued by the President/Supreme Commander, Sukarno, on July 5th, 1959, 




Once applied, Guided Democracy ended the development of liberal democracy and 
the Western human rights provisions found in the 1950 Constitution. During this period, 
party politics was discouraged and civil and political rights were restricted.
136
 This resulted in 
a significant amount of human rights violations such as restrictions on the freedom to 
organise and freedom of expression, and arbitrary arrests of prominent figures were made. 
Sukarno’s decision to dissolve the DPR and replace it with DPR Gotong Royong (DPR-GR) 
as part of Guided Democracy’s “retooling” or cleaning of state apparatuses, for example, 
caused widespread protests, as symbolised by the creation of Liga Demokrasi or the League 
of Democracy.
137
 The league was also supported by a number of parties, namely Masyumi 
and PSI. Sukarno responded against such protests through the Presidential Decree Penetapan 
Presiden No. 7 Tahun 1959 tanggal 31 Desember 1959 to dissolve the party system and to 
disband such groupings. He decided to dissolve the Masyumi and PSI parties based on 
allegations of subversion and PRRI/Permesta involvements, using Keppres No. 200 Tahun 
1960.
138
 At the same time, Sukarno and the army clamped down on the press, restricted 
political organisations, and arrested both journalists and former members of parliament.
139
 
Sukarno argued that: 
 
Liberalism had brought many disasters within state apparatuses...especially 
with the fanning and assistance from foreign subversion...Guided Democracy 
emphasises (that)...each individual is obliged to be devoted to public interest, 




General Nasution also explained his support for Guided Democracy:  
 
I was attracted to gotong royong...which was [the same as] kekeluargaan [the 
family principle] that I had encountered in the 1945 Constitution. 
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Kekeluargaan versus individualism [found] within Western liberalism and 
versus totalitarianism in the communist and fascist systems. One was too 
heavily weighted towards the individual, and the other to totality. 
Kekeluargaan had the meaning of a balance, a harmony, a concord between 




Sukarno, as the main power holder, also responded to Western powers interference in 
Indonesia’s domestic politics by fostering the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement 
(NAM) in 1961. NAM stood as a third world coalition of power against the ongoing major 
powers’ battles for influence throughout the Cold War, and NAM members had to abide by 
the conditions set in the 1955 “Dasasila Bandung”. With a heavy Sukarno influence, the 
NAM fostered an increasingly political position in aspiring to become the third power, as 





Simultaneously, while the NAM was vocally putting forward state rights through anti-
colonialism and non-interference discourse, human rights discourse was abandoned. Sukarno, 
for example, was quoted to have said: 
 
…to be free means the freedom to determine our own national policies, to 
formulate our own concepts, unhampered and unhindered by pressure or 
intervention from outside... let us bear in mind that our purpose here is to 
contribute relentlessly to the struggle against remnants of colonialism and 
imperialism...to facilitate the process of emancipation between nations...to 




In this regard, Indonesia had switched from having a moderate-non-aligned policy which was 
open to democracy and human rights, as seen in the early 1950s, to an aggressive-non-aligned 
policy which had denounced the importance of human rights in the early 1960s.
144
 This was 
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due to Sukarno’s perceptions which denoted democracy and human rights as a Western 




3.4.5 Neorealism and Neoclassical Realism Explanations 
 
During the second phase, from a neorealist perspective, the battles of influence 
between the blocs were intensifying with the rise of the PRC. The US had also been 
encouraging Indonesia to be on their side through intense lobbying, economic aid and 
training programmes in order to further promote liberal democratic values.  The US influence 
can be seen in the pro-West cabinets of Natsir and Sukiman which were brought down for 
showing their lenience towards US policy on the region. Meanwhile, the PRC managed to use 
its closeness to PKI and Sukarno’s proposal for alliance against the superpowers in the Cold 
War to bolster its view of the ‘imagined community’ of developing countries.
146
 By the same 
token, the PRC also used the 1955 Asia-Africa Conference in Bandung to strengthen its 




This makes the external constraints faced by Indonesia at the time different from 
those in the earlier period (1945-1949) when the Western powers dominated.  At this stage, 
Indonesia was provided with three options in pursuing its national interests, given the 
systemic opportunity and threats at the time. Such options were to bandwagon with the 
Western powers, to maintain its own policy through a soft form of balancing (by adhering to 
its conservative non-alignment behaviour and relying on third world coalitions) or to perform 
hard balancing against the Western powers (by bandwagoning with the Communist bloc, with 
the PRC in the lead, followed by the USSR). According to neorealist assumptions, a mistake 
in policy choices would result in systemic punishments. 
 
In this regard, however, neorealism seems to be lacking any predictive or explanatory 
capability in determining the choice of policy that Indonesia would pursue. For example, 
during the early 1950s, Indonesia had tried to bandwagon with the Western powers. This can 
be seen during the early years of parliamentary cabinet, namely under Natsir and Sukiman’s 
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cabinets, as the government was considered to have a mild pro-West attitude and Indonesia 
seemed to have continuation of its human rights policy in advocating Western ‘liberal’ 
democracy and human rights discourse.
148
 Yet, by 1955, Indonesia had embarked on a more 
assertive external policy. Indonesia began performing a soft form of external balancing 
against the major powers in the region by initiating a third world coalition to promote “state 
and human rights”, “non-aligned”, “anti-colonial” and “West Papua” interests. Such an 
abrupt shift was an anomaly and irrational, if seen from a neorealism perspective, as such 
deviation almost immediately resulted in Western powers’ support for the PRRI-Permesta 
rebellion as a form of systemic punishment of Indonesia. To explain such anomalous and 
irrational behaviour, neoclassical realism would argue that the pattern of Indonesia’s 
behaviour as a state was not pre-determined solely by the systemic/external pressures, 
although such pressures did have an impact.  
 
If analysed by neoclassical realism’s “leader’s perception-domestic power structure” 
model, such deviation from neorealist assumptions about Indonesia’s state behaviour can be 
explained by variables found within Indonesia’s domestic politics. This research finds that 
the major powers’ direct interferences in Indonesia’s domestic politics (as seen in the US 
support for Masyumi and the PSI, and the USSR and PRC support for the PKI during the 
early 1950s) had deeply affected the development of Indonesia’s state institutions, party 
coalitions and national stability, in a negative way. The numerous instances of bringing down 
of governments due to blatant divisions of extreme opposition in the parliament, based on 
Cold War ideological lines (Communist and pro-West Islamist groups) served as the main 
cause of the fragility in Indonesia’s practice of democracy and, ultimately, the change within 
Indonesia’s domestic power structure. The impact of such turbulent domestic conditions had 
facilitated Sukarno’s return to Indonesia’s domestic power structure as the “solidarity maker” 
type of leader, especially with Prime Minister Ali Sastroamijoyo’s invitation for Sukarno to 
be actively involved in Indonesia’s domestic politics. One of the initiatives taken by Ali and 
Sukarno to ensure domestic stability was to focus more on Indonesia’s external fronts, rather 
than to dwell on domestic rifts, by projecting its non-aligned, ‘anti-colonialism’ and bringing 
back ‘West Papua’ policy to the international scene.  
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Thus, this research finds that by the middle of the 1950s it was Ali and Sukarno’s 
perceptions of external initiatives that mattered. This was because the two managed to 
become the dominant figures within Indonesia’s leadership and their perceptions were 
unchallenged by the parliament. Even Aidit from the PKI, at this stage, seemed to be 
supportive of all Sukarno’s views on ‘non-alignment’, ‘anti-colonialism and anti-
imperialism’ and ‘West Papua’. Thus, Ali and Sukarno had secured domestic resources for 
their chosen policy. This resulted in Ali and Sukarno’s decision to indirectly challenge 
hegemonic power through the Asia-Africa coalition as part of Indonesia’s soft form of 
external balancing. In this regard, it was Sukarno and Ali’s perceptions which had elevated 
state rights over human rights, and this greatly affected Indonesia’s exportation of its third 
world version of human rights through the 1955 Summit. 
  
Yet, when structural constraints changed, as demonstrated by the US’ changed view 
of Indonesia from a potential ally to a potential threat, the large scale PRRI-PERMESTA 
rebellion broke out and was backed immediately by Western powers and their allies. At the 
same time, the PRC and USSR also intensified their influences on Indonesia’s domestic and 
foreign fronts. The PRC, for example, intensified its cooperation with Aidit’s PKI and also in 
many of Indonesia’s domestic policies, while Indonesia’s anti-PRRI-Permesta and West 
Papua campaigns were supported by the USSR with weapons.  
 
Using the neoclassical realism “leader’s perception-domestic power structure” model, 
the battle for influence within Indonesia’s democratic framework between the Western bloc 
and the Communist bloc during this period seemed to have favoured the Communist bloc, as 
demonstrated by the PKI’s performance as the fastest growing party and a potential winner in 
the election (after the 1955 election). In this regard, this research finds that the decision of the 
Western powers and their allies to support the PRRI-Permesta secessionist movement had 
significantly disrupted the development of Indonesia’s state institutions and its practise of 
democracy, through the takeover and subversion attempt outside the framework of 
democracy. The victorious campaign of Sukarno, the PKI and the army in quelling the 
Western powers-backed movement with arms support from the USSR had caused the 
parliament, the rightist leaders and the liberal figureheads (such as Syahrir, Natsir, Sukiman 
and others from the Islamist or rightist camps who were implicated in the movement) to lose 
political power. Thus, the movement had sealed the fate of Indonesia’s rightist movement and 
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Such circumstances paved the way for Sukarno, the PKI and the army to become the 
three remaining power holders left within Indonesia’s domestic power structure. With such 
an existing domestic power structure, the perceptions of leaders, particularly Sukarno, 
became a crucial intervening variable, especially since Aidit and Nasution shared Sukarno’s 
perception that the state was faltering due to external interferences. At this stage, Sukarno, as 
the main power holder, viewed the US and Western powers as now more threatening and 
aggressive to his Indonesia, if judged from the Western powers’ responses to Indonesia’s 
democratic practice, the Asia-Africa Conference, the PRRI-Permesta movement and the West 
Papua issue.  
 
Due to this view, Sukarno tried to perform a soft form of internal and external 
balancing strategy against the US and Western powers. Regarding his soft form of internal 
balancing strategy, Sukarno relied on his own innovation in creating a new governing system 
by consolidating power through his Guided Democracy (with the inclusion of the PKI as a 
civilian power and the army as military power in ruling) to denounce the Western system of 
democracy and human rights. Sukarno’s innovation can be considered as internal balancing 
because this is understood as “…a conscious, purposeful effort by one state to offset the 
perceived relative power advantage of another state by the creation of entirely new 




Whereas, regarding his soft form of external balancing, Sukarno fostered the NAM as 
the Third World coalition of power in order to balance the US and Western powers’ influence 
in the region. This can be seen in the NAM 1961 summit where non-aligned leaders, 
inclusive of Sukarno, agreed to focus more on achieving their third world version of state 
rights, namely non-interference, non-intervention, sovereignty, territorial integrity, social 
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The result of such internal and external balancing strategies was the abandonment of 
Western democracy and human rights practices, as seen in the shift in Indonesia’s human 
rights policy from UUDS 1950 back to UUD 1945, which Sukarno viewed as a way to amend 
Indonesia’s fractured unity. This chosen strategy also resulted in Indonesia’s shift in terms of 
human rights policy because Indonesia under Sukarno began to emphasise more on state 




In conclusion, neorealism’s limitation in analysing Indonesia’s human rights policy 
shift constrasts with neoclassical realism’s strength as a tool of analysis through the latter’s 
opening of neorealism’s ‘black box’ and activation of ‘domestic power structure’ and 
‘leader’s perception’ as intervening variables. The choices of, and the motives behind, human 
rights policies pursued by Indonesian leaders can substantially be explained by neoclassical 
realism analysis. Here, neoclassical realism analysis during the Sukarno era indicates that the 
less developed the domestic power structure is, the more exposed are the policy choices (shift 
or continuation) to external preferences and leaders’ perceptions.  
 
In the period 1945-1949, the research finds that as state institutions and apparatuses 
were very loose, leadership figures became the most influential intervening variables in 
policy-making and the Western powers were able to directly influence the composition of 
leadership within Indonesia (Syahrir over Sukarno). As a result, leaders who were acceptable 
to the Western powers at the time were faced with limited policy choices and most of these 
leaders had the perception that Indonesia was still weak in terms of relative power. This also 
resulted in the avoidance of confrontational policy and instead, these leaders pursued a set of 
indirect balancing strategies to engage the Western powers and the Netherlands to receive 
acknowledgement for Indonesia’s independence. The consequence of such strategies was 
Indonesia’s human rights policy shift from one based on the UUD 1945 to one based on the 
UU RIS 1949. 
 
  However, in the later period (1950-1966), the research finds that the application of the 
UU RIS 1949 (later changed to the UUD 1950), which was embellished with liberal 
characteristics, lacked commitment to Western liberal ideals due to the fact that the policy 
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shift initially served as a temporary strategy for the purpose of gaining recognition for 
independence. This view of such lack of commitment is strengthened by another element of 
the research findings which highlight that the external influences (mainly the battle for 
influence between the Western powers and the Communist group) had effectively disrupted 
the overall development of Indonesia’s state institutions and its practise of democracy 
causing an underdeveloped domestic power structure. In this regard, the external influence 
managed to affect the development of Indonesia’s domestic power structure in a negative 
way, which again resulted in the dominance of leadership figures, as could be seen in 
Sukarno’s role in ensuring national unity and stability and the effect of Sukarno’s perceptions 
in determining policy choices. This ultimately led to a shift of human rights policy from a 
pro-Western human rights policy based on the UUDS 1950 back to Indonesia’s traditional, 
collective and third world human rights policy based on the UUD 1945. 
 
 The next chapter discusses the termination of Sukarno’s leadership and the shift or 
continuation of human rights policy under Suharto, as Sukarno’s successor. As in this 
chapter, the research will investigate Suharto’s policy preferences in terms of human rights 
from the neoclassical realism perspective. It will discuss whether Suharto’s human rights 
policy was a shift from or continuation of Sukarno’s human rights policy, and the 
consequences of Suharto’s preferences for Indonesia’s overall practise of democracy and 














Suharto’s Human Rights and Anti-Human Rights Policies: 1966-
1998 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
This chapter analyses the continuity and change of human rights policy in the Suharto 
era. As in the previous chapter, it will test the validity of neoclassical realism in a historical 
survey of the Suharto New Order policy from its inception until its collapse in 1998. The first 
part of this chapter introduces neoclassical realism as the theoretical framework for the 
historical specificities of the Suharto era and outlines how it will be applied in this chapter. 
The second part discusses the birth of Suharto’s “New Order” as a replacement for Sukarno’s 
‘Guided Democracy’. It highlights the trade-off between what was domestically needed to 
secure Suharto’s position and what was externally acceptable to respond to the Cold War 
envrionment in the Asia Pacific region. The third part elucidates the nature and patterns of the 
human rights policy that Suharto’s New Order attempted to shape under constraints from 
both within and outside the nation. The fourth part elaborates the transformation to an anti-
human rights policy, following the fall of the New Order regime. The last part analyses 
Indonesia’s behaviour as a state from the neoclassical realist perspective and how such 
behaviour affected its policy continuation or shift in terms of human rights policy under 
Suharto. 
 
4.2 A Neoclassical Realism “Domestic Power Structure-Leader’s Perception” 
Approach  
 
As in the previous chapter, neorealism realism firstly will be used to emphasise the 
influence of Indonesia’s external environment. Mainly this comprise of great powers’ 
behaviours, interests and relations toward Indonesia during this period as well as the 
interaction among great powers themselves which have repercussions for Indonesia. This will 
be followed by an analysis of Indonesia’s domestic environments, comprising of “domestic 
power structure” and “leader’s perception” as to whether there is a deviation from neorealist 
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assumptions in forms of irregularities in terms of policy options. Suharto’s first irregularity in 
terms of human rights policy was why did Suharto display a dualism in his early human 
rights policy. On one hand Suharto’s seemed committed to improve Indonesia’s pratice of 
democracy and respect for human rights from the ones displayed during the Sukarno era.Yet 
on the other hand, he had brutally eliminated PKI members and affiliates. Suharto’s second 
irregularity was why did Suharto later on decided to pursue human rights policy that did not 
greatly differ from Sukarno’s Guided Democracy period policies which were greatly sourced 
on Pancasila values. Also, after 32 years of effective authoritarian rule, how did the new pro-
democracy and pro-human rights movement in Indonesia managed to force the stepping 
down of Suharto even when members of his own regime find it hard to do. 
 
Here neoclassical realism analysis is expected to explain the peculiarities of Suharto’s 
human rights or anti-human policies through an investigation of the external constraints and 
opportunities provided by the severity of the Cold War confrontation , the USSR-PRC split 
(in the 1970s)  the end of Cold War and the changing orientation of US foreign policy in the 
post-Cold War period. For example, Suharto was known to have used such external 
opportunity to usurp power and while defeating other political opponents such as Sukarno 
who were more constrained by the external condition. At other times Suharto managed to 
utilise Indonesia’s external condition to challenge the Western powers by using the 
“Asian/Pancasila Values” and “right to development” arguments and to deflect the Western 
powers’ imposition of their style of human rights from the late 1980s to the middle of the 
1990s. Such state behaviour had again deviated from neorealism’s logic and thus will be 
further investigated through the usage of neoclassical realism domestic intervenning variables 
in the following section. Yet despite the deviation, in accordance with neorealist logic, 
Indonesia’s attempt to defy Western power pressures, though effective for some time, was 
proven to be ineffective and ultimately resulted in Suharto’s downfall. Such interchangeable 
prevalence of neoclassical realism and neorealism assumptions in analysing Indonesia will 
also complemented with Putnam’s “Two Level Game” theory to better understand the 







4.3 1966-1970: The Beginnings of the “New Order” and Promises of Democracy 
 
4.3.1 Suharto’s Takeover from Sukarno 
 
During the last phase of Sukarno’s rule, Indonesia was in the “hot spot” of the Cold 
War (1950-1966) as the great powers, (the US and USSR) and emerging power (PRC), were 
involved in a competition to forge alliances within, and exert influence over, South East 
Asia.
1
 The US was already heavily involved in the Vietnam War (the Third Indo-China War) 
in order to contain the spread of communism as outlined in its “domino’ theory”, while the 
USSR had been supporting North Vietnam against South Vietnam.
2
 At the same time, the US 
had covertly supported the 1957-1958 PRRI-Permesta military rebellion in the outer 
provinces of Indonesia and it continued to foster a close relation with Indonesian ‘right wing’ 
military generals throughout Sukarno’s Guided Democracy.
3
 The PRC, meanwhile, was just 
emerging from the collapse of the Sino-Soviet alliance and was exerting influence in South 
East Asia, particularly in Indonesia.
4
 As a result, the PRC seemed to have overtaken both the 
US and USSR in its influence over Indonesia by moving closer to the PKI and Sukarno, as 





The battle for influence among the major powers, in the context of the Cold War, 
culminated in Indonesia’s October 1965 incident, known as G/30 S PKI or Gestapu/Gestok.  
A group of military men loyal to Sukarno had abducted and killed six alleged ‘right wing’ 
generals in order to prevent a covert military coup led by the Western-backed ‘council of the 
generals’ against Sukarno. However, these killings were viewed as a coup by the military 
and, under the command of Major General Suharto, who was then the head of the Komando 
Strategis Angkatan Darat (KOSTRAD), or Army’s Strategic Command, the movement was 
successfully brought to an abrupt end. This was symbolised by the Suharto troops’ speedy 
victory over the abductors’ troops. The importance of the incident was that the CIA and 
Western powers were assumed to be behind the ‘council of generals’ and their planned 
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military coup against Sukarno, while the PKI and PRC were suspected of being behind the 





In dealing with the fast pace of the incident and the uncertain conditions, Suharto’s 
military group managed to maintain an effective control over vital mass media such as the 
Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI) and, hence, was able to build up an image as the saviours of 
Indonesia against what most perceived as an imminent communist threat that had been 
nurtured under Sukarno’s ‘Guided Democracy’.
7
 This was due to the popular belief initiated 
by Suharto’s group
8
 that Sukarno’s rule was now heavily tainted by the PKI’s influence and 
had betrayed the revolution, the Pancasila and the UUD 1945 constitution.
9
 This resulted in a 
condition where the military and others, such as Islamic groups, the media, intellectuals, legal 
professionals, economists and university students, were all engaged in a collaborative attempt 
to remove the PKI and Sukarno from power.
10
 By 1967, the PKI and its affiliations were 
almost completely annihilated and Sukarno was ordered to be held under house arrest after 
the temporary parliament known as the MPRS had revoked him of his presidential powers. 
This made Suharto the acting President through the MPRS provision in March 1967.
11
 The 




In addition to the major powers’ subversive or direct involvement outlined earlier, the 
Western powers’ influence over the developments in Indonesia’s domestic politics at this 
stage was crucial. The Western powers, particularly the US and UK, were congenial towards 
the new triumverate of Suharto (a military figure) as the leader, Adam Malik (a civilian), who 
became the Deputy Prime Minister for Social and Political Affairs, and Sultan 
Hamengkubuwono IX (a traditional aristrocrat), who became the Deputy Prime Minister for 
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Economic, Finance and Developmental Affairs.
13
 Meanwhile, after the October 1965 
incident, while the USSR was in relative silence about the PKI’s defeat, the PRC’s influence 
in Indonesia was overturned by Suharto’s military regime when Suharto blamed the PRC for 
the sponsorship of the PKI’s failed coup attempt. The USSR’s passive position on the matter 
was an additional factor that led to a further relational split between the PRC and USSR.
14
 
Regarding the PRC, Suharto, for example, stated that “it is certainly a reality that [the] PRC 




With the Western powers’ influence now dominant, Suharto would make Indonesia’s 
policy more favourable to the West to the extent that he was able to secure his position.
16
 To 
start with, Suharto’s early foreign policy choice was to break diplomatic ties with the PRC in 
1967 and to suspend all military aid and training from the USSR, symbolizing a decline in 
relations with the Communist states.
17
 Suharto then invited foreign investment and aid from 
the richer Western states, as well as acquiring military training and equipment from them. 
This reflected the main priorities of the Western powers for Indonesia at the time; a speedy 
economic recovery to ensure stability.
18
 Large amounts of direct foreign investment and 
foreign loans were made to Indonesia through the creation of the Inter-Governmental Group 
for Indonesia (IGGI) as well as Suharto’s close engagement with the IMF, the World Bank 
and other Western-sponsored creditors, commencing in 1967 as the foundation of Indonesia’s 
new economy.
19
 Suharto would later use such foreign-capital-heavy economic policy to 
secure his domestic rule by boasting about his regime’s ability to maintain economic stability 
and development as the New Order’s justification to rule in an authoritarian manner.
20
   
 
The indication of Indonesia’s shifting behaviour, from an anti-West to pro-West 
stance, was also demonstrated in the NAM and ASEAN. Firstly, Indonesia under Suharto 
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played a passive role in the NAM, in contrast to Indonesia’s earlier support for NAM as one 
of its important foreign pillars as a way to contend with Western countries imperialistic 
tendencies during Sukarno’s years.
21
 Secondly, unlike Sukarno, who used confrontational 
policy against Indonesia’s immediate neighbours, (the Federation of Malaysia and 
Singapore), Suharto would instead engage them in a regional organisation called ASEAN.  
 
On one side, Suharto claimed that ASEAN was strictly for economic purposes. On the 
initial creation of ASEAN, Suharto stated “regional cooperation in South East Asia is a 
concrete effort towards a solid, secure and advanced livelihood in this part of the world in a 
number of fields, particularly economic, social and cultural”.
22
This was reflected in the 
common interests of most of the five initial creators of ASEAN, Indonesia, Thailand, the 
Philippines, Malaysia and Singapore, in acquiring economic aid from the US, Britain and 
Japan.
23
 Yet, on the other side, ASEAN also functioned as a bulwark against communist 
encroachment into South East Asia, especially after communism had prevailed in Vietnam.
24
 
Several analysts even suggested that the plan to create ASEAN was drafted through the US 
Council on Foreign Relations and the US Study Group on South East Asia, and was merely 




4.3.2 Suharto’s Early Dualism on Democracy and Human Rights 
 
After signalling the shift to the Western bloc in its external policy, Indonesia under 
Suharto appeared to readjust its domestic policy to reflect Western ideals of democracy and 
civil and political rights. Mainly this was because Suharto’s new military regime tried to 
align with Western powers’ interests in the region during the Cold War, namely to create the 
‘free world’ zone as seen in the creation of ASEAN, and to contain communist encroachment 
by making Indonesia anti-communist and susceptible to Western democracy, despite its 
militaristic tendencies. An attempt was made to rectify the anti-Western governing practices 
of Sukarno and the PKI, which the regime claimed had deviated far from the UUD 1945, by 
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returning power to the MPR as the people’s representative body and promising to uphold the 
rule of law.
26
 In his 1967 speech as the acting President, Suharto, for the first time termed 
Sukarno’s rule as Orde Lama or ‘Old Order’ and his new rule as the Orde Baru or ‘New 
Order’ as a way of showing the departure from his predecessor’s method of governing, as 
well as highlighting Sukarno’s mistakes.
27
 This resulted in a short interlude of a better 
practice of democracy and human rights, as Suharto himself said: 
 
In the past, we had been pressured from above in an autocracy, now 
freedom grows from below in a democracy...political stability which we 
shall form is a solid and dynamic environment, where people practice free 
will, where people scrutinise governing, where people enjoy their human 





To strengthen his claim, Suharto, based on his own initiative, commenced a series of reforms 
which were promising for democracy and clearly broke away from Sukarno’s policy.
29
 For 
example, the opening of the media which was prohibited under Sukarno and the release of 
most of Sukarno’s political prisoners, such as Islamic leaders and political opponents, were 
all carried out during Suharto’s early rule.
30
 Suharto also revived party politics which had lost 




A significant breakthrough in terms of human rights was also made in the early years 
of the New Order regime. Again, as part of Suharto’s democratic image-building targeted at 
Western powers as the audience, Suharto seemed supportive of the decision taken at the 
General Assembly IV of the temporary parliament known as Majelis Permusyawaratan 
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Rakyat Sementara (MPRS). Suharto allowed the MPRS to launch the Ketetapan MPRS 
Nomor XIV /MPRS/1966 (MPRS Decree No. XIV/1966). The decree had ordered the 
formulation of a human rights charter to complete the UUD 1945 (1945 Constitution), a 
process that had been long neglected by Sukarno after he had previously annulled the 
Konstituante.
32
 The charter was pertinent because human rights clauses implied in the UUD 




Yet, a dualism of human rights policy began to appear as Suharto still retained 
Sukarno’s UUD 1945 Constitution as the main justification for Sukarno’s previous 
authoritarian rule.
34
 As no mechanism was put in place in the UUD 1945 for parliamentary 
(MPR) membership and the existence of a stipulation in the UUD stated that every decision 
of the MPR must be made based on consensus, any chosen leaders would be able to 
manipulate the decision-making process of the parliament through the process of selecting 
loyal subjects to be seated in the parliament.
35
 As a result, after Suharto was formally 
appointed by the MPR in 1968 as the second President, he managed to create a state-
sponsored political party called the Golongan Karya (GOLKAR), or Functional Group Party, 
to control parliament. He then delayed the legislative election scheduled for 1968, as had 
been mandated in TAP MPRS 1966 to 1971, in order to buy enough time to consolidate 





Simultaneously, Suharto continued arbitrary killings, arrests, repression and 
persecutions of members, affiliates and sympathizers of the PKI, despite the fact that the 
organisation had been banned after the 1965 incident. There were reports that massive human 
rights abuses had been directed towards former PKI members and communist sympathisers 
by the general masses and the military in the central and outer regions of Indonesia, making it 
one of the biggest crimes against humanity of the century.
37
 In his speech, Suharto made it 
clear that: 
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National stability will be achieved expediently if we are united and able to 
eliminate underground activities of the PKI remnants. Allowing the remnants 
of PKI to perform political guerrilla [acts], to divide and conquer, and to 
resurrect themselves means the impossibility to reach such national stability. 




At this stage, the US had been experiencing a number of setbacks in its military 
campaigns in Vietnam against the Vietcong who were supported by the USSR and PRC. In 
this regard, the US and Western powers with a heavy interest in winning the Cold War were 
willing to ignore human rights lapses in ‘friendly’ anti-communist regimes, such as 
Indonesia, and they condoned such abuses when necessary to assure ‘friendly’ authoritarian 
regimes in their anti-communism sphere of influence. This resulted in a situation where the 
promotion of human rights in the region was heavily undermined, despite the existence of the 
UDHR and the ICCPR.  
 
The impunity given to Suharto’s Indonesia by Western powers was indicated in 
several ways. Firstly, Indonesia had a smooth re-admission into the UN in 1966 after it had 
walked out in 1965 due to Sukarno’s konfrontasi politics with Malaysia
39
 and even after the 
massacres committed by Suharto’s military regime in late 1965. This indicated that the 
Western powers had encouraged the UN to accept Indonesia’s re-admittance by overlooking 
Suharto’s bloody take-over.
40
 Secondly, in spite of the human rights violations, Western 
powers’ relations with Suharto’s military regime were strengthened as military equipment 
and training continued and foreign donors intensified their support.
41
 Such strengthening of 
relations was captured in an article by the journalist, Max Frankel, in the New York Times. He 
stated that, according to President Richard Nixon, after a number of US military defeats in 
Vietnam, the turnaround in Indonesia’s domestic politics was vital for US interests, as 
“Indonesia was the greatest prize for American diplomacy in Asia”.
42
 There were even 
indications of the US’ direct involvement in the carrying out of the massacre through its 
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release of a list of prominent communist figures, via the US embassy in Jakarta, to Suharto’s 
military group for strategic elimination.
43
Also, at a New York meeting of the Australian-
American Association in July 1966, echoing the US’ view on the issue, the Australian Prime 
Minister Harold Holt did not put much emphasis on Indonesia’s human rights violations 
towards communist members and affiliates as he instead said that “with 500,000 to one 






4.4 1971-1990: The Anti-Human Rights Rule of the New Order  
 
4.4.1 The New Order’s True Colours 
 
In the early 1970s, the split between the USSR and PRC had become apparent due to 
the increasingly close relationship between the PRC and the US, signalling tri-polarity and 
the domination of the US and Western powers’ position over the fragmented and weakening 
communist bloc.
45
 This condition resulted in the situation where the trade-off between what 
would be internationally tolerated and what was required to secure Suharto’s power 
domestically made the latter a relatively easy task. In other words, the anti-communism 
stance of Suharto’s authoritarianism had secured solid support for his rule from the Western 
powers. With the absence of their contestation of Suharto’s militaristic ways and blatant civil 
and political rights abuses, such as arbitrary arrests and killings that were directed at his 
political opponents and contenders, including Sukarno, Sukarno’s affiliates and PKI 
members, Suharto consolidated his domestic powers to become the dominant figure in 
Indonesia’s politics. This was accomplished through Suharto’s manoeuvring by appointing 
loyal subjects to seats in the MPRS, delaying the election scheduled for 1966 to 1971, and 
creating the state-sponsored GOLKAR party. Thus, the expected victory of Suharto’s group 
in the 1971 general election was achieved with relative ease. The election result then justified 
Suharto’s effective control of Indonesia’s domestic politics as the appointed President with an 
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overwhelming executive power over other state institutions based on the UUD 1945, while 




Such election results immediately impacted on Indonesia’s human rights development 
as the earlier attempts of the Ad Hoc Committee B in perfecting the human rights charter 
could not be transformed into law due to the failure to reach consensus in the General 
Assembly No. V of the MPRS in 1968.
47
 After the election in 1971, members of Suharto’s 
GOLKAR party had dominated the MPR and through Ketetapan MPR No. V/MPR/1973, the 
MPR decided to annul the previous Ketetapan MPRS No. XIV/MPRS/1966.
48
 This resulted in 
the abandonment of the human rights charter while still in draft form, as well as the 




After the 1971 election, Suharto used arguments of the importance of ‘national unity’ 
and ‘political stability’ to forcefully trim the multiparty system into a symbolic three-party 
system that was controlled by Suharto’s authoritarian regime in a policy called Fusi Politik. 
The three parties comprised of Suharto’s own GOLKAR party, the weakened PDI party, 
(which mainly consisted of Sukarno’s former sympathisers and Christian parties), and one 
Islam-influenced party. This forced parties such as Partai Syarikat Islam, Nadhlatul Ulama 
(NU), and small Islamic factions to amalgamate into a party known as Partai Persatuan 
Pembangunan (PPP), or the United Development Party.
50
 Suharto changed the politics of 
aliran, which had been based on ideologies developed during Sukarno’s experimentation 
with liberal democracy (the multi-party system), and replaced it with his state controlled 
electoral system. Although elections were regularly held in the coming years, Suharto’s 
GOLKAR party always achieved overwhelming victories, making the other two parties mere 
democratic decorations. Suharto’s election successes also reflected his policies that served to 
further restrict the realisation of civil and political rights in Indonesia. 
  
To further justify his authoritarian policies, Suharto used Indonesia’s 1950s 
experimentation with the Western model of democracy as a harsh lesson in the failure of 
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importing Western ideas, including democracy and human rights.
51
 The Malari incident in 
1974 had exemplified such failure and validated the need for Suharto’s New Order regime 
and the iron hand policy which would serve as a symbol of the beginning of Suharto’s 
authoritarian campaign.
52
 The incident started as an initiative by university students to protest 
government economic policies on foreign direct investment, matters of equity and disparity 
issues. This initiative was symbolised by demonstrations during the visit of Japanese Prime 
Minister, Kakuei Tanaka, which quickly turned into a massive and anarchic riot.
53
 Suharto 
responded with a brutal military crackdown on the demonstrations, forcefully restricted 
student movements within campuses and banned a number of independent media.
54
 Here, 
Suharto highlighted to the public how the uncontrollable nature of a demonstration could 
easily transform it into an anarchic riot resulting in a number of casualties. Thus, he argued 
that importing Western ideas of human rights and democracy into Indonesia’s political 




From then on, Suharto was adamant to identify Indonesia as a democracy that was 
distinguishable from the Western conception of democracy as, according to Suharto, its roots 
were found in the UUD 1945 and the Pancasila, and hence the term ‘Pancasila Democracy’ 
was used.
56
 In order to ensure that Suharto’s aim was achieved, propagandistic methods were 
employed during the Suharto era as ways to disseminate his regime’s interpretation of the 
national ideology. His “Pedoman, Penghayatan, dan Pengalaman Pancasila” or P4 policy 
was applied in all public institutions such as schools and the civil service in order to create a 
uniform national character which was conducive for national development.
57
 He also started 
to gain an effective control of public information due to his policy of only allowing state-
controlled debate or sympathetic media such as the Televisi Republik Indonesia (TVRI) and 
Radio Republik Indonesia (RRI) to operate, applying strict censorship in the flow of 
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 In addition, like Sukarno, Suharto perceived that the military should have a dual 
function comprising of its role of safeguarding the nation while, at the same time, being 
allowed to participate in civilian politics through the politics of golongan (functional 
groupings) or affiliations in a democratic environment.
59
 This meant that the military could 
participate in politics and government as their seats in the MPR were guaranteed, as well as 
executive posts such as ministers, governors, ambassadors, judges and attorneys.
60
 Whereas 
Sukarno had considered the military as an inseparable element of society, as demonstrated by 
his ‘Guided Democracy’, Suharto would instead prioritise the entry of military personnel into 





Indications that Suharto’s anti-human rights policy continued to be tolerated by the 
Western powers can be seen in their support for Indonesia’s 1975 East Timor Campaign. This 
reflected the Western powers’ interest to contain communism in the region.
62
 There were 
human rights violations committed during and after the 1975 Indonesian military campaigns, 
with the Balibo incident being one of the most well-known ones. This indicated that the West 
shared Indonesia’s fear of the potential communist threat coming from East Timor should the 
Marxist-influenced Fretilin group rise to power, as can be seen in the US, UK and Australia’s 
support for Indonesia’s position in the UNGA resolutions, from 1975 to 1982.
63
   
 
4.4.2 Asian Values and Right to Development (RTD) 
 
While the Western powers tolerated Suharto’s anti-human rights policy directed 
mostly at communists and challengers of the New Order, the PRC would instead support 
Suharto’s anti-West human rights policy, as characterised by the ‘Asian Values’ argument. In 
the early 1970s, as the US was weary of the USSR-supported North Vietnam’s dominance 
over South Vietnam, the US initiated a détente with the PRC. This began with the famous 
Ping-Pong Diplomacy of 1971 and soon the US and PRC’s closeness would replace the Sino-
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Soviet alliance. Although Suharto’s regime did not normalise relations with the PRC until 
late 1995, the PRC’s relations with ASEAN seemed congenial. The PRC continued to engage 
with Suharto’s ASEAN, with US blessings, rather than be in conflict with it throughout the 
1980s. In the 1990s, with the PRC’s new regionalism, the PRC and ASEAN were even united 
in their support of the ‘Asian Values’ argument to deflect Western criticism of their human 
rights records. They took a leading role in articulating an Asian version of human rights, as 
exemplified by the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, in preparation for the 1993 Vienna 




Such PRC support had gained ground due to Suharto’s own perception of human 
rights, which was always in contrast with the West and was closer to that of Sukarno’s.  
According to Suharto, within the governing system of the Republic of Indonesia, everybody 
had rights but such rights must be in accordance with, or limited by, the superior rights of the 
society or collective rights.
65
 He stated that: 
 
...each individual right is acknowledged and respected but it cannot be 
separated from the rights of others as every individual is an integrated part of 
his/her society...such social system which emphasizes family values and 
togetherness has not only given strength but it has also provided protection 




Thus, Suharto had retained Sukarno’s rejection of Western values in terms of human 
rights. Suharto also supported the “Asian Values” argument, along with other key Asian 
leaders. In 1991, the PRC decided to come to terms with ASEAN leaders in order to resist 
Western pressure over its 1989 Tiananmen incident and to promote the PRC’s image as a 
third world supporter of Asian values.
67
 This arrangement strengthened the arguments already 
made by Indonesia’s President Suharto, Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir Muhammad and 
Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yeuw, which supported the ASEAN emphasis on 
principles of “non-interference”, “consensus” and “respect for sovereignty” in their state 
relations, especially in dealing with the issue of human rights. In this regard, the coalition of 
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the PRC and ASEAN states, in opposing Western attempts to promote human rights, created 
an external opportunity to be exploited by Indonesia to maintain its authoritarian polity. 
 
Through the “Asian Values” argument, which resonated with his adherence to 
Pancasila values, Suharto denounced Western human rights. According to Suharto, freedom 
and independence were not the ultimate goal but merely a medium through which to achieve 
a society that is built by its members to be just and prosperous.
68
 Suharto believed that the 
main problem faced by developing countries was not the guarantee of human rights 
protection but rather their low levels of education and underdeveloped economies.
69
  Hence 
the most important thing would be to create a just and prosperous society for all and not just 
for the individual.
70
 Suharto said: 
 
…economic and social development is the first step towards the fulfilment of 
human rights protection as citizens will not be able to exercise freedom of 
opinion responsibly and constructively. Freedom to associate will be 
meaningless for the unemployed. Economic and political development must 




This was proven by Indonesia’s selectivity in signing and ratifying a number of UN 
human rights conventions. Human rights conventions which did not contradict Suharto's 
perception were almost immediately adopted, such as CEDAW (signed in 1980 and ratified 
in 1984) and CROC (signed and ratified in 1990), while CAT was merely used symbolically, 
as it was not signed until 1985 and the schedule was unclear on when it would be ratified.
72
 
Other important human rights conventions such as the Rome Statute, ICCPR and ICESCR 




Another mechanism used by Suharto in exploiting the given structural opportunity to 
maintain his authoritarianism was the utilisation of RTD. Here, RTD is understood as the 
third generation of rights since the first generation referred to civil and political rights while 
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the second generation referred to economic, social and cultural rights.
74
 Whereas the first 
generation of rights are usually considered to be advocated by liberal states and the second 
generation of rights by communist states, the third generation of rights were assumed to be 
voiced by developing states.
75
 The third generation of rights can be considered as solidarity 
rights among the third world to solve common problems such as the protection of the 
environment, development and peace.
76
 Indonesia argued for the importance of RTD in the 
49th session of the UN Human Rights Commission in 1993.
77
 Suharto’s human rights policy 
regarding RTD is implied in the speech of his foreign minister, Ali Alatas, which reflects the 
Bangkok Declaration: 
 
…while human rights are indeed universal in character, it is now generally 
acknowledged that their expression and implementation in the national 
context should remain the competence and responsibility of each government. 
This means that the complex variety of problems, of different economic, 
social and cultural realities, and the unique value systems prevailing in each 




In this regard, human rights implementation is claimed to be highly dependent on 
Indonesia’s history, its cultural and social traditions, and its stage of economic development. 
According to such logic, Suharto’s New Order could violate its citizens’ civil and political 
rights if they were seen as obstructing or diverging from the New Order’s planned 
programme for economic development and political stability. At this stage, Suharto even 
managed to control civil society and local NGOs and to utilise them in strengthening his 
development programmes.
79
 This can be seen in the way the early NGOs in Indonesia were 
considered merely as “developmental NGOs” that were used by the regime to provide input 
about setbacks in the development programmes but not to criticise them.  Meanwhile, the 
Tanjung Priok incident, the Suharto-endorsed Petrus programme and the Marsinah case are 
all examples of Suharto’s strong stand against his opposition and any dissenting voices by 
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blatantly violating citizen’s civil and political rights.
80
  At the same time, regional unrests and 
social injustices, fuelled by uneven development, led to the creation of GAM in Aceh 
province and OPM in the Papua province. Suharto again responded to these regional 
challenges with military action which caused numerous violations of human rights.
81
   
 
4.5 1991-1998: End of the Cold War, Defiance and Economic Crisis 
 
4.5.1 The Alignment of Internal and External Opposition against the New Order 
 
During the Cold War, small or middle power countries which tended to seek alliances 
with any of the major powers were mostly tolerated in spite of their anti-human rights 
behaviour as long as they served the major powers’ interests to upset the opposing side by 
‘containment’ or ‘subversion’, as demonstrated by Indonesia’s 1965 experience. However, by 
the early 1990s the Cold War had ended with the USSR’s collapse and the emergence of the 
US as the dominant power in international relations. However, US priority in terms of its 
regional security changed due to the receding communism threat. This altered the dynamics 
between smaller powers and major powers. Many states’ anti-communism and anti-human 
rights policies, including those of Indonesia, were no longer positioned under the US’ 
regional security concern to win the Cold War and thus would be irrelevant and could no 
longer be tolerated.
82
 Furthermore, the ending of the Cold War embodied several positive 
ramifications for human rights development such as the spurring of new democracies and the 
increase of globalisation. 
83
 Such changing dynamics can be seen aptly in the change in the 
US foreign policy emphasis as captured by Clinton’s doctrine.
84
 US foreign policy shifted 
from primarily focusing on “containment” of the global threat to market democracies to  
“enlargement” of market democracies targeted at “rogue states” and undemocratic states.
85
 
Such enlargement included spreading the ideas of a market economy and democracy 
(inclusive of human rights) to countries which were commonly viewed as undemocratic by 
                                                          
80
 Tanjung Priok in Kasenda, 2013, op.cit, pp.88-9; Petrus in Lestiono, 1991, op.cit., pp.336-7 and  Marsinah in  
Avonius and Kingsbury , 2008, pp.104-7. 
81
 See Mayersen and Pohlman, 2013, p.37. 
82









the US and thus were considered to pose a threat to their interests. Led by US 





This would impact Indonesia because its human rights record now began to receive 
intense international scrutiny. The US under the Clinton administration (1993-1997), headed 
the questioning of Indonesia’s overall human rights record, especially concerning East Timor 
after the 1991 Dili Incident.
87
  With Clinton’s doctrine implemented, the US began to engage 
in a number of concrete steps such as unilateral sanctions in the form of military and 
economic embargoes.
88
 Later, US allies such as the EU and Australia followed this 
example.
89
 This was vividly demonstrated in the 1992 session of the UN Human Rights 
Commission which intensively questioned Indonesia’s human rights policy and produced a 




At this time, most Western states tried to influence Indonesia’s human rights policies 
through conditionality mechanisms, mostly by inserting human rights clauses in trade as well 
as military aid agreements. To complement this strategy, the Western powers stimulated the 
growth of Indonesia’s middle class by financially sponsoring a new breed of Indonesian 
NGO in order to ignite internal democratic change, as demonstrated in the strengthening and 
mushrooming of NGOs through underground and grassroot movements referred to as Arus 
Bawah.
91
 These included Lembaga Bantuan Hukum (LBH) or the Legal Assistance Institute; 
Lembaga Penelitian, Pendidikan dan Penerangan Ekonomi dan Sosial (LP3ES) or the 
Institute for Social Economic Research Education and Information; Wahana Lingkungan 
Hidup Indonesia (WALHI) or the Indonesian Forum for the Environment; and the 
Democratic Forum. They differed from the older types of NGO that had been government 
related and had tended to collaborate strictly in advancing the New Order’s economic and 
development programme.
92
 In other words, the Western inducements which mostly occurred 
during the 1990s had contributed to shake the very foundations of Suharto’s ‘New Order’ 
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ideology through the process of ‘Westernisasi’ and ‘Demokratisasi’ in all aspects of life by 




Sensing the different tone coming from its former allies, Suharto’s Indonesia initially 
maintained its strong stand against such direct meddling in its internal affairs. Indonesia 
began by threatening to cease its economic liberalisation and refused to follow the Western 
insistence on the prioritization of human rights.
94
 Indonesia then further substantiated its 
threat by expelling the IGGI donor group in 1992 for ‘interfering’ in Indonesia’s domestic 
affairs, and continued to break down opponents and insurgents and deny allegations of human 
rights violations by resorting to the state sovereignty principle as displayed in its East Timor, 
West Papua and Aceh cases.
95
 Simultaneously, Indonesia began to reinstitute its prominent 
role in NAM, as seen in Suharto’s leadership of the 10
th
 Summit held in Jakarta in 1992, in 
which the President tried to fend off Western criticism of Indonesia’s practice of democracy 
and human rights by stating that: 
 
…it is a logical consequence of the right of every nation-state to have its own 
personality and national culture as well as the right to determine its own 
social and political system. Therefore, the main reason for developing and 
protecting human rights as stipulated in the UN charter is to establish 
cooperation to increase respect and protection for these rights. And, not to 
accuse, to force incompatible values or worse, to use human rights issues as a 




The end of the Cold War had tremendous repercussions for Indonesia’s human rights 
policy. The international exposure of the 1991 Dili incident in the province of East Timor had 
forced Suharto to agree to the establishment in 1993 of the National Commission on Human 
Rights (KOMNAS HAM) in order to deal with growing internal and external scrutiny.
97
 The 
KOMNAS HAM was designed to address human rights violations, particularly in the case of 
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 Such a move greatly symbolised Suharto’s weakening position as an 
authoritarian leader, especially as the commission was formed after Indonesia had effectively 
expressed its agreement with universal rights through its support for the 1993 UN Vienna 
Declaration and its programme of action on human rights. 
 
In spite of the signs of a weakening regime, from 1995 onwards Indonesia continued 
to resist Western influences on Indonesia.  Realising the decline in the communist threat 
symbolised by the USSR’s retreat from Vietnam, Suharto began to capitalise on the changing 
external environment. For example, Indonesia under Suharto began re-energizing its close 
relations with Russia from 1989 onwards and reopened diplomatic relations with the PRC in 
1995.
99
 Then, Indonesia encouraged ASEAN to allow communist and socialist states in the 
region, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam (CLMV), to become members in 
what seemed to be Suharto’s balancing act between non-communist and communist states in 
the region and his effort to balance the increasing ‘threat’ of the US hegemony. A further 
counter-attack was demonstrated in Ali Alatas’s action as Indonesia’s foreign minister when 
he led the attack on the ASEAN-EC trading clauses since Europe began to entrench human 
rights clauses into the region’s trading arrangements.
100
 The latest, in 1997, was Indonesia’s 
suspension of the purchase of the US F16 fighter jet in response to the vigorous criticism by 





4.5.2 Uncontrollable Pressure and the End of the New Order  
 
In 1997, however, the Asian Financial Crisis struck Indonesia. This had an 
unprecedented snowballing effect on Indonesia's economy as the Central Bank of Indonesia 
lost its control over the Rupiah and the foreign exchange fluctuated extremely. The direct 
result was a steep increase in the price of basic needs or sembako and people in general began 
to articulate their dissatisfaction of the New Order's handling of the crisis. As economic 
development had been the main pillar for Suharto to justify his rule, the crisis showed 
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Suharto’s regime to be underperforming the economic tasks of which it had previously 
boasted. The crisis also contributed to the democratic opening for Suharto’s opposition and 
for civil societies to work with existing international human rights groups to put pressure on 




Suharto, with the advice of his economic team, asked for an economic remedy from 
the US, the IMF and the World Bank by requesting that large sums of money be given to 
overcome the crisis.
103
 The IMF and World Bank forced Suharto to remodel Indonesia's 
economy, and to base its socio-political platforms on a neoliberal blueprint, through a 
conditionality mechanism which was directly linked to the provision of the loan.
104
 IMF- 
Structural Adjustment Programs had also produced heavy inflation rates, job losses, and 
higher taxes which brought further impediments to the New Order government that led to its 
downfall in May 1998. In addition, the US had already been financing Indonesia’s domestic 
NGOs with large amounts of money since 1995 to mobilise them against Suharto’s rule.
105
 
The Western powers were also united in demanding democratic reform for Indonesia.
106
 Thus 
Western countries, neoliberal institutions and NGOs pressured Suharto’s regime to respect 
civil and political rights. 
 
During the last stage of his leadership, with the ramifications of the end of the Cold 
War evident in the external environment, and the economic turmoil and mass movements 
unfolding in the domestic environment, Suharto’s New Order regime was incapable of 
carrying out the trade-off between what was desirable internationally and what was 
acceptable domestically as it had managed to do effectively in the earlier years of its rule. 
Instead, the New Order’s last reckless attempt to remain in power, through ordering the 
shooting of university students during the Trisakti University student demonstrations in May 
1998, resulted in a number of students’ deaths. This aggravated the problems that it already 
faced.
107
 As the tragedy was widely covered by the domestic and international media, this 
allowed academics, university students, NGOs and Suharto’s political opponents to gain 
momentum by organising a ‘people power’ movement aimed at overthrowing Suharto, 
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known as the reformasi. With the economic crisis unfolding and reports of human rights 
violations ongoing, contenders for Suharto’s position, such as Megawati Sukarnoputri as the 
head of PDIP, Abdurrahman Wahid as the head of Nadhatul Ulama, and Amien Rais as the 
head of Muhammadiyah, were given an opportunity to pressure Suharto into stepping down. 
This was successful and brought an end to Suharto’s 32-year hold on power.   
 
4.6 A Neorealism and Neoclassical Realism Explanation 
 
4.6.1 The Cold War Analysis 
 
According to the neorealist assumption that external constraints directly translate into 
policy outcome, the ideal Indonesian policy during Suharto’s early rule was to bandwagon 
with the West completely. The first reason was because the Western powers had provided the 
necessary support for Suharto’s New Order to prevail over Sukarno’s regime by downplaying 
the issue of succession (namely the possible coup d’ etat and the questionable takeover from 
Sukarno) as well as restricting the massacres of the PKI members from international scrutiny. 
The second reason was due to the fact that the USSR and PRC influences in Indonesia after 
the 1965 incident were weakening, while the US was trying to strengthen its position in 
Indonesia after the defeat in Vietnam.
108
 Such a policy was reflected in Suharto’s agreement 
to democratise, to uphold pro-West human rights and to join the “free world” symbolised by 
Suharto’s newly founded democracy and the creation of ASEAN during the 1966-1970 
period. Therefore, it can be argued that Suharto’s human rights policy, that reflected Western 
conceptions of human rights, was part of Indonesia’s bandwagoning behaviour with the 
Western powers. This argument is also strengthened by the fact that almost every crucial step 
of Indonesia’s policy-making during the early years of Suharto’s rule, especially those 
involving sensitive human rights issues, was done via direct consultation with its Western 
partners, as can be seen in the East Timor issue and the handling of political detainees 
(TAPOL) in the 1970s.
109
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However, a dualism in Indonesia’s human rights practices under Suharto was evident 
during the period of 1966-1973 when both pro-human rights and anti-human rights actions 
were seen. From a neorealist perspective, Suharto’s human rights abuses towards domestic 
communist affiliates and former members of the PKI still reflected Indonesia’s 
bandwagoning behaviour with the West, as it was still consistent with the Western powers’ 
strategic interests to defeat communism. Yet, particularly after the 1974 Malari incident, 
Suharto decided to end his pro-West human rights policy. Suharto would then, instead, 
pursue an overall anti-West human rights policy which bore a close resemblance to Sukarno’s 
human rights policy during the “Guided Democracy” era, defying neorealism logic. This can 
be seen from the mid-1970s onwards, when Suharto began to abandon Indonesia’s 
bandwagoning behaviour with the Western powers by repressing protesters, restricting 
freedom of expression in the media and on campuses, and stipulating that Western democracy 
was incompatible with Indonesia’s governing ways by highlighting its ‘failure’ in the 1950s. 
This was partially against Western powers’ interests at the time, as most would have 





According to the neoclassical realist “domestic power structure-leader’s perception” 
model, the perceptions of key leaders and the domestic structure are important intervening 
variables in explaining Indonesia’s human rights policy. From 1966 to 1970 Suharto as the 
uncontested leader of Indonesia had enough support from the Western powers to consolidate 
his rule domestically because he had distanced himself from Sukarno by advocating 
democratic changes, even though such changes were not pursued through democratic means. 
Based on the UUD 1945, state institutions such as the executive and the legislative bodies 
were heavily underdeveloped and Suharto managed to capitalise on this condition. He did this 
by bringing his own personal rule to the legislative body through his sponsorship of the 
GOLKAR party and by putting his own military protégés into crucial executive and judiciary 
body positions, such as ministers, governors, ambassadors, judges and attorneys. Societal 
forces such as the media and civil society were also manipulated and propagandised by 
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Suharto’s military regime by making the PKI and Sukarno the scapegoats of the 1965 
incident and, hence, the public gave their uncontested support to Suharto’s rule.  
 
By having effective control of all domestic institutions, Suharto became the dominant 
figure within Indonesia’s domestic power structure, in which his perception became the only 
crucial internal variable in the deciding of policies to respond to external imperatives. 
Regarding Suharto’s perceptions, in contrast to Sukarno, he did not perceive the Western 
powers as a threat and he considered Indonesia a pragmatic and independent state.
111
 As 
Indonesia had become a modern state, in contrast to Sukarno’s Indonesia that was in the state 
formation stage, Robert Putnam’s ‘Two Level Game’ logic, is applicable in understanding 
Suharto’s pro-West stand. ‘Two Level Game’ logic stipulates the need for leaders to maintain 
a balance between their domestic constituents and foreign imperatives in order to maintain 
their rule, and such balance is referred to as ‘synergistic linkage’ between external-domestic 
imperatives.
112
 Consistent with this logic, Indonesia’s condition under Suharto’s rule served 
as an early indication of the establishment of a direct interplay between external imperatives 
and domestic concerns, as demonstrated by Suharto’s early manoeuvres to maintain power. 
This can be seen in Suharto’s temporary bandwagoning strategy with the Western powers to 
consolidate his internal power (mainly from the threat of Sukarno’s regime) and in Suharto’s 
embrace of the Western democratic system, the foreign capital-heavy economic system and 
his dualism of policy in terms of human rights during his early rule (1966-1974).  
 
However, such a temporary bandwagoning strategy, namely Suharto’s early 
democratic changes, turned out to be symbolic in nature and Suharto’s policy on human 
rights shifted in the 1970s. This policy shift was due to Suharto’s changed perception of 
human rights and democracy after the 1971 general election, and particularly after the 1974 
Malari incident. Here, domestic inferences, namely Suharto and his perception of threats, had 
a major part to play in the making of Indonesia’s anti-human rights policy. After the general 
election in 1971 and the Malari incident in 1974, Suharto, as the dominant figure in 
Indonesian politics, began to perceive that the main threats to his Indonesia and Pancasila 
could emanate from two sources: 1) the extreme left, which were the communist movements; 
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and 2) the extreme right, which supposedly referred to the Islamic and liberal movements.
113
 
As a result of his perception of these threats, Suharto began violating human rights by 
arbitrarily and indiscriminately suppressing communist, nationalist, liberal and Islamic 
individuals, movements and parties. He also maintained that Pancasila should be the only 
ideology for the people, leading to the creation of a concealed form of authoritarian rule 
called the ‘Pancasila Democracy’.
114
 ‘Pancasila Democracy’, like Sukarno’s ‘Guided 
Democracy’, was a distinctive style of democracy which can be contrasted with the Western 
style of democracy and can be categorised as an innovation on Suharto’s part to balance 
external influences upon Indonesia through internal balancing, instead of simple 
bandwagoning behaviour. 
 
Given the external opportunities at the time, namely the tri-polarity of the Cold War 
among the USSR, PRC and US, Suharto also successfully forged a compromise between the 
Western powers’ strategic concerns (communist containment) in the region and Indonesia’s 
own interests to suppress internal opposition movements (through the internal balancing 
argued earlier) that were perceived to endanger the New Order’s rule as well as Indonesia’s 
expansionist agenda (East Timor). Here, compromise means a risk-averse behaviour and a 
relaxed version of bandwagoning, as opposed to balancing.
115
 The Western powers could 
have pressed harder for democracy and human rights, especially with the East Timor issue, 
but, due to strategic considerations of the Cold War, the Western powers accepted Suharto’s 
compromise. This was demonstrated in their tolerance and impunity for Suharto’s ‘Pancasila 
Democracy’ and anti-human rights policy as long as he kept the communist movements 
within Indonesia in check throughout the Cold War. In this regard, the neoclassical realist 
assumption of the importance of intervening domestic variables is valid to explain 
Indonesia’s policy shifts from a symbolic pro-West human rights policy, yet anti-human 
rights policy towards communists (policy dualism), to a completely anti-human rights policy. 
 
At the same time, if seen from the ‘Two Level Game’ logic, the external and internal 
conditions of Indonesia during the period of the 1970s to late 1980s also highlighted 
Suharto’s effectiveness in maintaining the balance or reaching a condition of ‘synergistic 
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linkage’ in the interplay between Indonesia’s external and internal politics. Here, Suharto was 
able to find ways to align himself between what was acceptable externally and what was 
tolerable internally. This can be seen in the toleration shown by the US and Western powers, 
as well as Indonesia’s own domestic population, towards the New Order’s blatant violation of 
human rights in East Timor in 1975 and Suharto’s authoritarian repression of domestic 
democratic forces from 1971 and the Malari incident in 1974, all the way through to 
Indonesia’s human rights abuses in the 1980s in the name of economic development. Despite 
such indications, however, Indonesia’s closeness to the PRC through ASEAN and RTD had 
also projected Indonesia’s probable shift from an anti-Communist and pro-West stand to an 
anti-Communist and anti-West stand which was, nevertheless, still tolerated by Western 
powers in the context of the Cold War. 
 
4.6.2 The Post-Cold War Analysis 
 
The end of the Cold War presented Indonesia with a new and crucial systemic change, 
in which the pressures and threats to Suharto’s New Order regime were now actually coming 
from the Western powers, led by the US. The Western powers, for example, abandoned their 
earlier compromise with Suharto’s Indonesia and could no longer tolerate his anti-human 
rights policy, as demonstrated by the banning of both military aid and sale of jet fighters 
while enforcing a conditionality mechanism in linking human rights clauses to trade 
agreements, as seen in the ASEM agreement.
116
 Based on neorealist assumptions, Suharto 
should have opted to maintain his bandwagoning strategy with the Western powers in the 
post-Cold War era by heeding to the external pressure due to the geopolitical changes which 
included the need to improve Indonesia’s human rights policy. This was because Western 
powers had been Suharto’s main source of support for power and impunity.  
 
However, since the human rights values promoted by Western powers was in 
contradiction with New Order’s emphasis on collective and developmental rights, Suharto 
began to see the Western powers as a threat to his Indonesia. While Suharto’s control of the 
domestic power structure remained relatively effective throughout his rule, his progressive 
change of perception from viewing the Western powers during 1966-1973 as a possible ally 
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to a mild threat to the New Order during 1973-1989, and then as an imminent threat in the 
post-Cold war period, indicated the significance of a leader’s perception as a crucial 
intervening variable in interpreting the external environment. The dominance of Suharto’s 
perception also indicates the validity of neoclassical realism in analysing Indonesia’s shift in 
terms of human rights policy as the sole interpreter of Indonesia’s external imperatives. The 
research also finds that Suharto’s perception of Indonesia’s increased relative power 
distribution from a pragmatic, non-aggressive nation to a vocal advocate of ‘Asian Values’ is 
crucial in determining whether Indonesia would bandwagon or balance the Western powers. 
 
Being challenged by the Western powers in the post-Cold War era, Suharto viewed 
Indonesia’s relative power distribution as strong and he began applying either indirect 
external balancing or a hedging policy and internal balancing instead of sheer 
bandwagoning.
117
 Hedging, here, refers to a state’s indirect balancing act that is combined 
with engagement because of uncertainty over whether bandwagoning or balancing will be 
more beneficial.
118
  With regard to his indirect external balancing act, Indonesia began to 
hedge by resuming diplomatic and trade relations with the PRC and Russia in the 1990s 
while at the same time expelling the IGGI in 1992 as a sign of a deterioration of relations 
with the West. Then, with PRC support, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore were enjoined in 
the ‘Asian Values’ campaign by deflecting Western pressures through ASEAN, namely 
through the principles of ‘non-interference’, ‘consensus’ and ‘respect for sovereignty’. To 
accompany such a claim, Indonesia also tried to introduce the importance of RTD as a human 
rights norm to contest other human rights norms, namely civil and political rights, as part of 
its balancing strategy.  
 
Another form of soft external balancing displayed by Indonesia was its reinvigoration 
of the NAM as a third world diplomatic coalition, through its 1992 NAM leadership. Through 
NAM, Indonesia began emphasising the need for a balance between the promotion of 
individual rights and the needs of community rights. Indonesia also raised the significance of 
national competence in promoting and protecting such rights and refused to accept external 
meddling in Indonesia’s domestic affairs, particularly regarding its human rights practices as 
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captured in Indonesia’s 1992 NAM communiqué known as the ‘Jakarta message’.
119
 At the 
same time, Indonesia applied internal balancing by emulating a democratic institution 
through the establishment of KOMNAS HAM or a national commission on human rights 
with domestic jurisdiction to investigate the 1991 Dili case, in order to avoid international 




In explaining the last stage of Suharto’s leadership,  according to neorealism, although 
states are free to determine their behaviour in response to external constraints or opportunities 
in which domestic variables could be influential, but a misreading of these external 
conditions  (such as balancing when they should have been bandwagoning and vice versa) 
entails risks. This appears to be the case during the 1990-1998 period. Although Suharto 
managed to resist such pressures for quite some time through the above-mentioned measures, 
he nevertheless gave in to the Western pressures as his regime was incapable of sorting out 
Indonesia’s multi-dimensional crisis, instigated by the 1997 economic crisis.  
 
If seen from neorealism perspective, Suharto’s downfall reflected the Western 
powers’ prioritisation of the need for improvement in Indonesia’s democratic and human 
rights policy development as a condition of assistance to be given to the Suharto regime to 
solve Indonesia’s economic crisis.
121
 This can be seen in the West’s support, as ‘donor’ 
countries, for Indonesia’s innate democratic movement by increasing financial and political 
assistances to Indonesian civil society groups starting from the middle of the 1990s, despite 
the fact that such groups were still fragmented, scattered and ineffective in undoing Suharto’s 
determined authoritarian control.
122
 Such room for change finally came about through the 
IMF and World Bank assistance to Suharto’s government in dealing with the 1997 economic 
crisis. This ultimately resulted in a regime change in Indonesia as the Western powers’ 
exploitation of Indonesia’s financial crisis opened up the space for the domestic democratic 
movement to gain momentum. Finally, the success of Western pressures on the New Order 
regime by exploiting the economic remedies given and fostering domestic linkages 
comprising of democratic movements, local NGOs and Suharto’s domestic opponents was 
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Although neoclassical realism concurs with the contraints and the outcome provided 
by the abovementioned neorealism explanation, but neoclassical realism provides more 
detailed reasonings in terms Suharto’s policy options. If seen from neoclassical realism 
“domestic power structre-leader’s perception” model, despite of the immense external 
pressures to democratise, the main reason for the democratic opening as well as Suharto’s 
downfall was due to Suharto’s and his regime’s  misperception of threat and the solutions to 
the crisis. Such misperception led to the grave mistake of the regime to seek remedies in 
terms of advice and loans from the source of threat (IMF and the US) to overcome the 
crisis.
124
 In other words, to cope with the crisis, Suharto and his ill-advised economic team 
perceived that they had to bandwagon with the source of threat rather than to balance as their 
rational solution to the crisis at the time.
125
 This can be seen as a misreading or a 
misperception of the external constraints and solution since the US and Western powers were 
more interested in creating a condition for Suharto to step down rather than to assist Suharto 
and the New Order regime in recovering its economic performance.
126
 This resulted in the 
aggravation of the situation as a form of systemic punishment. For example, as a consequence 
of Indonesia’s bandwagoning behaviour, IMF’s misguided recommendations to cut down 
fuel subsidies and shut down banks worsened the economy and angered the Indonesian public 
and businesses.
127
 As waves of demonstrations ensued, Suharto’s New Order responded to 
the chaotic situation by violating the human rights of the protesters which further destroyed 
Suharto’s domestic credibility and rule.  In complementing such neoclassical realism 
analysis, if seen from “Two Level Game” logic, Suharto’s wrong policy option in the 
handling of the crisis disrupted the existing balance between what was accepted externally 
and what was tolerated internally, which Suharto had effectively maintained for 32 years. At 
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this stage, all Suharto’s manoeuvres to maintain the balance had become irrelevant since the 
end of the Cold War had made Indonesia’s anti-Communist authoritarian regime no longer 
acceptable to the US and other Western powers, while the New Order’s incapability to sort 
out the financial crisis had eroded the domestic justification for its authoritarian governing.  
Ultimately such condition created an alignment of external and internal forces in forcing 




This chapter argues that Suharto’s policy shifts from bandwagoning to 
hedging/external balancing and then to internal balancing could not be determined only by 
structural changes as, instead, they also were heavily affected by domestic imperatives which 
in turn affected Suharto’s implementation of an anti-Western human rights policy. As argued 
above, the interplay between the external and internal variables certainly affected Indonesia’s 
human rights policy. Such interplay indicates a possible deviation from neorealism 
assumption although it will still be restricted within neorealism constraints. In this regard, 
neoclassical realism would still argue that the external constraints are the primary 
determinants of Indonesia’s human rights policy, but this has to be supplemented by an 
investigation into domestic factors in order to better understand the policy choices made. 
 
The research finds that, apart from the President or the head of the executive, other 
domestic political institutions within Indonesia’s domestic power structure were becoming 
less relevant during Suharto’s rule. This was mainly due to external support for Suharto’s 
authoritarian rule, based on his retention of UUD 1945 which negated opposition, prevented 
development of state institutions and subdued societal forces. This resulted in a condition 
where, as the dominant figure, Suharto and his perceptions become the key factors in 
deciding Indonesia’s human rights policy continuation or shift in response to external 
imperatives. In this regard, the less developed the state institutions and political opposition 
groups, the more prominent is the individual ruler in policy-making, especially if the 
individual ruler had also earned the support of the Western powers to safeguard his rule. In 
this sense, the incorporation of the ‘Two Level Game’ explanation is needed to understand 
Suharto’s reasoning, as well as his objective in his pro-West stand and human rights policies, 
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and to complement neoclassical realism’s ‘domestic power structure-leader’s perception’ 
explanation. 
 
Hence, the changing stances of the Western powers towards Indonesia’s human rights 
conditions, both during and after the Cold War, clearly had an indirect impact on Indonesia’s 
policy outcomes. For example, this condition allowed Suharto, as the key interpreter of 
external constraints, to shift Indonesia’s human rights policy from the one that was part of his 
bandwagoning strategy, (as seen in his dualism of policy), to the one that was part of his 
balancing strategy, (anti-West human rights policy), in accordance with his changing 
perceptions of the Western powers from potential opportunity to potential threat. Thus, the 
more concentrated power was in the hand of a single leader, the easier were the policy 
choices that could be pursued, as demonstrated by Suharto’s abrupt shift from bandwagoning 
to a balancing strategy, without facing any significant domestic hurdles. In addition, this 
research also finds that Suharto’s ousting from power by the collaboration between foreign 
and domestic forces can be explained by neorealism, neoclassical realism and ‘Two Level 
Game’ theory. Neorealist and neoclassical realism explanation indicate that policy shifts of 
Indonesian government during the period resulted in the systemic punishment, namely a 
multi-dimensional crisis which led up to the downfall of the New Order government whereas 
‘Two Level Game’logic ellaborates on why the upsetting of the balance between the external 
and internal imperatives contributed significantly to the downfall of Suharto.  
 
The next part of the research will further explore Indonesia’s human rights policy 
shift and continuation in the post-Suharto era. The bringing down of Suharto clearly opened 
the possibility for Indonesia to have better conditions for human rights as a policy shift was 
imminent. Indonesia’s human rights policy shift or continuation, once again, will be analysed 









 Following on from the previous chapters, the discussion of Indonesia’s history in this 
chapter has reached the transitional period, from an authoritarian system to a democratic one, 
known as the reformasi period. During the reformasi period, from 1998 to 2004, Indonesia 
had three consecutive leaderships facing different external and internal circumstances. This 
chapter explores whether these differences resulted in human rights policy shifts or 
continuation as well as the relevance of the neoclassical realism “domestic power structure-
leader’s perception” model as an explanation.  
The first part of the research will look at the human rights policy of Habibie, 
Indonesia’s third President, and the environment in which it was formed. It explores 
Habibie’s efforts to shift Suharto’s anti-West human rights policy to a pro-West human rights 
policy, even though his leadership remained, institutionally, part of Suharto’s “New Order” 
regime. The second part will explore Habibie’s successor, Abdurrahman Wahid, and his 
choice of human rights policy. Throughout Wahid’s brief period of rule between 1999 and 
2000, most of Habibie’s human rights reforms remained largely intact. This part will 
investigate why Wahid seems to have been resisting the Western powers while remaining 
committed to his own agenda of human rights improvement. The third part analyses 
Indonesia’s human rights policy under Megawati, as Wahid’s successor. It explores 
Megawati’s shift to a Pancasila-ist human rights policy just as she was seemingly joining the 
Western powers in the ‘War on Terror’ campaign. 
 
5.1.1 Neoclassical Realism “Domestic Power Structure-Leadership Perception” 
Model 
 
When Bacharudin Jusuf Habibie came to power in 1998, Indonesia was facing 
immense external constraints symbolised by Western powers pressure to democratise and to 
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respect human rights. And just like his predecessor, Habibie’s response was swift and had 
catered most of external demands for Indonesia such as to foster democratic changes and 
respect human rights and to provide democratic solutions for Indonesia’s East Timor 
province. The points that need to be addressed here is why Habibie, a prominent figure from 
the New Order, decided to side with democratic movement and abandon his regime’s anti-
human rights policy as seen in the agreement to hold a referendum for East Timor. If the 
reasons, if seen from neorealism logic, were assumed to be due to the immense external 
pressures exerted by Western powers towards his rule, then why Habibie still failed in 
maintaining his leadership despite of heeding excessively to the external pressures as seen in 
the democratic changes made and East Timor seccession from Indonesia. At the same token, 
why did he also looked into human rights cases which may not involve external pressures 
such as the human rights violations involving Indonesian ethnic Chinese. In this regard, 
Habibie’s human rights policies seemed perplexing for both his own regime and the pro-
democracy advocates. Though seemingly explained under the assumptions of neorealism, but 
Habibie’s peculiar policy choices, nevertheless, needed to be further investigated via 
neoclassical realism involving “domestic power structure” and “leader’s perception” 
variables to better understand Habibie’s reasoning behind such anomalies. 
Meanwhile, as democratic forces became increasingly influential during 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s presidency and external constraints were softening as demonstrated 
by the lessening of Western pressures towards Indonesia (especially as the East Timor issue 
had been resolved) Wahid’s pro-human rights policies seemed to become the dominant 
feature in terms of policy options. The interesting question would then be why Indonesia’s 
relation with the Western powers did not greatly improve despite of having been transformed 
into a democracy. Simultaneously, why Wahid, known for his democratic agenda, was ousted 
by the newly strengthened and democratic parliament and why Indonesia’s internal security 
and stability seemed to be at risk under Wahid’s democratic and pro-human rights rule. As 
Indonesia was transformed into a democracy, analysts therefore needed to open the domestic 
‘black box’ in explaining anomalies in Wahid’s policy choices and, thus, foil the assumptions 
of neorealism. This increases the potential of neoclassical realism as a tool of analysis in 
explaining Wahid’s human rights policies, which can be distinguished from Habibie’s, as will 
be further explored in the section of this chapter dedicated to a study of Wahid’s rule. 
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Similarly, when Megawati Sukarnoputri took over from Wahid, Indonesia’s external 
constraints were in the process of shifting from being substantially reduced to becoming an 
open opportunity for Indonesia, particularly after the unfolding of the 2001 World Trade 
Center (WTC) terrorism incident and the later domination of the US ‘War on Terror ’ 
campaign. At that time, though provided with external opportunity, Megawati’s policy 
options (inclusive of human rights policy) were substantially constrained by the recent 
development of Indonesia’s domestic democratic environment. Yet, in spite of domestic 
constraints, Megawati seems to have been successful in bypassing domestic hurdles. This 
again points to the need for further exploration through the usage of neoclassical realism 
variables in explaining the Megawati’s continuation or shift from Wahid’s pro-human rights 
policies and the possible link between Megawati’s human rights or anti-human rights policy 
and the US ‘War on Terror’ campaign worldwide.   
 
5.2 Bacharudin Jusuf Habibie’s Pro-West Human Rights Policies: 1998-1999 
5.2.1 Mounting External Pressures 
 
As the first President of the post-Suharto era, Habibie assumed transitional power 
from being Vice President under Suharto to becoming Indonesia's third President in June 
1998, through the indirect appointment stipulated by Suharto in his resignation speech. By 
this time, as a continuation of Clinton’s international ‘democratic enlargement’ agenda that 
had begun during Suharto’s period, the US and its allies, including Australia and the EU, had 
intensified their pressures upon Indonesia by demanding significant improvements in terms 
of human rights, particularly regarding East Timor.
1
 The external pressures faced by 
Indonesia at the time could be seen in two ways.  
 
Firstly, the political pressure to democratise and uphold human rights involved 
sanctions.
2
 Indonesia was confronted with the already established transnational advocacy 
coalitions between the local NGOs, such as Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Tindakan 
Kekerasan (KONTRAS) or Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence, LBH, 
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WALHI and LP3ES, and INGOs such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and 
the East Timor Advocacy Network (ETAN) that were critical of Indonesia’s human rights 
records and were supported by Western powers and their allies.
3
 This resulted in at least three 
major demands for reforms, coming from within Indonesia itself, namely: 1) a guarantee for 
human rights as included in the 1945 Constitution; 2) an investigation into Indonesia’s past 
external human rights violations; and 3) improved internal human rights conditions.
4
 To 
accompany such internal demands, Western powers’ sanctions played a crucial part in forcing 
Habibie to comply with external demands. The US, for example, began to sanction Indonesia 
by freezing the US-led military training program, International Military Education and 
Training (IMET), in October 1998, and by suspending military sales in September 1999 in 
response to the violation of human rights in East Timor.
5
 In addition, Australian Prime 
Minister John Howard sent a letter to Habibie in 1998 which highlighted Australia’s human 




Almost at the same time, the PRC government voiced its concerns about Indonesia’s 
violation of human rights that had been directed against its Indonesian-Chinese population at 
the time of the May 1998 riot, prior to the end of Suharto’s rule.
7
 It had been reported that 
there were deliberate acts of inciting chaos and disorder in the community, resulting in 
horrendous acts of killing, torture and rape directed against the Chinese minority in the events 
leading up to the May 1998 riot.
8
 In responding to such violations, initially the PRC 
government had been mute because its position has always been that human rights matters 
belong within a state’s internal affairs.
9
  However, as public pressures began to mount in 
Beijing, the PRC government then issued a direct statement to Habibie’s government to 
investigate the matter and to bring the perpetrators to justice.
10
 This was a rare occurrence of 
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Secondly, it was the external market pressures led by Western powers which had put 
Indonesia in a difficult bargaining position to maintain its anti-human rights policy, as 
Indonesia needed to cope with the ongoing economic crisis. In this regard, the factors that 
contributed significantly to limiting Habibie’s policy options included the Western powers’ 
view of Habibie as Suharto’s extension, but with a weaker legitimacy, and the existence of 
the Western powers’ push for a democratic opening within Indonesia (as seen by the impact 
of globalisation, the rise of NGOs and domestic opposition) which had started in the later part 
of Suharto’s era. Thus, the Western powers would only need to intensify the economic 
pressures through the IMF and World Bank, knowing that Indonesia, under Habibie, could be 
easily exploited due to Indonesia’s financial crisis and heavy economic dependence on the 
US, IMF and World Bank.
12
 For example, this can be seen in the IMF and Consultative 
Group for Indonesia (CGI) loans agreements to assist Indonesia in overcoming the economic 
crisis that included liberal democratic clauses for Indonesia to implement in return for the 
loans.
13
 At the same time, the World Bank stated its concern for Indonesia’s human rights 
conditions, in general, and for East Timor’s in particular, and that Indonesia must take 





5.2.2 A Benevolent Authoritarian Regime 
 
Despite such mounting external and internal pressures, at the beginning, when 
Habibie first inherited the authoritarian regime from Suharto, nothing significant had changed 
institutionally from within the regime, other than the change in leadership. However, the 
external environment that the regime faced was different, as former allies were now potential 
threats, as demonstrated by the Western powers’ exploitation of Indonesia’s political and 
economic vulnerability. Similarly, within the domestic environment, ‘people power’ was 
gaining momentum.   Nevertheless, the remnants of the New Order had remained in power 
because power was still centralised in the President’s position and the President was still the 
source of all policy initiatives.
15
 The regime also continued to enjoy enough support from the 
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machinery of the state, namely the military for security and the GOLKAR party for civilian 
support.
16
 In this regard, Habibie’s power as Suharto’s appointed President did not receive 
any substantial opposition from within the regime.
17
 Outside the regime, however, the story 
was quite different, as democratic proponents accused Habibie of copying Suharto’s 
leadership and, hence, called for his removal. For example, the democratic movement and 
opposition leader, Amien Rais, pointed out that "...it is true and clear that the Habibie 
government is beginning to imitate the iron fist pattern of Suharto until the people are 
repressed and become victims".
18
  
However, while the authoritarian regime had largely remained intact, the democratic 
movements in Indonesia were scattered, fragmented and poorly organized, despite gaining 
momentum.
19
 This was because Suharto’s New Order policy had been successful in rupturing 
the organisation of civil society and repressing independent societal organisations.
20
 During 
the Suharto era, the democratic movements had to rely deeply on power holders (the 
President, GOLKAR party members and the military) or external forces (Western powers and 
INGOs) to pursue their agenda of reforms and democratic changes.
21
 Consequently, the 
democratic movements during the early days of the Habibie period could not overhaul the 
entire New Order regime because the achieved democratic changes (Suharto’s stepping down 
and the cabinet reshuffle) were merely the result of a compromise reached between former 
New Order members and democratic supporters.
22
 This condition had indeed provided room 
for members of the New Order regime during the Habibie period to re-configure their 




Although, initially, Habibie seemed to have maintained Suharto’s authoritarian 
regime, in the later part of his rule Habibie carried out constitutional and institutional changes 
that were disruptive to his own regime. As Habibie was also known as a civilian and a 
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Western-oriented figure (he was a German-educated engineer) who served under Suharto’s 
New Order regime, he was well aware of how Western countries perceived the New Order in 
terms of its poor human rights records, lack of democracy and transparency, and the East 
Timor problem.
24
 However, unlike Sukarno and Suharto who denounced democracy and 
human rights as Western creations, Habibie seemed to be more accepting of them as he said: 
 
We have explicitly abandoned the phase of conceptual uncertainty, which all 
this time has considered human rights as a cultural product originating in the 
West. We strictly have stated that human rights are our wholesome 
commitment to the respect of human dignity regardless of race, ethnicity, skin 




Due to such a perception, and the existence of the immense external pressures 
mentioned earlier, Habibie agreed to the insertion of external human rights elements into 
Indonesia’s UUD 1945 constitution, as a sign of Indonesia ending its ‘Asian Values’ 
campaign, and also included mention of individual human rights in domestic laws.
26
 This 
resulted from Habibie’s negotiations with the parliamentarians to insert UDHR elements into 
Indonesia’s 1945 constitution.
27
 He established law no. 39/1999 on human rights, which was 
Indonesia’s adoption of the UDHR. Habibie also decreed a number of laws which would 
guarantee freedom of expression in the media and campuses, relaxed the laws regarding 
subversion, and released Suharto’s political prisoners, intellectuals and former suspected PKI 
leaders.
28
 In addition, Habibie strengthened the KOMNAS HAM (which had been established 
during Suharto’s period) by allowing the commission to properly function as the only body 
with the authority to investigate human rights violations in Indonesia.
29
  
At the same time, Habibie launched RAN HAM or the National Action Plan on 
Human Rights, for the period of 1998-2003.
30
 The RAN HAM was an outline of the state’s 
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initiatives to rectify the overall human rights conditions in Indonesia, and acted as the 
encouragement to sign a number of UN human rights conventions.
31
 Through RAN HAM, 
Habibie ratified the already signed UN Convention against Torture (CAT) in 1998 and then 
signed and ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) 
in 1999. Indonesia under Habibie also signed and ratified other UN conventions, including 
the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organise Convention in 1998, and in 1999 the ILO Conventions on Discrimination 
in Employment and Occupation, Minimum Age for Admission to Employment, Abolition of 




Concerning Indonesia’s state relative power distribution, Habibie seemed to imply 
that Indonesia was a weak state in terms of economic power and was highly dependent on 
foreign assistance and trust. Such perception was mirrored in Habibie’s own perception of 
threats. The first threat was the lack of trust by foreign stakeholders in Indonesia’s economy, 
as Habibie believed that:  
 
The Government realises that our success in overcoming the economic crisis, 
apart from relying on our own ability, also is greatly affected by foreign 
assistance...These targets (economic recovery targets) can only be achieved if 
we are capable of regaining international trust, through the reaching of 
agreements with multilateral organisations, namely the IMF, World Bank and 
[Asian Development Bank] ADB, or support from friendly states in general 




Such a perception was reflected in Habibie’s dependence on international financial 
institutions. Habibie had willingly maintained the IMF and World Bank loan packages from 
Suharto.
34
 He also condoned this policy option despite criticisms circulated by economists 
and intellectuals, both local and international, which had suggested that the IMF and World 
Bank reform packages might not be acting in the best interests of Indonesia, as the neo-liberal 
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agenda of these institutions seemed to be at odds with what Indonesia really needed to 
recover from its faltering economy.
35
 Habibie, nevertheless, brushed aside such warnings and 
he remained committed to continuing the Suharto-brokered IMF rescue package. Habibie’s 
maintaining of Indonesia’s high dependency on the external package served as a sign of 




The second threat was corruption and nepotism, since Habibie believed that 
corruption, “is a disease that, if it is not properly healed, will spread and destroy institutions 
and even foundations of social and political systems of the state.”
37
 In relation to this, 
Habibie minimised his own regime’s potential for corruption. For example, Habibie set the 
MPR as the institution with the highest authority which could assess the President and 
cabinet’s performance as well as determine the selection of the President.
38
 He limited the 
presidential tenure so that the head of the executive could only be reappointed for a 
maximum of one more term (a presidential term is five years and the maximum terms for 
presidency are two) and he restored significant power to the legislative so tht all executive 
appointments, including ministers and ambassadors, needed approval from the DPR.
39
 Such 
amendments ended the executive’s domination of power through a more effective ‘check and 
balance’ mechanism between the legislatives and the executives. He then changed the law of 
the parliamentary system by adding more seats in the DPR and reducing the number of 
military seats as well as the military’s role in the parliament.
40
 Habibie also adjusted the 
qualification method for the party system, resulting in the formation of a multi-party system 
for the upcoming 1999 general election, which destroyed Suharto’s three-party system.
41
 
The third threat (related to the second threat) were violations of human rights and 
undemocratic practices of governing, which could lead to the ‘Balkanisasi’ of Indonesia, or 
Indonesia’s disintegration and anarchy. Habibie said that “...the shift from an authoritarian 
system to a responsible and cultured democratic system, in a peaceful and timely manner, is 
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the only convincing solution to solve multi-complex problems and the implementation of the 
reformation programme which we must endure”.42He then added that “the problem of Aceh 




Regarding respect for human rights in the East Timor province, on top of the 
mounting external political and economic pressures, Habibie emphasised his own perception 
of democracy and human rights and denounced the argument which claimed that his decision 
on East Timor was mostly due to external pressure.  For example, he was quoted to have said: 
 
My decision to solve the problem is so that Timor-Timur and the rest of the 
Indonesian people can truly enjoy human rights values, without resorting to 
‘double-standardness’ in deciding the fate and future interests of the 




External powers must not be given the opportunity to exploit the East Timor 
problem as a reason to interfere with the process of reformasi....if the solution 
for East Timor is executed based on the suggestions made by the leaders of 
the East Timorese people or John Howard then there will be long-lasting 




Consequently, Habibie agreed to hold a UN-led referendum for the East Timor 
province that led to its independence from Indonesia. In light of the external pressure to better 
human rights conditions in East Timor, initially the plan, as elaborated by Ali Alatas as the 
foreign minister at the time, consisted of two options. The first option was the Special 
Autonomy Status for East Timor as a final solution.
46
 The second option was to bring the 
East Timor issue to the MPR to be decreed as a separation clause from Indonesia, without 
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 Yet, Habibie, with the final say in decision-making, opted to hold a 
referendum for the East Timorese people to accept autonomy or be separated from 
Indonesia.
48
 In addition, Habibie agreed to the sending of multinational troops, the 




Although many of Habibie’s policies seemed to indicate a pro-West and pro-
democracy and human rights stance, his chosen policies would instead contribute to his 
downfall. Due to his controversial handling of the East Timor issue, though he was 
acknowledged by local NGOs and INGOs for the improvements made in terms of human 
rights, Habibie nevertheless was forced to forfeit his presidential campaign by the newly 
strengthened parliament. It was the parliament’s decision to reject Habibie’s accountability 
report in 1999, which brought about the end of his rule in Indonesia.
50
 Having been rejected 
by the parliament, Habibie withdrew his presidential bid because he knew he would not be 





5.2.3 A Neoclassical Realism Analysis 
 
Indonesia, under Habibie, seemed to have behaved in accordance with neorealist 
expectations. Here, neorealism assumes that the external constraints (Western powers 
political and economic pressures), automatically translate into policy choices of the targeted 
state (Indonesia) as part of the targeted state’s display of self-help behaviour (bandwagoning 
with the Western powers). Political and economic pressures from the US, EU and Australia 
and the IMF are assumed by neorealism to have forced Habibie to implement democratic 
change and to better human rights conditions for Indonesia. This can be seen vividly in the 
pressure placed on Habibie by the IMF and the US to improve the condition of human rights 
in East Timor, with the IMF’s loans in the forms of rescue packages for Indonesia at stake. 
Dispensing and withholding of loans in this sense had become an enforcing mechanism for 













the Western powers to make Habibie comply with their demands for democratic and human 
rights improvements in Indonesia, particularly East Timor.  
 
Based on neorealist logic, to ensure the state’s survival, Habibie opted for 
compromise as a soft form of bandwagoning.
52
 He did this by making excessive concessions, 
such as by making significant domestic democratic changes to satisfy external-internal 
demands for human rights improvements and by allowing the UN-led referendum for East 
Timor alongside the presence of INTERFET.
53
 The result of the referendum was in favour of 
secession from Indonesia and Timor Leste gained independence from Indonesia in 1999. In 
this way, it seems that the policy shift from an anti-human rights policy under Suharto’s 
authoritarian regime into a pro-West human rights policy under the reformation regime 
headed by Habibie was mainly due to the existence of such Western pressures. 
 
However, such an explanation using neorealism is still contestable. Mainly, this is due 
to the fact that Indonesia during Habibie’s early rule was not yet a democratic country and 
Habibie himself was considered a figure from Suharto’s New Order.
54
 Initially, when Habibie 
first inherited the regime from Suharto, the strength of the regime had not been reduced 
substantially through reformasi because there had only been a change of leadership and not of 
the regime’s internal power structure.
55
 Therefore, Habibie should have been able to continue 
Suharto’s typical strategy of reshuffling cabinet while maintaining the New Order policies to 
appear to satisfy democratic aspirations, despite the risk of being punished by the system. 
Hence, neoclassical realism would argue that, although Indonesia during the later stage of 
Habibie’s rule ultimately shifted to adopt policies that were more democratic and pro-human 
rights as a bandwagoning policy, the reasoning may not be as neorealism would assume (i.e. 
that external constraints directly translated into policy outcome). This is because, according 
to a neoclassical realism perspective, such external pressures did not materialise without 
firstly being translated by the domestic power structure and leader’s perception variables 
within Indonesia’s domestic politics.  
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The argument is as follows. Despite overwhelming external and internal pressures, 
Indonesia’s domestic power structure at the time was still intact because it had managed to 
allow Suharto to appoint Habibie as his successor, a move stipulated in Suharto’s resignation 
speech. This allowed Habibie, as the former Vice President during Suharto’s New Order 
regime, to easily claim the highest position without election within Indonesia’s domestic 
power structure that had been left unchanged by Suharto.
56
 This was also the main reason 
behind the Western powers and reformasi figures’ accusations that Habibie was merely an 
extension of Suharto’s New Order regime and that democratic changes could not be expected 
or envisioned under his rule.
57
 Thus, despite lingering questions regarding his actual political 
legitimacy and authority, and the existence of high external pressure,
58
 Indonesia’s choices of 
policies at this stage fit with the neoclassical realism assumptions.  
If seen from the neoclassical realism perspective, the figure of Habibie as the 
President remained as the crucial domestic intervening variable in interpreting external 
pressure, especially as the New Order regime’s 32 years of rule had been successful in 
reducing and fragmenting the development of other state institutions, civil society and NGOs.  
At this point, with regard to external and internal pressures for change, Habibie, who had the 
highest decision-making powers at the time, was provided with two feasible options to 
maintain his rule and legitimacy, if seen via neorealism’s logic. The first option was that he 
could increase his power base by siding with the democratic movements and accede to the 
Western powers’ demands through a gradual transformation into a democracy.
59
 The second 
option would be to strengthen his power base by siding with his former regime.
60
 In this 
regard he could adopt a status quo policy to boost his own credentials by entertaining the 
military and GOLKAR party interests while looking for other remedies to overcome external 
pressures, such as by the giving of concessions and pursuit of other economic remedies that 
                                                          
56
 In this regard Habibie still has an ‘absolute power’ of the Suharto regime to direct as it sees fit in Habibie 
2006, op.cit., pp.65-7 and p.73. 
57
 This can be seen in the formation of ‘Barisan Nasional’ or BARNAS in which important figures such as Eddie 
Sudrajat from the military and Megawati Sukarnoputri from the non-military were a member of in Habibie 
2006, op.cit., pp.150-1. 
58
 Kai He’s “external pressure-political legitimacy” neoclassical realism model problematises Habibie’s weak 
political legitimacy and high external pressure as one of his reason for succumbing to external pressures by 
using the external pressure to increase his political legitimacy. He, 2008, op.cit., pp.55-9 
59
 Ibid, pp. 56-9. 
60
 Habibie can still perform domestic political manoeuvres in “Habibie's Rule isn’t as Wobbly as It Looks”, 
November 22, 1998.  
140 
 
may not involve the IMF and World Bank loans.
61
 If analysed using neorealist logic, the 
second option entails the risk of systemic punishments, though neorealism, in this case, 
would be undetermined. Meanwhile, if seen from Putnam’s ‘Two Level Game’ logic, both 
options carry the same risks of either systemic punishments or domestic ousting if Habibie 
fails to achieve the condition of “synergistic-linkage” or an effective trade-off between what 
is tolerated externally and what is acceptable internally. 
Neoclassical realism argues that, in responding to Western powers’ demands, it was 
Habibie’s own pro-West human rights perceptions and weak relative power distribution, as 
argued in the historical narrative above, which served as the main reasons for Habibie to opt 
for the first option at the expense of the second. At this stage, Habibie’s own perception of 
threats and his view of Indonesia’s relative power distribution, as the head of an authoritarian 
regime, were the determining factors in pushing Indonesia to adopt a compromising 
behaviour as a soft form of bandwagoning in response to the external imperatives. This 
resulted in a condition where the actual democratic changes were introduced by Habibie 
himself (top-down) and not initiated by grassroots movements (bottom-up) that the Western 
powers had expected, although it does not alter the fact that such changes were self-
destructive to Habibie’s own regime.
62
 
 In addition, the giving of concessions by Habibie’s Indonesia, as an indication of 
compromising/bandwagoning with Western powers, also does not entirely follow neorealist 
logic. This was because, if seen from a neoclassical realism perspective, Habibie had also 
tried to utilise Indonesia’s giving of excessive concessions as his chosen internal balancing 
strategy to prevent further exploitation of Indonesia’s vulnerabilities by the Western powers. 
This can be seen in Habibie’s own speeches, in which he used Indonesia’s new democracy to 
prevent further ‘Balkanisasi’ or disintegration of Indonesia, gaining international trust for 
Indonesia’s faltering economy and ameliorating Indonesia’s tarnished international image due 
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to its poor human rights record. In this regard, external pressures, particularly from Western 
powers, though significant, acted only as a catalyst for change to spur on Habibie’s own 
leaning towards pro-West and pro-human rights reforms as his chosen internal balancing 
strategy.   
 
This internal balancing strategy, with the dominance of Habibie’s perceptions, also 
can be traced through other evidence. For example, Habibie agreed to the PRC’s demand to 
investigate human rights violations committed upon Indonesian-Chinese (namely killing and 
rape cases) during the May 1998 riot, which had contributed to the conditions that forced 
Suharto to step down.
63
 This is quite a landmark in terms of policy change since Habibie was 
a part of Suharto’s New Order regime, a regime which was heavily implicated in the ethnic-
Chinese and PKI massacres in the late 1960s and enjoyed impunity while denouncing any of 
the PRC’s claims of human rights violations in Indonesia. Habibie, nevertheless, also 
initiated an investigation into the violations of human rights of Indonesian-Chinese in May 
1998, despite the PRC’s concerns lacking threats or sanctions. Instead of being reactive and 
considering such claims as internal meddling, a team called Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta, or 
the Joint Fact Finding Team, was launched by Habibie to investigate the matter. 
64
 In 
response to the PRC’s demand, he stated: 
 
Anarchy in forms of looting and burning shopping centres and dwelling 
vicinities is even accompanied by acts of sexual violence directed against 
women, particularly of Chinese descent. The whole chain of irresponsible acts 
has tarnished our image as a civilised nation with high morality. As a cultured 




Such given examples have demonstrated that, when Habibie claimed the leadership of 
an authoritarian regime, it was his perceptions that crucially determined Indonesia’s choice of 
policy trajectory. In the end, however, Habibie was perceived by his own regime as a traitor. 
This was seen in the resentment evident from the military and nationalist groups in relation to 
his East Timor policy and the denouncement of Habibie’s nomination as the President by 
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prominent GOLKAR figure, Akbar Tandjung, while the GOLKAR party dominated the 
parliament.
66
 In addition, neither the Western powers nor the Indonesian democratic 
movements trusted Habibie’s democratic changes, as can be seen in the rejection of his 
accountability report by the MPR, an institution which he had strengthened through his 
reforms.
67
 Habibie’s downfall, if seen from Putnam’s ‘Two Level Game’ logic, also indicated 
Habibie’s failure in achieving the acceptable trade-off between external imperatives and 
internal constraints, where Habibie seemed to be failing on both external and democratic 
fronts, resulting in his resignation from being a presidential candidate in the 1999 election. 
 
5.3 Abdurrahman Wahid’s Islamic Human Rights Policies: 1999-2001 
5.3.1 Continuing Hardship within a Democracy 
 
Although Habibie did not effectively manage to secure his presidential position, he 
was, nevertheless, successful in delivering Indonesia its first democratic election in the post-
Suharto era in 1999. Forty-eight parties participated as a result of Habibie’s earlier 
democratic reforms and the election was held under the supervision of an independent body 
known as the Komisi Pemilihan Umum (KPU) while being witnessed by international 
observers headed by former US President, Jimmy Carter.
68
 The winner was the Partai 
Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP) which was headed by Megawati Sukarnoputri 
(Sukarno’s daughter) and had an overwhelming dominance over the other major parties such 
as Suharto’s former GOLKAR party, Abdurrahman Wahid’s Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa 
(PKB), and the PPP. The result of the election based on the number of votes was PDIP 
(33.3% of votes), GOLKAR (25.9%), PPP (12.7%), PKB (11%), and PAN (7.5%). 
 
Although Megawati was the head of the winning PDI-P party, according to the newly 
established rule the party needed two thirds of the vote in the MPR to be able to nominate a 
President, and her party did not manage to secure such a majority vote. Instead, the Islamic 
parties Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN), PKB and PPP, under the leadership of Amien Rais as 
head of the Muhammadiyah Islamic organisation and figurehead of PAN, joined together in 
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nominating Abdurrahman Wahid as the President. The Islamic coalition, known as Koalisi 
Poros Tengah or the Middle Axis Coalition, managed to secure the two thirds majority vote 
in the parliament. By the end of 1999, Wahid was declared the fourth President of Indonesia 
and Megawati Sukarnoputri was named his Vice President. Wahid’s election was significant 
because he represented a civilian with an Islamic background, as he was the head of the 





When Wahid came to power, Indonesia was still relying on the IMF’s rescue package, 
amounting to US$43 billion, to overcome the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. In this regard, 
Wahid had the perception that economic vulnerability was one of Indonesia’s greatest threats 
as he stated that “...the economic crisis that has pulverised our nation has resulted in the 
degradation of economic activities, the decline of people’s welfare, and the deterioration of 
important economic institutions.”
70
This resulted in the Wahid administration signing three 
Letters of Intent with the IMF (20 January, 17 May and 31 July 2000).
71
 To some extent, the 
IMF had also contributed to Indonesia’s acceptance under Wahid after receiving the 
INTERFET troops and further liberalising the economy in Indonesia. When Wahid tried to 
resist several of the conditions set by the IMF, it withheld loan disbursement, which would 




Wahid also indicated that the sovereign right of the state to operate within its 
jurisdiction should also be taken into account in relation to the IMF assistance package given 
to Indonesia in resolving the aftermath of the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis. Wahid stated that: 
The participation of the IMF, with its huge funds, in Indonesia’s economic 
recovery programme requires the government’s improved discipline and 
strong commitment in order to be able to comply with the policy framework 
agreed upon. This gives rise to the perception of an act interfering with a 
government’s sovereignty. Yet, the government is of the view that 
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international commitments have to be fully observed, while believing that the 
national economic recovery programme belongs entirely under our control.
73
 
Wahid's period was also marked by the effects brought about by the Habibie-
sponsored UUD 1945 amendments that created a more responsive parliament (the MPR and 
DPR) and a more effective check-and-balance mechanism among the executive and the 
legislative.
74
 As a result of the ongoing democratic reforms, expressions of opposition to the 
government’s policies coming from within Indonesia’s domestic environment (especially 
since Wahid’s PKB party had a weak coalition) had also become increasingly apparent during 
Wahid’s period. For example, the parliament and the public refused to give their support for 
Wahid’s plan to open diplomatic relations with Israel, and his subsequent attempt to do so 
failed.
75
 Wahid’s plan was unanimously rejected by the newly developed parliament, which 
also was supported by public demonstrations, and the plan was finally abandoned due to such 
domestic resistance. 
  
However, as Indonesia’s reforms slowly progressed into democracy, deterioration in 
terms of foreign relations with the Western powers began to reappear. With the newly 
acquired power and memories of East Timor still not far behind, the parliament and civil 
society at the time had mostly articulated an anti-Western tone in the conduct of Indonesia’s 
foreign policy. This was demonstrated in Amien Rais’s opinion, as the head of the MPR 
during Wahid’s presidency, when he rebuked the US’ constant meddling in Indonesia’s 





Unlike Wahid, Rais perceived the Western powers and IMF, which had assisted 
Suharto’s authoritarian regime, as a major threat. He criticised New Order economic 
performance as hollow and engulfed with economic debts and he described attempts by the 
IMF to make aid conditional upon improvements in East Timor as “threats to Indonesian 
sovereignty”.
77
 Rais also argued “...if Indonesia bows down to threats from the US, it will 
always be considered a light-weight and will continue to be manipulated by other foreign 
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 Whereas, regarding the IMF, he stated that “... (Indonesia's) economic 
sovereignty is in the hands of the IMF…the IMF is an unavoidable crime we have to commit. 
We did not want it, but we were forced to accept it.”
79
 In another example, in September 
2002, when the Commission I of the DPR (which deals with foreign affairs matters) called 
for the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, to postpone a visit, Amien Rais, speaker of 
the MPR, and Akbar Tanjung, speaker of the DPR, immediately concurred with Commission 
I and refused to meet Howard.
80
 This was a powerful statement of the entire legislative 
branch vis-à-vis another country’s executive. 
 
Such a domestic condition created a challenge to the US, especially as it had made 
Indonesia one of its targeted countries to be democratised.
81
 Mainly, this was because 
Wahid’s administration was judged to be liberal and the best option for the US ‘democratic 
enlargement’ agenda in Indonesia.
82
 For example, when Wahid tried to reform the military 
institutions, rumours were circulating in the public media that a military coup might be staged 
towards Wahid’s administration. In response, Richard Holbrooke, as US ambassador for the 
UN, stated that a military coup in Indonesia would not be welcomed by the international 
community, and this statement implied a warning against any domestic threats to Wahid’s 
administration, a position that was in complete opposition to the US and Western powers’ 
welcoming of Suharto’s military regime in 1966 against the civilian Sukarno.
83
 In this regard 
the US was also concerned of the increasing nationalistic tone of Indonesia’s policy due to 
Indonesia’s development of democracy that included the emergence of democratic Islamic 
figures like Amien Rais. The US, therefore, needed to apply a form of restraint in its pressure, 
especially as Indonesia’s newly democratic environment allowed the possibility for the 
emergence of anti-Western policy.
84
 Such US paradoxical interests ultimately resulted in the 
reduction of its pressures on Indonesia, if compared with the immense pressures exerted 
during Habibie’s leadership, especially on matters of democracy and human rights.
85
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The combination of such low external pressure and leaders’ perceptions, including 
Rais’s, resulted in an external opportunity for Wahid’s projection of a ‘high profile’ foreign 
policy.
86
 Such policy was mainly attributed to Wahid’s perception, as he said: 
The conduct of [Indonesia’s] foreign economic relations is aimed to be as 
optimum as possible to unleash the existing potentials of those countries that 
have financial, management, networking and technological capabilities. Those 
include the United States of America, the European Union, Japan, and others 
such as ASEAN, East Asia, Pacific and Middle East countries.
87
 
The implementation of this policy included Wahid’s numerous state visits to a number of 
Western and Arab countries, as well as Russia and the PRC, as Wahid began entertaining 
almost all countries’ interests in Indonesia despite maintaining Indonesia’s heavy reliance on 
the US, Western powers and the IMF. 
Yet, despite such a ‘high profile’ foreign policy, the domestic democratic changes 
also triggered hardships for Wahid as the first President to rule within a democratic 
environment. First, Wahid tried to democratise the military institution as part of his 
democratic agenda but it was done by appointing and removing military personnel according 
to his own free will, as exemplified by his same day dismissal-reappointment-dismissal of 
General Wiranto, a prominent military leader, and the dismissal of Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono, who was then his Coordinating Minister for Politics and Security. 
88
Although 
the main purpose of his actions was to demonstrate civilian power over the military 
institution, the result proved to be counterproductive.
89
 As the military began to think less of 
him, security issues and social unrests all over Indonesia began to flare up and the 
inexperienced Wahid was left with limited options, particularly regarding the Maluku and 
Ambon conflicts.
90
 Secondly, Wahid began to break up his party coalition, which had 
allowed him to stay in power, by dismissing from the cabinet Yusuf Kalla, who was a 
strongman of the GOLKAR party, on accusations of corruption. Wahid also launched a 
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personal crusade against the MPR by suggesting that he would dissolve the parliament by 




Such actions caused confusion for many of his former supporters and encouraged 
them to join Wahid’s opponents while, simultaneously, the financial market did not respond 
well, as demonstrated by the continuous fluctuation of the Rupiah. With political unrest and 
economic instability continuing to unfold, in addition to a number of embezzlement 
accusations directed towards him, namely Buloggate and Bruneigate,
92
 Wahid was also 
heavily criticised for the never-ending foreign tours that he had embarked upon as the 
President which, to some, was a waste of the people’s money. Others considered the trips as 
evidence of Wahid’s great emphasis on the external front rather than the domestic one. 
Wahid was finally impeached by the MPR in its capacity as the new strenghtened parliament 
after Habibie’s earlier amended reforms, and was forced to give up his presidency in 2001 as 




5.3.2 Wahid’s Human Rights Policies 
 
Due to the low pressures being exerted upon Indonesia by the US and Western 
powers, and internal pressures that would increase the nationalist and anti-Western tone of 
Indonesia’s policies, democracy and human rights developments in Indonesia at this stage 
were mostly left to Indonesia’s own political dynamics.  In terms of human rights policies, 
Wahid and Rais were considered as genuine advocates of human rights.
94
 According to 
Wahid, freedoms of speech, faith and expression are rights that must be defended 
vigorously.
95
 He also saw similarities between the human rights that were put forward in 
Islam and the Western version of human rights as, according to Wahid, within Islam, human 
rights is also acknowledged and respected and hence there should not be a violation of these 
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rights by the state, as had occurred in the New Order era.
96
 Similarly, according to Rais, 
democracy, pluralism and human rights are virtues to be found in Pancasila and Islam.
97
 
Consequently, Wahid had continued Habibie’s reform policy without significant 
opposition from Rais. The second amendment to the 1945 Constitution was made under 
Wahid’s presidency. Some of the important amendments were the insertion of the human 
rights clauses into articles 28a-28j, and Chapter XII which separated the police and military 
functions.
98
 Regarding human rights, Wahid also managed to pass Law no. 26/2000 on the 
establishment of a special court known as the National Human Rights Court
99
 as his way of 
meeting the external demand for transparency when dealing with human rights issues, 
particularly in the East Timor, Aceh and Papua human rights cases. Unlike his predecessors, 
Wahid apologised to the communist or PKI members’ families who were victimised by the 
1965-1966 atrocities, especially those connected to the killings performed by the NU-
sponsored Banser group.
100
 Under his leadership, Wahid also unbanned organisations with a 




Regarding separatist movements, the East Timor problem had been previously 
resolved by Habibie, and Wahid would only need to complete Indonesia’s withdrawal from 
the former province. However, there were allegations of human rights violations committed 
during the process.
102
 This was the only time where the US and Western powers gave a stern 
warning to Indonesia about the violations of human rights which had allegedly occurred 
under the eyes of Indonesian officials in 1999, and about the two UN volunteers who were 
killed by paramilitary groups in Timor in 2000.
103
 However, despite such warnings, the 
pressure exerted was considerably low as no added trade or military embargo was involved 
and additional conditions set by the IMF and World Bank in influencing Indonesia’s 
democratisation process would receive further lambasts, especially from Amien Rais, as the 
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 Wahid also refused Western powers’ pressure to try in a war crime court 
those who had been responsible for the violence in 1999.
105
 
Meanwhile, according to Wahid’s perception, disintegration was one of Indonesia’s 
greatest threats. He stated that “...our nation-state is now politically confronted with a threat 
to its territorial and national integrity through these separatist movements as well as due to 
the prevailing inter-religious and inter-ethnic conflicts.”
106
Thus, Wahid focused much of his 
policies on the troubled provinces of Aceh and West Papua, by granting a referendum for 
Aceh which would lead to an autonomy symbolised by the MoU reached in 2000 with the 
GAM, while he used the approaches of dialogue and the giving of concessions for West 
Papua  by visiting the province and by returning the usage of the term “Papua” from “Irian” 
as the term used previously by Indonesia. Such chosen policies were mostly due to Wahid’s 
perception since, according to Wahid, like Habibie, to uphold democracy (inclusive of human 
rights improvements) was the solution for Indonesia’s disintegration and disharmony 
problem. Wahid said that the first agenda of his government would be: “to build a democratic 
political system and maintain unification and unity”.
107
 Additionally, whereas the Aceh 
solution was a constant failure given the continued hostility even after the MoU, the Papua 
solution was regarded by many as quite successful since the dialogue and giving of 
concessions approach seemed to have been effective in reducing the amount of conflict 
involving human rights violations between the OPM and the Indonesian military.
108
 Such 
civilian solutions for troubled provinces, introduced by Wahid, could also be interpreted as 
his way of reducing the influence of the military by not resorting to military solutions in 
dealing with troubled provinces.  
At the same time, as a democracy and human rights advocate, Wahid had also 
encouraged civil society participation and allowed many NGOs to develop by giving them 
access to direct consultation with him on human rights matters or by allowing their inputs to 
government programmes, especially after the New Order had severely weakened and divided 
them.
109
 For example, it was also due to Wahid’s pro-human rights approach that NGOs and 
KOMNAS HAM’s inputs made under Wahid’s rule were able to be translated into the 
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provision of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) as part of extrajudicial 
solutions, as agreed by the government through Law No.26/2000. The TRC was thought of as 
a possible working solution for Indonesia’s troublesome past in provinces such as Aceh, by 
introducing a form of TRC to reconcile the conflicting parties
110
 but, despite such leeway 
given by Wahid, as these NGOs were still in an early stage of development, less influence 
could be exerted by them on other matters, especially as most were overridden by the 





5.3.3 A Neoclassical Realism Explanation 
 
If seen from a neorealist perspective, Wahid seemed to have maintained 
bandwagoning behaviour with the US and Western powers in terms of human rights policy. 
Despite the low pressures exerted by the US and Western powers, indications of Indonesia’s 
bandwagoning behaviour can be seen in Wahid's military reforms to reduce military 
dominance in Indonesian politics and Wahid's dismissal of Wiranto, a prominent military 
figure. Earlier, Wiranto had been positioned as his Minister of Defence, but, due to the 
allegation of Wiranto's involvement in the human rights violations committed during the 




However, again, there are several indications which suggest that a neorealist 
explanation is too simplistic. For example, although Indonesia's human rights policy under 
Wahid was in line with the demands of the US and Western powers to conform to UN human 
rights standards, the newly democratic Indonesia’s relations with the Western powers, 
particularly the US and Australia, were much more strained under Wahid than when 
compared with Suharto’s period. This was momentous, since such a phenomenon 
contradicted Indonesia's earlier strong relations with the US and Western powers during 
Suharto’s rule, during which Indonesia was well known for its authoritarian regime and its 
violation of human rights.  
                                                          
110
  Prasetyo, op.cit., 2006. 
111
 MPR rejection of Habibie’s accountability report, which led to his ousting and MPR decision to impeach 
Wahid, are two indications of the newly acquired power of the MPR as a superbody. 
112
 Wiranto was implicated in Komnas HAM’s report based on the Fact Finding Commission investigation. 
151 
 
It is also worth noting that, after Habibie’s experience of the loss of the East Timor 
province, the success of leaders in Indonesia to stay in power is greatly measured by their 
abilities to maintain Indonesia’s integrity as a unified archipelagic state as well as to avoid 
other Western supports for its troubled Aceh and Papua provinces. This can be seen in the 
articulation of a nationalist-toned policy, its respect for sovereignty and integrity, and the 
non-interference by the majority members of the parliament (DPR and MPR) and the public. 
In this regard, respect for human rights, therefore, could be seen as Wahid’s internal 
balancing strategy to satisfy Indonesia’s domestic constituents, instead of simple 
bandwagoning behaviour. Also, the change in Indonesia’s domestic power structure was quite 
different from the Habibie era because policy-making was no longer the monopoly of the 
elites or the executives due to the emergence of democratic forces that had resulted from 




Hence, based on such considerations, the neorealism concept of treating foreign 
policy-making as a ‘black box’ is not applicable in analysing Indonesia’s foreign policy under 
Wahid. The researcher therefore argues that the neoclassical realism proposal of opening the 
‘black box’ in this case would instead be more appropriate in analysing Wahid’s policy with 
regard to the interplay between external factors and domestic factors in the policy-making 
process, by applying neoclassical realism’s domestic intervening variables alongside the 
application of Putnam’s ‘Two Level Game’ approach. In terms of domestic power structure, 
the legislative’s status had been upgraded by having influence in the decision-making process 
through a power sharing or ‘check and balance’ scheme embodied in the reforms made. This 
can be seen in the new amendments to the UUD 1945, which established Commission I in the 
DPR to assess foreign policy matters and to discuss them with the executive, and article 13 
(2) of the amended UUD 1945 which stipulated that candidates for ambassadorial posts must 
be considered in consultation with the DPR.
114
 Due to such changes, Wahid’s perception as 
the President needs to be accompanied by Amien Rais’s perception as the head of MPR in 
interpreting Indonesia’s threat and relative power distribution. 
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In this regard, if seen from the perspective of neorealism, low pressures would create 
an external opportunity for Indonesia, under Wahid, to either bandwagon or to balance the 
US Western powers, but neorealism could not be used to determine which direction Indonesia 
may follow and can only suggest that wrong policies will be punished by the system. 
Neoclassical realism ‘domestic power structure-leader’s perception’ analysis, meanwhile, 
argues that it was actually Amien Rais’s view, as the head of the newly strengthened MPR, in 
resisting the West that had tremendous influence in causing Indonesia to perform balancing 
acts (internal balancing and hedging) which had sent Indonesia to its lowest point in terms of 
relations with the Western powers and Australia as reflected by Wahid’s foreign policy tone. 
Instead of confronting Rais and the public, Wahid, as a pro-democracy figure, acquiesced to 
their views. This was demonstrated in Wahid’s preference to back down against popular 
sentiments and the parliament by not pursuing his Israel policy, and by his policy to agitate 
the US. Wahid’s ‘high profile’ policy against the Western powers was also the reason for the 
international loss of support, as many international observers and statesmen, including his 
own friends, began to state that Wahid had produced an erratic policy which confused friend 
and foe alike.
115
 In this regard, though the Western powers initially supported Wahid’s 
administration as their best chance for a prospering democracy, as Wahid’s policy continued 
to be influenced by random domestic factors, the Western powers began to pull back their 
support for Wahid’s administration, and his impeachment by the MPR in 2001 was 
inevitable.
116
 In this regard, although neoclassical realism provides a better analysis in terms 
of deciding which policy Indonesia would pursue under Wahid, it cannot escape neorealism’s 
imperatives. Hence, neorealism’s ‘systemic punishments’ seem to once again be at play 
during the process of bringing down Wahid as, at this stage, most international and domestic 
media commentators believed that Wahid had to go due to his erroneous policy choices.
117
 
Furthermore, if seen from a neoclassical realism perspective, a closer look at Wahid’s 
government policy would also suggest that Wahid’s human rights policy continuation from 
Habibie seemed to be derived not solely from low external pressures as part of bandwagoning 
but also from Rais’s legislative support and Wahid’s own perception of ‘maintaining unity 
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and integrity’ as a form of internal balancing.
118
 Thus, human rights and democratic progress 
in the central region and provinces would ease tensions and would also reduce the possibility 
for external parties to support separatist movements, namely in Aceh and Papua.
119
 In this 
sense, as it had been for Habibie, Wahid’s human rights policy becomes a form of internal 
balancing strategy to maintain territorial integrity, due to his own and Rais’s preferences 
based on their neo-modern Islamic views which also respect human rights and democracy, 




Another clear indication that Wahid’s human rights policy was a form of internal 
balancing was the fact that Wahid had refused the Western powers’ demands to bring 
perpetrators of East Timor human rights violations to trial, despite Wahid’s own commitment 
towards developing human rights. The reason for this was because he viewed such demands 
as a danger to his rule and Indonesia’s stability since the military and Suharto remained 
influential despite the progress of democracy in Indonesia.
121
 At the same time, Wahid also 
displayed his soft external balancing behaviour by engaging a number of countries, or 
hedging politically and economically with countries, such as Arab countries, the PRC and 
Russia, to cut down Indonesia’s reliance on the IMF and Western states as well as to get 
external support for Indonesia’s territorial integrity by displaying its diplomacy which 
centred on human rights and the progress of democracy for its troubled provinces.
122
 This 
would later translate into his numerous state visits which, according to Wahid, served the 
purpose of getting countries to be committed to Indonesia’s territorial integrity.
123
 
Similar to the neoclassical realism argument, “Two Level Game” analysis also 
considers the interplay between external and internal forces with regard to Wahid’s human 
rights policy. The theory assumes that a leader’s main interest is to maintain his/her rule by 
finding a state of equilibrium between external expectations and domestic concerns. 
124
 In 
applying the theory to Wahid’s case, as Western power pressures were reduced significantly, 
as argued by neorealism and neoclassial realism, it should have been easier for Wahid to find 
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the acceptable trade-off between external and internal constraints to secure his rule. For 
example, Wahid’s democratic election victory and his image as a liberal and advocate of 
human rights had made the US and Western powers tolerate (low pressure) Wahid’s internal 
balancing strategy, as seen in his refusal to try the actors and individuals responsible for the 
human rights abuses during Indonesia’s exit process from East Timor, as well as Wahid’s 
hedging strategy to cut Indonesia’s economic dependency from the Western powers.  
Yet, Wahid’s impeachment by the MPR in 2001 indicated Wahid’s failure to maintain 
an effective balance between what was tolerated externally and what was acceptable 
internally, resulting in his domestic ousting from power. If seen from “Two Level Game” 
theory logic, it was on the domestic front that Wahid failed to satisfy his constituents, despite 
his significant pro-human rights policies. This was because Wahid had increasingly broken 
up his own party coalition, tried showing civilian supremacy over the military in a sluggish 
manner, and finally established erroneous policies. Several of such erroneous policies were 
pursuing his highly unpopular Israel policy, causing him to lose the Islamic population’s 
support as his original power base, and trying to dissolve the MPR through Presidential 
Decree, which contradicted his own democratic stand.  As Wahid’s foreign policy tone was 
becoming increasingly anti-West, Wahid’s impeachment by the MPR also caused Wahid’s 
attempt to better Indonesia’s human rights conditions to be overlooked by both domestic and 
external democracy advocates, and his fall from the head of Indonesia’s domestic power 
structure became imminent. 
 
5.4 Megawati Sukarnoputri’s Pancasila-ist Human Rights Policies: 2001-2003 
5.4.1 A Tentative Democracy  
 
After Abdurrahman Wahid was impeached by the MPR in July 2001, before his tenure 
expired, Vice President Megawati became Indonesia’s fifth President. Megawati, unlike 
Wahid, enjoyed firm military support and her party, the PDIP, was the dominant party which 
controlled 31 percent of the parliamentary seats.
125
 Her party also secured a substantial 
coalition with the major parties and achieved solid domestic support for her policies, in 
contrast with Wahid’s fragile coalition. Her ‘Gotong Royong’ cabinet reflected a fair 
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distribution of power among the major party members by making them ministers and officials 
in executive branches of the government. Though Megawati symbolically continued Wahid’s 
democratic reforms but there were indications suggesting the lack of initiative by her 
government to support further democracy and human rights development. 
When Megawati was chosen as President in 2000, the Indonesian government’s 
external relations with the US were at their lowest point. This was due to the US usage of the 
conditionality of IMF loan agreements to impose a Western human rights agenda, its demand 
to bring perpetrators of human rights abuse in East Timor to justice, and its latest pro-Israel 
position in the Israel-Palestinian conflict at the end of 2000 that had infuriated the majority of 
Indonesia’s Muslim population.
126
 This caused the Indonesian public to be mostly sceptical of 
the US or Western powers’ intentions in Indonesia because most presumed that the Western 
powers were prepared to undermine Indonesia’s sovereignty and unity if given the chance.
127
 
Meanwhile, the US also seemed to be wary of the PRC’s more assertive actions in the South 
China Sea and its increased trade in ASEAN, and hence began to engage ASEAN.
128
 In 
responding to such uncertain geopolitical conditions, the US, as in Wahid’s period of rule, 
exerted low external pressure (sanction-less pressure) upon Indonesia as it tried not to agitate 
Indonesia’s public further as anti-West views began to dominate.  
 
Such circumstances allowed Megawati to introduce her own ‘back to basics’ foreign 
policy.
129
 This was achieved by introducing a ‘neighbour first’ foreign policy which 
prioritised Indonesia’s involvement in ASEAN. She stated in her 2001 presidential speech 
that: 
In order to create a strategic yet conducive environment for the attempts to 
resolve domestic problems, last August I visited 9 ASEAN countries. Apart 
from reaffirming ASEAN as our foreign policy cornerstone, such a step was 




Her concentration on ASEAN was reflected in her role in establishing the Bali Concord II 
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agreement in 2003, along with the rest of the ASEAN leaders, to transform the association 
into an ASEAN Community comprising of the ASEAN Security Commission (ASC), the 
ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and the ASEAN Socio Cultural Community 
(ASCC).
131
 The ASC was later proven to be pivotal for the development of a human rights 
framework in the South East Asia sub-region. 
 
Internally, the third amendment to the 1945 constitution was also carried out under 
her leadership which mean that Indonesia’s public would be able to vote for the President 
through a ‘direct election’ process. In terms of parliamentary reforms, the DPR’s (lower 
house) Commission also began to function as intended to assess issues of foreign policy in 
Komisi I and human rights in Komisi III. This allowed the legislative to have a say in 
government regulation and policy despite the fact that the President still had the ultimate say 
in government’s policy, based on the amended UUD 1945.
132
 
During the same period, NGOs also continued to expand and demand human rights 
progress, as became evident during the terms of Habibie and Wahid. Local NGOs such as 
Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia (YLBHI), Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (AJI), 
Imparsial, KONTRAS, dan Kalyanamitra and Eksekutif Lembaga Studi Advokasi Masyarakat 
(ELSAM) continued their efforts in voicing their opposition to government policies which 
were in contradiction of human rights. Megawati, however, seemed hesitant and, instead, 
displayed a more conservative behaviour toward NGOs by showing a lack of both interest in, 
and sensitivity to, their outright demands. Thus, many of the NGOs were concerned about 
Megawati’s behaviour when dealing with human rights issues, especially in relation to the 
unsatisfactory result of the trial regarding Indonesia’s military role in East Timor in 1999, 
and the Tanjung Priok incident, which was mostly ignored by Megawati’s administration.
133
 
She stated that rights granted to the Indonesian public had largely been misused to promote 
only certain interests and anarchy: 
My impression is that there has been a recent pattern in society that tends to 
use human rights to fulfil certain interests while at other times human rights 
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are used to negate things that do not correspond to certain interests. 
Meanwhile, there is also the tendency to excessively adhere to it, as if ‘human 
rights’ is a limitless concept.
134
 
Interestingly, after the 11 September 2001 WTC terrorism incident, the strained 
relation between Indonesia and the Western powers would be substantially rectified due to the 
Western powers’ change of emphasis from ‘Democratic Enlargement’ to its ‘War on Terror’ 
agenda.
135
 Although Megawati had denounced the alleged terrorist attack, later she opposed 
the US retaliation against Afghanistan as a direct response to the 9/11 incident by stating that 
the US and its allies’ unilateral action was unjustified.  The US responded by beginning to 
loosen its pressure on Indonesia and shifted its policy from an overwhelmingly human rights-
concerned foreign policy to a more cooperative policy, as proven by President Bush’s 
engagement with Megawati in 2001 and the surfacing of talks about lifting military and 
commercial sanctions.
136
 At this stage, the Western powers led by the US had entertained the 
probability for Indonesia to once again be their partner, particularly in the fight against global 
terrorism. Such a gesture by the US and Western powers had gained ground especially after 
the 2002 Bali Bombing incident, the 2002 breakdown of Cessation of Hostilities Agreements 
(CoHA) between the GAM separatist movement in Aceh and the Indonesian government, and 
the 2003 Jakarta (JW Marriott) bombing.  
Concurrently, the elite groups played a vital role in Megawati’s decision-making 
process.  For example, Muslim groups under her rule proved to be an important element in 
influencing the policy-making process.
137
 Megawati’s intention to engage the US during her 
rule was becoming a complex issue after the US initiated an aggressive policy against 
Afghanistan, an Islamic state. The hard-line Muslim group in Indonesia’s domestic politics, 
enraged at US policy, had successfully exerted pressure on the Megawati government to 
criticise the US. Megawati’s government heeded to such pressure as she then started 
changing the tone of her policy, as demonstrated in her comments, and later followed by her 
minister for foreign affairs’ comments in the 2001 APEC forum, in criticising the US 
                                                          
134
 Sukarnoputri, 2001, op.cit. 
135
 Wibisono,  2009, op.cit., pp.195-8. 
136
 Ibid. The US change of attitude was mainly due to Indonesia’s large Islamic population which could be a 
potential safe haven for Islamic terrorists and militias and hence pose a threat to the US’ ‘War on Terror’ 
campaign. 
137
 Ibid. pp.219-36. 
158 
 




Also, in terms of IMF control over Indonesia, like Wahid, Megawati tried to detach 
Indonesia’s dependence on the IMF by completing the loan repayments needed for its 
economic recovery. Regarding Indonesia’s economic reliance on the IMF and World Bank, 
however, in contrast to Wahid who resisted some of the imposed Western-supported IMF 
guidelines, Megawati stated that Indonesia needed to settle matters with the IMF quickly and, 
hence, Indonesia needed to cooperate with the IMF.
139
 Like her father’s perception, 
Megawati had the view that Indonesia should be truly independent, self-sufficient and 
sovereign, and she also strongly argued that Indonesia should not be a ‘copycat’ nation 
whereby everything is being dictated from outside or by a stronger country.  For example, 
regarding the IMF, she stipulated that “...we remain committed to our principled stance that 
such a cooperation should not take over our own efforts to overcome the crisis or in any way 
interfere in our sovereignty”.
140
  
By ending Indonesia’s engagement with the IMF rapidly after the loan repayments 
were completed, Indonesia, according to Megawati, would have been able to cut off its main 
source of dependence, a sign of its lingering vulnerability, and it would be free to restore its 
self-sufficiency and to regain its complete sovereignty.
141
 Megawati’s government ceased the 
IMF loan package on 31 December 2003 which meant the end of external powers’ substantial 
pressure that had exploited Indonesia’s economic vulnerability through the loans.
142
 
Megawati’s ending of the IMF dependency indicated her intention to re-strengthen 
Indonesia’s sovereignty in relation to external powers and reflects her view of a stronger 
Indonesia in terms of relative power distribution in direct comparison with Habibie’s 
perception of a dependent Indonesia. 
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5.4.2 Megawati’s Half-hearted Human Rights Policies 
 
Under Megawati, the military seemed to be brought back to life after it had been 
pacified under Habibie and Wahid’s presidencies.
143
 This was demonstrated in Megawati’s 
policy which mirrored Suharto’s militaristic policies, as she herself did not seem to mind an 
increased role for the military in civilian life and politics.
144
 She stated that “...dwifungsi 
ABRI is not a problem as long as ABRI still dedicate themselves to the interest of the 
people”. 
145
This was visible in her chosen policies, particularly in the human rights field, as 
they tended to be influenced by the rebirth of the military influence in Indonesian politics, 
such as her refusal to pursue those responsible in the East Timor and Tanjung Priok cases, 
which had involved a number of military personnel.
146
 One highlighted controversy during 
her leadership was Megawati's endorsement of General Sutiyoso's reappointment as the 
governor of Greater Jakarta which enraged human rights activists at home and abroad, given 
Sutiyoso's alleged involvement in a number of human rights violations
147
 This strengthened 
the military’s position in Indonesian politics, and was in stark contrast to what her 
predecessors, Habibie and Wahid, had tried to establish by reducing the military’s role in 
politics.  
At the same time, Megawati herself did not vigorously advocate in favour of an 
external discourse on human rights. Megawati, for example, was a staunch nationalist and a 
loyalist to the formulation of Pancasila and the UUD 1945, and hence she considered that 
Indonesia’s ideal democracy and human rights implementation should be based on the 
Pancasila and the UUD 1945.
148
 She did perceive rights to be somewhat important since, 
according to Megawati, the military, the private sector and wong cilik (poor people) all have 
equal claims on human rights as all these parties are human beings.
149
 However, her 
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understanding of human rights can be distinguished from the Western conception as she 
stipulated that: 
It is very naive if matters on human rights must be debated between those who 
are in power and those who are not…indeed it is very naive to debate the 
interests of the majority with the interests of the state or vice versa with 
reasoning of human rights…such freedoms must be sourced from the basic 
understanding of human rights based on Pancasila…Moreover, it is not 
logically acceptable if there are other nations which impose or dictate to us 
their own version of human rights…the yardstick for human rights in 




Due to such perceptions, Megawati did not try to strengthen democratic or human 
rights institutions through new initiatives, as her policies were merely extensions of her 
predecessors’ policies. For example, Megawati simply continued the 2nd RAN HAM or 
National Action Plan on Human Rights which called for the next cabinet to continue 
international ratification of UN human rights instruments such as the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (ICC). The Government had also taken into consideration the 
DPR’s directives concerning law enforcement in relation to the protection of human rights.
151
 
Wahid’s proposed Law No. 26 of 2000 on Human Rights Tribunal, as a legal instrument, was 
complemented under Megawati by Government Regulation No. 2 of 2002 regarding its 
Procedure on Protection of Victims and Witnesses in relation to Grave Violation of Human 
Rights, and by Government Regulation No. 3 of 2002 regarding Compensation, Restitution 
and Rehabilitation for the Victims of Grave Violation of Human Rights. The judicial process 
on human rights cases as they became ready for trial, including that of the violation of human 
rights in East Timor, was also under way during Megawati’s term of office.
152
 
However, after the 2001 WTC incident in the US, the human rights policies of 
Megawati’s government shifted. According to a Human Rights Watch report, Megawati’s 
human rights policies resembled those from Suharto’s New Order.
153
 For example, with less 
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international pressure and less scrutiny for Indonesia’s human rights conditions, Megawati 
was beginning to restrict freedom of expression, as demonstrated in a number of individual 
arrests made by her government during peaceful demonstrations.
154
 Megawati also seemed to 
prefer a heavy-handed or militaristic policy on regional unrests such as the ones applied to 
Aceh’s GAM movement, if compared with Wahid’s dialogue approach, as seen in her 
government’s military aggression in 2002 against GAM members following the breakdown 
of CoHA.
155
 She also perceived that there was a considerable link between the threat of 
separatism and the discourse of democracy (inclusive to human rights) and, hence, the 
solution for both is relatively similar as she said that “...in parallel to the economic and 
recession problems as well as the stronghold of world fear of terrorism, I need to report that 
the tendency to secede – or separatism – needs to be treated with great caution”.
156
She also 
added that “...the threat of separatism in certain regions, which rides behind the discourses of 
democracy, openness, and human rights, has been resolved”.
157
 
  Another report by the Coalition of NGOs stated that Megawati’s government seemed 
incapacitated when it came to bringing the perpetrators of human rights violations to justice, 
namely regarding the Tanjung Priok and East Timor cases, even though the trials had 
commenced.
158
 The trials were even considered as Megawati’s way to wash her hands of 
government responsibilities or involvement in these human rights violation cases. In addition, 
Megawati’s administration was suspected of having purposefully delayed the ratification of 
two of the most important human rights conventions, namely the ICCPR and the ICESCR, 




5.4.3 A Neoclassical Realism Explanation 
 
If seen from the perspective of neorealism, prior to the September 2001 WTC 
incident, the relaxation of external political and economic pressures on Indonesia had 
unpredictable consequences for Indonesia’s behaviour, such as whether Indonesia would 
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balance against or bandwagon with the Western powers. In her early rule, despite the low 
pressures from her external environment, Megawati seemed to be bandwagoning with 
Western powers, as demonstrated by her early chosen policies, namely continuing the IMF 
loan policy and human rights policies initiated by her predecessors. Yet, if seen from a 
neoclassical realist perspective, as Indonesia was facing more relaxed external constraints 
prior to the WTC 2001 incident, there were several indications that Megawati had abandoned 
Indonesia’s bandwagoning behaviour. Firstly, Megawati seemed to be very interested in a 
policy for Indonesia to opt out of the IMF loans contract expediently in order to reclaim 
Indonesia’s economic sovereignty which had been severely brought down by the Western 
powers, IMF and World Bank through the conditionality mechanism. Secondly, her 
consolidation of internal power prevented a vibrant parliament and halted the progress for a 
more democratic environment in Indonesia’s domestic politics that had been demanded by 
Western powers at the time. Also, Megawati was astutely congenial towards military figures, 
and the military organisations seemed to reciprocate her welcoming gestures, making her the 
acceptable figure for the military despite Western NGOs articulated concerns of a possible 
military comeback in Indonesia.
160
 This, for example, may have contributed to her less 
enthusiastic human rights policy and the marginalisation of NGOs. Meanwhile, potential 
civilian oppositions avoided clashing with the Megawati government as most parliament 
members realised that Megawati had commanded a strong majority party, the PDIP, in the 
parliament and she had strong support from the military.
161
 Such conditions can be contrasted 
with Wahid’s experience where parliamentary members and the military were committed to 
pose a head-on challenge against the executive. 
The reasons of such choices of policy can be traced using neoclassical realism’s 
intervening variables. In terms of domestic power structure, Megawati seemed to have 
applied a lesson learnt from Wahid’s mistakes. Her priorities were on not making internal 
enemies and not applying Wahid’s style of democracy where random domestic factors such 
as NGOs, civil societies, legislatives and other formal and informal institutions can play a 
part in policy-making. This resulted in Megawati’s domestic manoeuvres to embrace the 
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military figures linked to the New Order to assure stability and security, to pacify 
parliamentary power and, thus, she alienated civil society groups.
162
 In this regard, the change 
in domestic power structure which had favoured Megawati’s rule also provided substantial 
room for further democratic reforms to take place but Megawati, as the leading influential 
figure, did not capitalise on such a domestic opportunity to maintain the democratic 
momentum. One clear example of this was the fact that she had refused to resume Wahid’s 
military reforms which could endanger her own rule as well as Indonesia’s survival. Having 
pacified the parliament and civil society (inclusive of NGOs) and embraced the military, 
Megawati’s perception becomes the crucial domestic intervening variable for her chosen 
policies in responding to the external demands.  
As Megawati had now become very influential in policy-making, she responded to the 
existing external constraints and internal threats through a series of balancing strategies 
directed at Western powers’ influence. Firstly, she applied an internal balancing strategy by 
being adamant about not giving in to the pressures to democratise further, as dictated by 
external parties and NGOs, as she decided to limit Indonesia’s human rights progress after it 
was set in motion by Habibie and Wahid.
163
 The other indication of her internal balancing 
strategy was clearly depicted in her government’s lack of commitment in investigating and 
holding trials for perpetrators of past human rights violations committed by the military 
figures from the New Order regime. In this regard, Megawati’s domestic manoeuvre for 
internal consolidation was aptly targeted to ensure her regime’s survival by ensuring internal 




At the same time, she also began to embark on a soft form of external balancing 
strategy by re-engaging ASEAN. The reason for this was mainly because ASEAN was 
Indonesia’s regional defence to counter threatening external influences (as seen in Suharto’s 
usage of ASEAN to counter the spread of communism during the Cold War) while, at the 
same time, economic stability could be promoted through ASEAN by gaining greater 
confidence from major trading partners, foreign investors, donor agencies and donor 
countries as a way for Indonesia to consolidate its economic strength.
165
 Also, through 
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ASEAN’s ASC, as part of ASEAN Concord II, Indonesia began to display its external 
balancing strategy.
166
 The ASC, apart from being used to reclaim Indonesia’s 'strategic 
centrality', was used to project Indonesia’s human rights interests in ASEAN.
167
 Indonesia’s 
interest in the ASC was to show the international community in general, and Western powers 
in particular, that there was another way to promote human rights in the region which does 
not involve sanctioning, aid-withholding, or political pressure. It could be achieved the 
ASEAN way, involving mechanisms such as ‘constructive intervention’, ‘flexible 




However, in the post-September 2001 WTC incident period, the external environment 
had presented Indonesia with a completely different geopolitical condition. Here, the external 
pressures exerted upon Indonesia changed drastically as the Western powers would instead be 
welcoming Indonesia to join their ‘War on Terror’ campaign by applying a less-concerned 
policy regarding their human rights agenda and, instead, resuming military and economic 
cooperation. The Western powers’ sudden change of attitude towards Indonesia’s handling of 
human rights and democracy had also, indeed, questioned Indonesia’s ‘reformasi’ agenda 
motives. Such changing systemic pressure could also potentially point out the reasoning 
behind Indonesia’s democratic changes, whether the applied democratic reforms were made 
genuinely based on Indonesia’s own grassroots democratic movement or simply a 
government strategy to serve its national interests. This was because external pressures and 
threats had now become an external opportunity for Indonesia to either continue or to reverse 
the ongoing democratic process.  
Interestingly, Megawati was initially not moved by such external gestures until a 
number of incidents occurred, namely the 2002 Bali Bombing and the 2003 Jakarta (JW 
Marriott) Bombing.
169
 If seen from a neorealist perspective, after these domestic incidents, 
Megawati should have bandwagoned automatically, considering the Western powers’ 
welcoming gestures and Megawati’s less enthusiastic human rights stance. Yet, neoclassical 
realism would argue, although Megawati would later bandwagon with the Western powers’ 
‘War on Terror’ campaign with anti-human rights fervour, a closer look at Megawati’s policy 
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would suggest that there might be domestic reasons which caused the delay in her 
bandwagoning behaviour that had repercussions for her upcoming shift in her human rights 
policy. This means that the reasoning behind Megawati’s shift in policy from balancing to 
bandwagoning behaviour, and from an anti-West human rights policy to an overall anti-
human rights policy, would firstly need to be traced through an investigation using 
neoclassical realism’s domestic intervening variables, namely the domestic power structure 
and Megawati’s own perceptions.  
During this period, the Western powers and Australia would now be less vocal in 
criticising Indonesia’s human rights records, despite knowing Megawati’s tendencies to delay 
Indonesia’s human rights progress. When the 9/11 tragedy unfolded, Megawati had earlier 
been planning a state visit to the US, so she decided to proceed with the visit and tried to 
seize the opportunity immediately by condemning the terrorist attacks. This is a sign of a 
possible bandwagon with the US.
170
 The US responded with the invasion of Afghanistan as 
retaliation for the incident. However, if seen from the existing domestic power structure at the 
time, due to the emergence of democratic forces in forms of oppositions within Indonesia’s 
newly revamped domestic power structure, Megawati could not pursue an immediate 
bandwagoning strategy with the US. Mainly this was because there were immense domestic 
pressures led by a number of Islamic parties and the majority of the Islamic groups in 
demanding that the government should take a strong stand against US invasion of Islamic 
countries.
171
 This also indicated a show of strength of Islam as a political power within 
Indonesia’s domestic power structure. In responding to such internal pressure, Megawati and 
her foreign minister would then formally readjust Indonesia’s position in rejecting the US 
unilateral action towards Afghanistan.
172
 
Despite such internal pressure, Megawati continued to entertain the US anti-terrorism 
policy by meeting with US President Bush in Bali, even after Indonesia’s policy against the 
US invasion had been ignored by the US. This is a sign of her government’s bandwagoning 
behaviour.  In this regard, despite the intense criticisms coming from Indonesia’s domestic 
actors, such as parliamentary members and Islamic NGOs, the domestic power structure 
allowed Megawati and her coalitions (military, PDIP, and GOLKAR) to have the ultimate say 
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in deciding policies. She continued her initial strategy of bandwagoning with the US and 
Australia to investigate and arrest terrorist suspects from Jamaah Islamiyah (JI), which was 
believed to be affiliated with Al Qaeda and had planned the two bombings.
173
 At the same 
time, the government under Megawati would also begin to expand the authority and structure 
of its national intelligence body, namely the Badan Intelijen Nasional (BIN), as seen in the 
government ‘anti-terrorism’ regulations. Such regulations were viewed as restricting civil 
liberties because they provided intelligence institutions with a coercive power to detain 
suspected individuals or retrieve information in the name of protecting civilians from 
terrorism.
174
 This means, as a sign of Indonesia’s bandwagoning behaviour with the US, that 
Indonesia had shifted from a reform policy with a heavy human rights agenda, as instigated 
by Habibie and Wahid, to a policy which had accommodated strong anti-terrorism measures 
through regulations which were anti-human rights in nature.
175
  
At this stage, Megawati also used Indonesia’s bandwagoning behaviour to safeguard 
her rule.
176
 Provided with the opportunities in her external environment and influenced by her 
closeness to the military, Megawati would now try to bring Indonesia to converge its interests 
with those of the US and its allies to solve Indonesia’s domestic problem of local terrorism 
and separatism, especially after the breaking down of the CoHA agreement between the GoI 
and Acehnese GAM in 2002.
177
 In other words, she had attempted to link Indonesia’s Aceh 
problem to the global Islamic extremist and militant movements in spite of meeting US’ 
objection.
178
 This puts her policy in stark contrast with those of Habibie and Wahid, who had 
both tried democratic solutions such as human rights improvements, dialogue and granting of 
autonomy in dealing with separatist issues. 
As a result, despite the democratic changes in Indonesia’s domestic power structure, 
her strong political coalition and her closeness with the military allowed her to stage a full 
scale military aggression against GAM in Indonesia’s Aceh province, by bypassing the 
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existing domestic hurdles. The aggression resulted in a large amount of civilian casualties and 
considerable human rights violations in the Aceh province as part of her iron hand strategy 
towards the secession movements which had threatened Indonesia’s territorial integrity. The 
immediate reaction was that the US Congress proposed a continuation of the banning of arms 
sales and supplies to Indonesia, while the British government refused to allow its fighter jets 
to be used in the military campaign against Aceh.
179
 However, such sanctions had less impact 
on Megawati’s bandwagoning policy because President Bush would instead reinstate military 
ties with Indonesia despite US congress’s resentment.
180
  
The success of Megawati and Bush to downplay international concerns regarding 
Indonesia’s regression in terms of human rights was an indication of an improved 
relationship between Indonesia and the US. As a result, no substantial international scrutiny 
took place regarding Megawati’s handling of GAM, in contrast to the 1999 East Timor case. 
By applying bandwagoning strategy, after the 2002 Bali bombing and the 2003 Jakarta 
Bombing, Megawati was successful in putting Indonesia’s interests back on the US agenda, 
as symbolized by the agreement signed by both countries to resume provision of military 
supplies and military training, as well as the Indonesia-Australia joint establishment of the 
Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement and Counterterrorism (JCLEC) in 2004, despite the 
continued violation of human rights. This would also mean that Megawati’s pragmatic 
interpretation of independent and active policy began swinging the pendulum back to the 
right, and Indonesia under Megawati would bandwagon with the US by choice. 
 
If seen from “Two Level Game” theory logic, Megawati’s smooth ruling until the 
expiration of her term in 2004 showed her success in maintaining an effective balance 
between external constraints and domestic expectations. For example, Megawati’s internal 
balancing strategies, as argued by neoclassical realism (paying off the IMF loans expediently, 
marginalising democratic movements and embracing the military) showed her success in 
meeting her domestic constituents’ expectations. Meanwhile, her external balancing 
strategies, such as re-engaging ASEAN to balance the Western powers’ influence, and her 
later shift to bandwagoning with the US ‘War on Terror’ campaign indicated her 
government’s effective reading of external constraints and opportunities to serve Indonesia’s 
interests, as well as Megawati’s own as rule. This was demonstrated in the Western powers’ 
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shifting positions towards Indonesia, from being tolerant of Megawati’s internal balancing 
strategies prior to the 2001 WTC incident to inviting Megawati to align her interests with 
Western powers in the post-2001 WTC period, despite Megawati facing domestic oppositions 
(NGOs and Islamic movements). Yet, Megawati’s alignment between external 
constraints/opportunities and domestic expectations comes with a consequence. Such 
consequence was that Indonesia’s democratic progress, initiated by Habibie and Wahid, 
seemed to have been deprioritised by her aligned interests with Western powers to deal with 
Indonesia’s separatism problem and terrorism. This can be seen in the increased number of 
human rights violations committed by her government, despite her effective rule, if compared 




In conclusion, the research finds that, during the Habibie period, the transitional 
President faced immense Western power pressures which immediately suggested a potential 
neorealism explanation as the most plausible explanation for Indonesia’s human rights policy 
shift. However, as neoclassical realism can consider, since state institutions and democratic 
forces had only been in an embryonic stage, Habibie’s position and  perceptions remained as 
the most crucial intervening domestic variables in determining Indonesia’s bandwagoning or 
balancing behaviour in responding to the heavy Western pressure. With regard to Habibie’s 
anomaly of pro-human rights and democracy policies which tended to be disruptive to his 
New Order regime, neoclassical realism analysis would need to be complemented by ‘Two 
Level Game’ theory analysis in order to get a better understanding of Habibie’s oversight of 
the consequences of his own actions as Indonesia, after the Habibie-led reforms, transformed 
into a functioning new democracy with unpredictable policy variants on human rights and the 
practice of democracy.  
Facing a less constrained external environment, Habibie’s successor, Wahid tried to 
maintain a policy continuation in terms of human rights within Indonesia’s new democracy. 
The research finds that neoclassical realism analysis illustrates that, during Wahid’s rule, the 
low and more relaxed external pressures allowed Indonesia to perform both external and 
internal balancing. Interestingly, however, such state balancing behaviour was mainly due to 
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the development of Indonesia’s domestic political institutions, particularly the MPR, as seen 
in the rise of Rais’s influence in Wahid’s policy-making. Yet at the same time, Wahid and 
Rais’s pro-West human rights policy is in agreement with their perceptions of neo-modern 
Islamic human rights and, thus, can be construed as an internal balancing act to maintain 
Indonesia’s stability and territorial integrity against Western influences in Indonesia’s 
domestic affairs, such as separatism. Even so, again, Wahid’s erroneous policy towards the 
end of his rule, as neoclassical realism and ‘Two Level Game’ theory analysis points out, was 
mainly due to his erroneous choice of internal and external policies in testing the relations 
between Indonesia’s new domestic democracy and its external environment, and it ultimately 
led to Wahid’s impeachment by the MPR, as Indonesia’s newly strengthened parliament. 
With regard to Indonesia’s human rights policy during Megawati’s presidency, the 
research also finds that, through the usage of neoclassical realism and ‘Two Level Game’ 
theory analysis, overall, Megawati had been less concerned about human rights policies. Prior 
to the 2001 WTC incident, her policies served as soft balancing behaviour targeted at the 
Western powers’ influence although, just as in Wahid’s period, they were tolerated by 
Western powers. She was nevertheless successful in finding an effective trade-off between 
what was expected domestically and what was tolerated externally. Her success was achieved 
through a number of internal balancing strategies such as Megawati’s manoeuvre in 
sacrificing Indonesia’s human rights progress and her embracing of the military which, again, 
caused less challenges to her policy options. After the 2001 WTC incident, however, 
Indonesia’s external environment had shifted from constraints to providing opportunities for 
Indonesia. The presented external opportunity provided support for her policy shift from her 
predecessors’ policies that were heavy with a human rights agenda to the ones which were 
less concerned with human rights. In this regard, Megawati’s own perception was the main 
reason for her chosen bandwagoning strategy with the Western powers. She did this by 
aligning interests less with human rights policy and more with the Western powers’ “War on 
Terror” campaign.  
The next chapter discusses Indonesia’s further development in terms of domestic 
power structure, especially since Indonesia had changed its presidential election into a direct 
popular election rather than nomination by the parties. Susilo Bambang Yudhyono, as the 
winner of the 2004 election and the successor of Megawati, became Indonesia’s sixth 
President and this research will investigate SBY’s dealings with human rights issues 
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throughout his leadership. It will analyse the external factors and internal factors from a 










Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono’s Human Rights and Anti-Human 






 This chapter explores Indonesia’s human rights policy under President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). During his term, human rights improvements were evident 
within Indonesia and also were included to a greater degree within its foreign policy.  The 
important question is if Megawati, as Indonesia’s sixth President, did not perceive Indonesia’s 
declining human rights development as a matter of concern and chose to bandwagon with the 
US and Western powers in its “War on Terror” campaign, then why would SBY, as 
Indonesia’s seventh President, view human rights and democracy as an important matter and 
perform balancing acts against the US and Western powers? To be able to answer this 
question, the researcher argues that neoclassical realism, as a tool of analysis, has the 
potential to provide an extensive explanation of the reasoning behind SBY’s choices of 
human rights policies, by highlighting the external-internal link in affecting policy outcome.  
  
Firstly, this chapter explores Indonesia’s external dimension, namely the dominance 
of the US’ hegemony and “War on Terror” campaign, the emergence of the PRC as a 
significant power and the global human rights networks that were supported mostly by 
Western powers. Then, the recent development of Indonesia’s domestic politics under SBY, 
such as the rise of political Islam, NGOs, oppositions, and other factors also will be 
investigated.  Secondly, the chapter explores SBY’s chosen human rights policies. Thirdly, it 
explains deviations of SBY’s human rights policies from the existing external constraints, if 
there are any, which may have been caused by domestic factors if analysed via the 
neoclassical realism “domestic power structure-leader’s perception” model. Lastly, the 
chapter presents case studies during the SBY period to show the actual interplay between 
external variables and internal variables and how SBY reasoned between the two. These cases 
will be analysed by using the neoclassical realism approach in tandem with “Two Level 
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Game” theory analysis as a complementary modifier to the neoclassical realism approach. It 
is intended that application of such an approach in the cases will be able to determine what, 
why and how certain human rights policies are implemented as a result of the dominance of 
certain domestic intervening variables over others in policy making followed by a conclusion. 
 
 
6.2 Neoclassical Realism “Domestic Power Structure-Leader’s Perception” 
 
This chapter explains SBY’s human rights policy shift or continuation from the 
perspectives of neorealism and neoclassical realism. It will firstly consider neorealism’s 
privileging of external constraints in foreign policy-making, particularly the great powers’ 
behaviours and policies towards Indonesia. Great powers here refers to the Western powers, 
such as the US, EU countries and their allies, namely Australia. Here, Western powers, as 
during Megawati’s period, seemed to invite SBY to continue Indonesia’s bandwagoning 
behaviour with the US “War on Terror” and the US anticipation of the “Rise of China”. This 
resulted in the US and other Western powers exerting low or no pressures on Indonesia with 
regard to its development of democracy and human rights. Such relaxed external conditions 
also provided the opportunities for Indonesia, under SBY, to either bandwagon or balance the 
Western powers. Meanwhile, although the PRC had displayed indications of a regional 
hegemony, its rise had little to do with Indonesia’s democratic and human rights progress, as 
the PRC’s conservative view of human rights (as argued in the previous chapter) was that it 
belongs in the domain of state internal affairs. Likewise, although Russia remained as a great 
power, it had rarely influenced Indonesia’s human rights policy choices by this stage. It is, 
however, important to note, that Indonesia’s foreign policy at this stage was crucially tested 




During the SBY period, due to the increasing salience of domestic political 
institutions such as the MPR/DPR, civil societies and NGOs, there was a greater likelihood 
for the policies pursued to deviate from neorealism’s constraints. Hence, the research needs 
to investigate the potential of neoclassical realism’s intervening variables in analysing the 
policy-making process. This neoclassical realism approach is deemed important since 
                                                          
1
 See Reid, 2012, p.66. 
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Indonesian politics during SBY’s period, as during Megawati’s rule, still displayed a strong 
presidential figure, in spite of the continuous development of political institutions, 
oppositions and civil society. In this regard, since Indonesia’s democratic system was still at a 
developmental stage, SBY, like Megawati, relied heavily on strategic manoeuvring to firstly 
consolidate internal power before he could decide on the policies to respond to external 
imperatives. This suggests the importance of domestic intervening variables. Successful 
strategies can allow influential leaders to pursue either an anti- or a pro-human rights policy 
despite the existence of external constraints or pressure groups.  Thus, the researcher argues 
that the possible link between external-internal drives during the SBY period can be firmly 
captured through neoclassical realism, while the actual interplay between external and 
internal drives can be analysed through “Two Level Game” theory in modifying neoclassical 
realism’s approach in explaining SBY’s chosen human rights policies as a way of balancing 
or bandwagoning the external powers to maintain his rule. 
 
6.3 A Home-grown Democracy 
 
 As the surviving hegemonic power during this period, the US, along with its allies, 
was engaged in its second military aggression in Iraq after it had earlier begun its military 
campaign in Afghanistan. The US also attempted to gain Indonesia’s support for its campaign 
in Iraq, knowing that Indonesia was now a democracy but with groups of Islamic extremists 
such as JI and Hisbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in its backyard. Such strategic considerations 
resulted in the reduction of economic and political pressures directed towards Indonesia, 
which had started during Megawati’s period. The US military training and assistance 
programmes, for example, had been reconsidered in 2002 and resumed in 2005 upon the 
repeal of the suspension of the IMET joint cooperation with Indonesia. The suspension had 
been based on the US Congress “Leahy Amendment” due to Indonesia’s human rights 
violations, particularly regarding East Timor’s secession.
2
 Overall, the US had altered its 
attitude towards Indonesia from one that was aggressive and demanding (as seen throughout 
the 1998-2001 period) to one that was more subtle and engaging (starting from the Megawati 
era). Later on, this was strengthened by the US’ change of foreign policy trajectory in the 
region, as it has indicated its intention to return to the Asia Pacific region and South East Asia 
                                                          
2
 See Denmark, Sukma and Parthemore, June 2010.  
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sub-region after concentrating its influence in South Asia.
3
 Such change was sealed by the 
election of Barack Obama as the US President in 2008, who favoured the Asia Pacific region 
as a foreign policy priority. 
 
At the same time, international attention to human rights issues and democracy 
worldwide had also increased significantly, in parallel with the US and Western powers’ 
expansion of democracy and a free trade zone.
4
 Transnational human rights networks were 
increasingly performing monitoring and reporting functions in relation to violations of human 
rights, in powerful and weak states alike.
5
 Following former UN Secretary General Kofi 
Anan’s UN reforms in 2000, UN Human Rights institutions were also strengthening as 
demonstrated by the changes made as the weaker UN human rights commission transformed 
into the new UN HRC, where issues of human rights, which at times involved superpowers, 
were now considered equally by the HRC, alongside those of countries like Indonesia. 
International human rights groups such as TAPOL had also been proactively engaging the 





With such developments in Indonesia’s external environment, in 2004 Megawati 
successfully brought Indonesia to its first direct presidential election.
7
 Despite such success 
and parliamentary continuous support (as parliament was dominated by Megawati’s PDIP 
party) for her rule, however, Megawati’s leadership was heavily weakened by her poor 
handling of economic policies, such as the sale of under-priced state firm INDOSAT to 
Singtel, the sale of shares of some private banks to foreign banks, and the failure of her 
government to prosecute Indonesian businessman Syamsul Nursalim for alleged corruption. 
The result was the unexpected victory of SBY over Megawati during the presidential 
election. This resulted in an unfavourable domestic condition for SBY as he did not have the 
majority parties’ support, despite his victory, since SBY was from a weak party known as 




 Anthony Lake, National Security Adviser in the Clinton administration explicates that US foreign policy as 
‘pragmatic Wilsonianism’ as it aims to“expanding democracy and free trade, at defending democracy from its 
foes, at quarantining repressive and pariah states, and at protecting and promoting human rights”, 1993. 
5
 See Risse-Kappen, Ropp and Sikkink, 1999.  
6
 See “Tapol: 25 Years and Still Going Strong”, n.d. 
7
 See Crouch, 2010, pp. 35-9. 
175 
 
Partai Demokrat (PD) or the Democratic Party.
8
 At first, Akbar Tanjung’s GOLKAR and 
Megawati’s PDIP, as the number 1 and 2 parties in the 2004 election were ready to become a 
strong opposition to SBY. This can be seen in the formation of a “national coalition” or 
koalisi kebangsaan comprising of the GOLKAR, PDIP, PPP, and the Partai Damai Sejahtera 
(PDS) or Peace and Prosperity Party, which was aimed at controlling the DPR against SBY’s 
smaller coalition known as the “people coalition” or koalisi kerakyatan.
9
 SBY’s appointment 
of Yusuf Kalla as his Vice President, however, was decisive. Yusuf Kalla, after being 
appointed as vice President in 2004, would later challenge Akbar Tanjung’s leadership in the 
GOLKAR, and won. Under Kalla’s leadership, the GOLKAR would break its coalition with 
the PDIP and the number 1 seeded party would throw its weight behind SBY’s government, 
followed by other smaller parties.
10
 This meant that SBY now had control of the executive, 
the GOLKAR party, a number of Islamic Parties and his own PD party, which enabled SBY 
to bypass substantial parliamentary hurdles. 
 
After SBY’s election as President, the US negotiated for Indonesia’s support for the 
“War on Terror” campaign. This can be seen in the resumption of full military ties between 
Indonesia and the US on 22 November 2005, after the Aceh peace process and the US CIA 
had been working closely with Indonesia’s intelligence (or BIN) as early as 2005.
11
. The 
purchases of eight Apache helicopters from the US military further solidified the close 
relations between Indonesia’s and the US military.
12
 The Indonesian national police’s move to 
strengthen its anti-terrorism capabilities by the formation of ‘Detachment 88’ through the US 
provision of Antiterrorism Technical Assistance (ATA) can also be interpreted as the US 
government’s approval of Indonesia’s contribution to the global war on terror.
13
 However, 
despite the US welcoming gesture, Indonesia’s handling of human rights in the Papua 
province remained a concern for the US.
14
 This resulted in a condition where human rights 
issues continued to be a stumbling block for the relationship between Indonesia, the US and 








 See Wandelt, 2007, pp.287-91. 
12
 See “US to sell helicopters to Indonesia in $500m deal”, August 26, 2013. 
13
 See Wise, 2005, p.70. 
14
 In 2005, the US Congress revised the previous fifty six year US policy of silence about human rights abuses in 
Indonesia, and on July 28 passed the US Congress 2006 Foreign Relations Authorization Bill H.R. 2601 which 
made specific mention of the ongoing genocide and legitimacy of its sovereignty of West Papua. Section 1115 
was the specific section referring to Indonesia. 
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Although the US and Western powers’ pressures and scrutiny were decreasing 
significantly due to Indonesia’s support for the “War on Terror”, the Indonesian parliament 
managed to challenge the newly elected President. This was demonstrated in the DPR’s 
summoning of the President through the right of questioning or interpelasi, a constitutional 
right which had never been previously exercised, in regard to SBY’s decision to favour the 
UN Security Council Resolution No. 1747 which had provided for sanctions on Iran in 2007. 
Such a move was seen by many parliamentarians as SBY’s siding with the US and a betrayal 
of Muslim countries or, as one legislator pointed out, “a demonstration of how SBY is an 
extension of US interests”.
16
  SBY nevertheless was aware that he had secured a majority in 
parliament and decided not to attend the legislative’s show of power through such a 
questioning session and was, instead, represented by seven of his ministers. 
17
 Even so, since 
Indonesia has a big Muslim population, SBY would still need to cater for the majority of 
Muslim parties and organisations’ demands and he abstained on the next UN Security 




At other times, SBY and the newly developed democratic environment in the 
legislative would find common ground on matters of human rights. For example, Indonesia’s 
DPR members were supportive of Indonesia’s projection of human rights interests (namely, 
for human rights clauses to be inserted into the ASEAN Charter) and ASEAN’s advising of 
Myanmar to improve its human rights conditions.
19
Another example concerning the 
legislative’s recommendations on human rights matters was on 30 September 2009 when the 
DPR’s Commission III on human rights had recommended that the President should authorise 
a search party for the 13 activists abducted by the military during the 1997-1998 clash 
between “people power” and Suharto’s security apparatus. The Commission then 
recommended that the SBY government should compensate the families of the missing 
persons. The Commission also recommended that the UN International Convention on the 
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 See Pennington, 2011.   
16
 See “Indonesia Ikut Setuju” March 26, 2007. 
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 See “President Urged to Show at Iran Plenary Session”, May 26, 2007. 
18
 See “Indonesia Abstains in UN Vote on Iran”, March 6, 2008. 
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Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance be ratified. As in July 2014, such a 
demand had been partially met by SBY, as seen in Indonesia’s signing of the convention, 





Regarding the military institution, when SBY came to power, as part of ongoing 
military reforms, the military was already separated from the police institutions and had lost 
much of its political influence.
21
 This trend, however, did not alter the fact that the military 
was a crucial actor in domestic politics. SBY himself seemed hesitant in holding public trials 
for his military colleagues or in meddling in military internal businesses as it may prove to be 
counterproductive for Indonesia’s democratic agenda. For example, as demonstrated in 
Wahid’s period, Wahid’s military reforms had led to the escalation of internal security issues, 
such as the Ambon and Sampit cases. This means that, although military reforms were 
underway before SBY came into office, signalling military retreat from their allocated seats 
in the parliament, the military body during Megawati’s rule had remained immune from 




Yet, when SBY came to power, the military’s hesitation to support civilian leaders, as 
well as its commitment to internal reform, would also be remedied by SBY’s figure as a 
former military general and SBY’s strategic manoeuvres within the Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia (TNI) or the National Army of Indonesia body. Unlike Megawati, who gave 
concessions to the army by stalling the military reform agenda, SBY performed military 
reforms as part of his way of consolidating power and to ensure stability by choosing loyal 
sympathisers in the army. Such a move can be seen in SBY’s appointment of Djoko Suyanto 
as Commander-in-Chief, Djoko Santoso, as the army’s Chief-of-Staff, General Erwin 
Sudjono as Commander of Komando Strategis Angkatan Darat (KOSTRAD) or The Army’s 
Strategic Command and General Pramono Edhie Wibowo as Commander of Komando 
Pasukan Khusus (KOPPASUS) or The Command of Special Forces (the last two being his 
brothers-in-law).
23
 SBY’s tactic to maintain support from the TNI was achieved by 
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appointing like-minded officers such as Djoko Suyanto, who was considered as a “dove”, like 
SBY (rather than a hardliner, which Megawati had preferred, namely General Ryamizard 
Ryacudu, who was considered as a “hawk” and had won DPR support). Although Law No. 
22 on National Defence states that the President needs the approval of the DPR in appointing 
Commander-in-Chief of the TNI, SBY managed to oppose the legislator’s preference for 
Ryamizard Ryacudu by avoiding the head-on challenge from the legislators. SBY would 
delay the matter until the respected figure reached his retirement age and SBY would then 
install Djoko Suyanto as the army’s Commander-in-Chief instead, a figure whom SBY had 




By the same token, Indonesia’s civil society was also showing vibrant signs of life 
under SBY as it had been transformed into an effective watchdog in scrutinising the 
government’s policies.
25
 NGOs and interest groups, particularly human rights groups such as 
KONTRAS, continued to be vocal, particularly regarding past human rights abuses and 
several unresolved cases. Other NGOs, such as ELSAM, were also vocal in monitoring the 
government’s promises on human rights improvements. Yet, at other times, however, SBY 
and the legislative were united in limiting the space for NGOs to operate.
26
 This can be seen 
in SBY and the DPR’s preference, through the Department of Internal Affairs, to list the 
NGOs and to issue licences for NGOs to operate.
27
 The executive would then evaluate 
foreign and domestic NGO’s performances, particularly those which operated without a 
licence. Mainly, this was due to the fact that many NGOs had lost credibility in the public’s 




 However, even though NGOs and interests groups were allowed to develop, it was 
the Islamic organisations and interests groups such as the Front Pembela Islam (FPI), or 
Islamic Defender Front, and the HTI which exerted significant pressures on the 
government.
29
 Unlike the human rights organisations and NGOs, which were often depicted 
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as representing external interests, these Muslim interest groups seemed to have successfully 
influenced government policy by utilising the sentiments of the Muslim majority. The 
magnitude of this influence could be seen when the 2005 Prophet Muhammad caricatures 
were printed in a Danish Newspaper (Jyllands-Posten) and most Islamic NGOs pressured the 
government to freeze its diplomatic ties with Denmark.
30
 SBY responded favourably to such 
domestic pressure by saying that the cartoon was an “act of blasphemy and had clearly 
offended Muslims”. 
31
 He further added that “...the justification of freedom of expression 
used by the media is difficult to accept...human rights are not absolute and their 




When SBY was re-elected for the second time in 2009, SBY’s previous weak PD 
party had been transformed into the No. 1 seeded party and hence he was again able to secure 
parliamentary support for all his policies.
33
 The PD managed to emerge as the largest party, 
with 21 per cent of the vote, beating the GOLKAR and PDIP. Many of the original leaders 
and activists in the PD were from a GOLKAR background. The party almost tripled its votes 
from 7.5 per cent in 2004 to 20.8 per cent in 2009, with a proportionate increase of from 57 to 
148 seats in the national parliament. The PD had gone from being a relatively small player in 
the DPR to being the leading party. This was a personal triumph for SBY because the party 
had little or no identity beyond the figure of the President. Since the PD had already won the 
legislative election, it was a strong popular endorsement of the SBY administration and 
almost a certain victory for his presidential direct election.
34
 Overall, this shows that the 
parliament consisted of political parties that could not maintain the loyalty of their followers, 
as seen in SBY’s election where many members of opposing parties would bandwagon with 
SBY. 
 
After SBY secured his second term in office, an important external development 
facing Indonesia during the period can be seen in light of the “Rise of China”. Here, the 
PRC’s growing economic and military influence as a regional power, especially in the South 
East Asia region, was alarming for the US presence. If seen from political and military 
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perspectives, the PRC’s claim of the South China Sea and its increase in military spending 
and capabilities were troublesome for the US and its allies and Indonesia. In terms of 
economy, ASEAN had certainly accommodated the PRC’s growing economic power, through 
trade agreements such as the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), and in 2008 the PRC 
was already Indonesia’s second most important trade partner after the US.
35
 In addition, the 
US concerns over the PRC’s rise was also strengthened by Indonesia’s “soft” way of 
maintaining regional security and spreading democracy and human rights in the region, 
which was accommodative of all powers’ interests, inclusive of the PRC’s human rights 
interests. The US, in this sense, had to tread with caution in observing Indonesia’s 
engagement with the PRC, since a wrong US policy on Indonesia might send Indonesia 
closer to the PRC in terms of its human rights policy, as it had been in the Sukarno and 
Suharto Era.
36
 Indonesia’s methods through ASEAN, via the ASEAN Regional Reform 
(ARF) and the ASC, which had commenced during Megawati’s era, and the BDF, which was 
initiated by SBY in 2008 and 2009, mostly involved engagement, dialogue and the sharing of 
best practices between democratic and non-democratic states. In this regard, such a method 
had opened the channel for Indonesia’s close engagement with communist and socialist states 
with worrying track records of democracy and respect for human rights, such as the PRC, 




Also, SBY’s perception of the Indonesian state’s relative power distribution amid the 
state system at this stage seems to have viewed Indonesia as a strong state, as he said: 
 
 We should be a country that has a solid national identity, but also a strong 
international identity…We are a proud nation who cherish our independence 
and national unity. We are the fourth most populous nation in the world. We 
are the world’s third largest democracy…we treat big, medium and small-




SBY saw Indonesia as an increasingly influential country and he believed that Indonesia was 
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 The PRC’s government policy seems to suggest that the PRC tended to refrain from criticising other 
government practices of human rights as it could be perceived as domestic interference in Svensson, Marina, 
2002, p.314. 
38
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heading towards being an important state.
39
 Indonesia’s active role in the G20 countries 
grouping vindicated this rising confidence as an economic power.
40
 Furthermore, such 
confidence in his perception of the strengthening of Indonesia’s relative power distribution 
was also demonstrated by SBY’s “dynamic equilibrium” for international and regional 
structure.
41
 It was such a view that caused SBY’s foreign policy to project what is referred to 
by Joseph Nye as “soft power”. Here, “soft power” refers to co-optive power which involves 
the cultural or ideological attraction of international institutions as opposed to “hard power”, 
which mostly involves coercive mechanisms through military, economic or political power. 
This can be seen particularly through the positioning of Indonesia during the SBY period as a 
“bridge”, “consensus builder” and “problem solver” in regard to world problems such as 
democracy and human rights.
42
  On one occasion SBY said that: 
 
I know, it is the natural instinct of Americans to want to change the world. 
What I would like to tell you is that the best way for America to change the 
world is to share your knowledge with the world…America’s enormous 
power is a source of security to some, and insecurity to others…remember: 
the use of soft power charms and disarms. Hard power, on the other hand, if it 





6.4 Indonesia’s Elusive Human Rights Policies during SBY Period 
 
 The SBY period was marked by a number of human rights policies, which could be 
considered as a significant turnaround by SBY, compared with his predecessors. The first 
breakthrough was Indonesia's ratification of two of the most important international human 
rights instruments, the ICCPR and the ICESCR through law No.12/2005 and law 
No.11/2005, after the long delay of this process during the Megawati presidency. This 
indicates that Indonesia did not want to be associated with its past practice of violating civil 
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 In addition, Indonesia planned to sign the Rome Statute on the ICC, 
indicating that individuals must not go unpunished if they continue to violate human rights in 
Indonesia on a mass scale.
45
 During SBY’s term in office, the constitutional court also struck 
out the section of the criminal code dealing with laws of defamation, which had been used to 
outlaw criticisms of the President, political leaders and the state. This delivered more space 




 The second breakthrough was regarding Indonesia’s handling of its troubled 
provinces. The Aceh peace accord was reached in August 2005 and Indonesia, under SBY, 
agreed to give special autonomy to Aceh and ended the 30 years of conflict with the Aceh 
Separatist Movement or GAM.
47
 SBY’s earlier internal military reform and his party 
coalition with Yusuf Kalla’s GOLKAR party also served as a prerequisite for the peaceful 
solution in Aceh. The ending of Indonesia’s human rights abuses in this province was due to 
SBY managing to secure support from both the military and parliament in resolving the Aceh 
case. This had become part of Indonesia’s chosen policy, as GAM had received significant 
international support, particularly from the Scandinavian countries, because the movement’s 
leader, Hasan Tiro, was based in Sweden. The cause was internationalised and the process of 
reconciliation was subsequently mediated by Marti Ahtisaari, from Finland, who later 
received a Nobel Peace Prize for his efforts. This highlights how Indonesia was able to deal 
with its separatism problem, not through military means but through a peaceful dialogue 
which involved an external party, and this is a sign of its relaxation of its rigid concept of 
sovereignty.  
 
  Coincidentally, Indonesia under SBY also seemed more willing to solve its West 
Papua problem through dialogue and engagement rather than the usage of coercive 
mechanisms. Although Indonesia refused to discuss the political status of Papua based on 
its view that the issue had been settled in 1969 through the UN-led “one man, one vote” 
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referendum, Indonesia did agree that human rights in Papua must be improved. To the 
central government, any human rights issues that were circulated internationally by the 
OPM movement and others was a deliberate attempt to secede from the already fractured 
“unified” state of Indonesia by trying to get international sympathy, as had occurred 
during the Timor Leste experience.  
 
  In terms of secessionist movements and their relationship with human rights, SBY 
stated that “...the Government intends to solve this [Papua] problem peacefully by putting 
forward dialogue and a persuasive approach.”
48
 He further added that “...law enforcement 
and security is conducted with respect given to human rights and the cultural peculiarities 
of the Papuan community.”
49
  Even so, SBY again reiterated that Aceh and Papua were 
inseparable parts of Indonesia and he would not negotiate further on the matter. He also 
expected that this stand would be understood by all parties, internal and external.
50
 SBY 
stated “...I call on all friendly states and the United Nations to respect Indonesia's 




  In his other statement, SBY said that Indonesia had always respected other 
countries’ sovereignty and territorial borders, and in return Indonesia expected other 
countries to reciprocate.
52
 Here, SBY, legislative members and the military shared almost 
the same perception that Indonesia’s territorial integrity should be construed as an internal 
problem of a sovereign state, and that external meddling on the issue (unless invited, such 
as in the Aceh case) would be considered as a provocative act that would strengthen a 
rigid nationalistic “anti-Western” stand on the issue. For example, Hidayat Nur Wahid, 
replacing Amien Rais as Head of the MPR, during his US visit in 2009 stated: 
 
I ask members of the [US] congress to genuinely assist Indonesia…I heard 
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  Yet, despite this nationalistic stand, SBY and the parliament agreed to negotiate 
and offer special autonomy status to the Papuan people as a solution to the West Papua 
issue, an offer which effectively halted any possible referendum or secession from 
Indonesia. Unlike Megawati, this consideration of SBY and the parliament for a special 
autonomy strategy for Papua can be seen as a sign of Jakarta’s moderate stand on the 
matter and their willingness to better human rights conditions for Papua was a sign of the 
increasing resilience of the democratisation process in Indonesia.
54
 Under SBY, the 
government also seemed to be more open concerning external criticism on possible human 
rights violations in West Papua since the general attitude of his government was pro-




 Meanwhile, as a follow up to Kofi Anan's UN reform in 2000, upon the establishment 
of the HRC and the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), the third breakthrough under SBY 
was Indonesia's international and regional commitment to human rights improvements. 
Internationally, Indonesia was appointed to the HRC as one of its first members. Such an 
appointment served as an indication of the international acknowledgement of Indonesia's 
ongoing human rights progress and Indonesia's overall success in terms of its human rights 





The regional breakthrough on human rights is also one of Indonesia's human rights 
achievements under the SBY period. Indonesia, together with like-minded countries such as 
Thailand and the Philippines, successfully put forward the ASEAN human rights 
improvement agenda.
57
 This was exemplified by a number of ASEAN working groups, 
workshops and a High Level Panel (HLP) which had been set up to assist in drafting the 
ASEAN convention on human rights.
58
 To date, ASEAN has made important leaps forward 
in terms of human rights by establishing the ASEAN Charter in 2007, the ASEAN 
Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) in 2009 and the ASEAN Human 
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Rights Declaration in 2012.
59
 By the same token, SBY also initiated a new multilateral 
institution known as the BDF. This is a regional intergovernmental forum in which countries 
in the Asia-Pacific region can work together to develop practices of democracy and human 
rights, with emphasis on the principles of “dialogue”, “sharing of experience” and “best 
practices” to develop democracy.
60
  Marty Natalegawa, as SBY’s foreign minister, also 
reiterated that: 
 
...through a process of sharing lessons learnt, derived from our respective 
successes and setbacks, we provide mutual encouragement and support in our 
promotion of the principles of democracy, the rule of law and good 
governance, respect for and promotion of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms as inscribed in the ASEAN Charter. Beyond Southeast Asia - 
Indonesia is pursuing the same positive and constructive approach through 
what is called the Bali Democracy Forum: a platform for countries in the 




Despite such regional progress, the US and Western powers were critical of ASEAN’s 
human rights progress because the ASEAN human rights mechanism, according to them, 
tended to defend arguments made by proponents of “Asian Values” rather than of any 
universal standard.
62
 The US even pressured ASEAN to sanction and punish the Myanmar 
military regime because of its treatment of human rights and democracy activists (particularly 
Aung San Syu Ki) by threatening to boycott the ASEAN Summit in 2006, and two major 
meetings after that, if they were held in Yangon, Myanmar.
63
 SBY on ASEAN’s unchanged 
“non–interference” principle said:  
 
This demonstrates ASEAN's fully developed capability to solve its own 
problems. It shows a delicate sense of balance between non-interference in the 
affairs of a sovereign state and upholding human rights and fundamental 
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  Compounding the issue, there were still lingering domestic problems faced by 
SBY’s government in regard to Indonesia’s practice of democracy and human rights. 
Regarding Indonesia’s democracy, SBY stated that: 
 
…the democracy that is currently developing in Indonesia is a home 
grown one based on Indonesia’s experience and not merely an import 




Under SBY’s rule, steps were also taken to activate the implementation of MPR Decree 
No.7/2000, which required civilian crimes committed by military personnel to be tried in a 
civilian court. Resistance from the military, however, was obvious and the government 
made a compromise where such cases would be heard in civilian courts but investigation 
would still be in the hands of military police.
66
 At other times, SBY also seemed to invite 
the TNI to make their contributions through their territorial function, in order to help the 
police in responding to terrorists and extremist religious groups. Here Indonesia’s civil 
society voiced their concerns by opposing the idea on the grounds that such steps could 




  SBY’s government also seemed to be incapacitated when dealing with the 
Ahmadiyah group issue. The Ahmadiyah case is another state level problem that touches 
on human rights issues. Ahmadiyah was a branch of Islam led by Mirza Gulam Ahmad, 
who claimed to have been an Islamic prophet after Muhammad. In Indonesia, Ahmadiyah 
followers are subjected to intimidation, persecution and most of their places of prayer are 
singled out for destruction. So, the Ahmadiyah case presented Indonesia with another test 
in regard to its human rights policy. To deal with the issue, SBY seemed to give in to the 
Islamist movement pressures at the expense of human rights activists’ demands.
68
 SBY, 
for example, stated: 
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Surely I comprehend our constitution, UUD 1945; also the UN declaration on 
human rights. I understand the individual rights to have his/her own beliefs, 
but the state also has the responsibility to produce regulations in order to 
safeguard public safety and prevent violence which threatens lives. My 




Consequently, the SBY government launched the Surat Keputusan Bersama in 
2008.
70
 The SKB simply issued a warning that Ahmadiyah members could still practise their 
religion within their own society but the movement would not be allowed to spread its 
teaching or convert people. Any infringement would result in five years of prison for the 
perpetrator.
71
 To many analysts, the SKB had indirectly cornered the Ahmadiyah 
movement.
72
 Even though the decree did not completely denounce Ahmadiyah, it would be 
sufficient to pacify the movement.  
 
6.5 A Neoclassical Realism Explanations and “Two Level Game” Theory Case 
Studies 
 
If analysed from neorealism’s perspective, with a reduction of pressures being applied 
by the Western powers due to the “War on Terror” campaign and the “Rise of China” 
phenomenon that indicated the PRC’s emergence as a pivotal regional balancer, Indonesia 
was less constrained in its choice of policy trajectory, due to the opportunities presented in its 
external environment. Given such external enviornment, neorealist expectations of 
Indonesia’s policy would thus be indeterminate. In this sense, Indonesia could have a range 
of policy options, such as pursuing bandwagoning behaviour, balancing behaviour, hedging 
behaviour or any combination of these. For example, Indonesia under the rule of SBY can be 
interpreted as applying an informal bandwagoning with the US. This can be seen in the 
“comprehensive partnership” established between Indonesia and the US in November 2011, 
when SBY and Obama affirmed that there were shared values between the two countries. 
This could also indicate that the US-Indonesia partnership was considered important by both 











states, as was the need to promote democracy and respect for human rights in their respective 





However, upon considering the post-Cold War structure of the international system, 
the “War on Terror”, the “Rise of China” and the recent emergence of democratic forces in 
Indonesia's domestic politics, Indonesia’s state behaviour, particularly on human rights issues, 
seemed to indicate more than just simple bandwagoning. Mainly, this was because SBY’s 
human rights policies showed great ambiguities. On the one hand, Indonesia seemed to be 
heading towards great improvements in terms of human rights policy, both internally and 
externally, as part of its bandwagoning behaviour with Western powers. This can be seen in 
the 2005 Aceh peace accord, SBY’s dialogue and democratic approach to the issue of Papua, 
and the establishment of ASEAN and BDF human rights mechanisms. On the other hand, 
SBY’s Papua approach and his usage of ASEAN and BDF indicated a possible form of 
external and internal balancing strategies to promote Indonesia’s own interests rather than 
echoing the great powers’ interests. At the same time, SBY also seemed passive in dealing 
with the persecution against Ahmadiyah followers by Muslim groups. This highlights the 
shortcomings of neorealist predictions in determining Indonesia’s policy trajectory and brings 
into consideration the potential validity of neoclassical realism as a tool of analysis. 
 
In accordance with neoclassical realism, although the external environment plays a 
significant part in constraining policy options, the domestic environment also potentially 
constrains policy-making, particularly in a democracy, as it is crucial in limiting the 
discretionary power of state authorities in extracting or mobilising national resources to 
support certain policies, inclusive of human rights policies. Hence, such domestic inferences 
could potentially lead to state behaviour that deviates from the assumptions of neorealism. At 
this stage, due to neorealism’s indeterminancy as Indonesia was facing low external pressure 
to better its human rights conditions, it was the changes in Indonesia’s domestic power 
structure that presented more potent challenges to policy-making. Mostly, this was because 
after several amendments to the UUD 1945 and ongoing democratic reforms, the parliament’s 
power status had received a significant boost through the recent check-and-balance scheme, 
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and both civil society and NGOs were reinvigorated. Under the recent amendments, the 
parliament could play a vital role in influencing policies since it had been granted with 
constitutional rights to question the President, launch legal investigations and even to 
impeach the President, as seen in Wahid’s experience. This means that Indonesia’s democracy 
during the SBY period had given way to new developments of domestic political institutions 
which could now act as domestic constraints for policy options.   
 
However, as during Megawati’s presidency, Indonesia’s democratic institutions and 
processes under SBY, though institutionally progressive, were still prone to manipulation to 
preserve individual leaders’ interests in the actual political process. During SBY’s period, in 
terms of policy-making, the President seemed to manage to bypass any domestic constraints 
through strategic manoeuvres and through exploiting the existing constitutional gap.  
Regarding strategic manoeuvres, for example, SBY managed to contain Megawati as the 
opposition leader by out-manoeuvring her through Yusuf Kalla’s appointment as vice 
President and nomination as the head of the GOLKAR party. At the same time, SBY 
managed to persuade a majority of Islamic parties to bandwagon with his party coalition in 
the DPR due to the fact that prominent Islamic figures such as Abdurahman Wahid had 
retracted from politics, and Amien Rais, who had resigned as the MPR chairman to become a 
presidential contender in 2004, had lost most of his supporters.
74
  Meanwhile, resistance from 
the military to SBY’s policies was also nullified by his selection of protégés within the army. 
By securing majority parties through parliamentary coalition and military support, he was 
able to neutralise most domestic political oppositions and, hence, he was able to easily extract 
resources to support of his policies. Regarding the constitutional gap, for example, although 
the bill approval process indicates that each bill or policy presented by the government must 
be considered by the DPR through its eleven commissions, the President was still granted 
veto power of such bills by the constitution.
75
 Thus, with SBY’s party coalition commanding 
an overwhelming majority in the parliament, SBY’s policies, despite being scrutinised by the 
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eleven commissions, were rarely rejected.   
 
The question would then be: if SBY faced low external pressure to improve human 
rights conditions and a controlled domestic environment, as during Megawati’s period, why 
would he pursue a more proactive human rights policy than Megawati? In answering the 
question, if seen from a neoclassical realism approach, another possible intervening variable 
in explaining Indonesia’s behaviour (given the existing systemic conditioning and a 
controlled domestic power structure) could also be traced from the individual leader’s 
perception. In this case, as the President, SBY’s own perception of democracy (inclusive to 
human rights) and Indonesia’s state’s relative power distribution is the crucial intervening 
variable in determining whether Indonesia should bandwagon or balance the existing 
hegemony. If seen from the “Two Level Game” theory logic in modifying neoclassical 
realism, SBY’s perceptions of the issues of human rights should also be complemented with 
his reasoning in finding an acceptable trade-off between foreign pressures and domestic 
expectations.
76
 Failure to do so would entail systemic punishments or domestic ousting from 
power, as seen in Suharto, Habibie and Wahid’s experiences. The tandem approach of 
neoclassical realism’s “domestic power structure-leader’s perception” model and “Two Level 
Game” theory analysis can, thus, be applied in order to better understand SBY’s human rights 
choices and to show the actual interplay between foreign constraints and domestic concerns 
in the three case studies discussed below. 
 
On the issues of ASEAN and BDF, the Western powers’ pressures to influence 
Indonesia’s domestic or regional affairs had created resentment among nationalist circles 
within Indonesia where suspicion of foreign motives was already running high.
77
 The 
parliament and Indonesia’s middle class were already indignant of the fact that Indonesia and 
ASEAN had been subjugated by the Western powers to abide by Western “double-standards” 
in terms of being expected to carry out human rights and democratic reforms while also being 
involved in terrorist “witch-hunts” which had also violated a number of human rights 
norms.
78
 This led to widespread public support among Muslim groups, academics, activists, 
NGOs and parliamentarians for the inclusion of Indonesia’s own democratic values and 
                                                          
76
 Putnam, 1988, op.cit. 
77





experiences agenda into the projection of SBY’s human rights policy in relation to ASEAN. 
  
Thus, if analysed via the neoclassical realism ‘domestic power structure-leader’s 
perception’ model, the low external pressures at the time, SBY’s perceptions of Indonesia’s 
distinctive definition of democracy and human rights, and Indonesia’s increased strength in 
terms of the elites within Indonesia’s domestic power structure (namely the DPR) resulted in 
Indonesia’s soft form of balancing behaviour against the US and Western powers. SBY, for 
example, had maintained Megawati’s policy of reviving the vitality of ASEAN as Indonesia's 
main instrument to withstand external influences, through the ASEAN human rights 
mechanisms, as stipulated by the ASC.
79
 Then, Indonesia under SBY continued its balancing 
act through the diplomatic manoeuvre of refusing to support a US-sponsored UN Security 
Council resolution, in January 2007, criticizing Myanmar’s human rights record.
80
 Indonesia 
also rejected France’s UN Security Council proposal to apply the “responsibility to protect” 
(R2P) principle to Myanmar regarding the handling of the Cyclone Nargis in 2008.
81
 In 
addition, Indonesia also abstained from, or voted against, any UN General Assembly 
resolutions concerning Myanmar’s human rights conditions.
82
 Thus, in order to promote 
Indonesia’s own strategic interests, in this regard, SBY had implied that the region had 
possessed an ASEAN version of human rights mechanism which may or may not correspond 
to Western or external standards of human rights protection.  
 
As the parliament and civil society seemed to be supportive of any move by SBY to 
counter the US’ “hard power” in spreading human rights and democracy in the region, 
Indonesia under SBY also began to embark on another balancing act. The “soft power” or 
soft balancing was later demonstrated by Indonesia’s proactive effort to strengthen the 
development of democracy and human rights in the region through the creation of the BDF 
for democratic and non-democratic states, such as the PRC. Such “soft power” roles 
displayed by Indonesia are extremely significant, especially in dealing with the US human 
rights pressures as well as the US’ unilateral actions in the “War on Terror” campaign 
involving its justification of bringing democracy to undemocratic states. Indonesia, for 
example, tried to resort to the middle path by constructively being the bridge between the 
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West and the Islamic World, especially in matters regarding terrorism, democracy and human 
rights.
83
 This policy indicated Indonesia’s human rights strategic interests and implied a “soft 
power” form of Indonesia’s external balancing policy against the US’ “hard power” influence 
in the Asia-Pacific region. 
 
Once again, the convergence between SBY’s perceptions and his parliament’s 
position on the possible threat from the Western powers’ subjugation of democracy and 
human rights values resulted in Indonesia’s attempts at several forms of internal balancing, a 
soft form of external balancing or “soft power” and hedging, especially as many of the 
legislative members still held nationalistic perceptions that external powers, namely the US 
and its allies, were trying to maintain their influence on Indonesia and, hence, displayed anti-
West attitudes.
84
 Thus, the interplay between external and internal variables resulted in 
Indonesia’s state balancing behaviour in terms of human rights policy. ASEAN and BDF, in 
this sense, were used by Indonesia, under SBY, as a way of showing that democracy and 
human rights are better achieved through dialogue and sharing of experience and problems 
among stakeholders, or through “soft power”, and not through the Western powers’ displays 
of “hard power” in form of sanctions and threats.
85
 At the same time, it also indicated the 
possibility of Indonesia’s close engagement with the PRC, should the US continue its 
subjugation of democratic and human rights values. 
 
  In consideration of Indonesia’s regional balancing act, the West Papua case also 
provided Indonesia with another important human rights issue. Regarding systemic 
conditioning, the West Papua issue had received a lot of international exposure, mostly 
due to the efforts of a coalition of transnational advocacy networks in exposing human 
rights violations in Indonesia, particularly concerning West Papua, which continued to 
taint Indonesia’s overall human rights record.
86
 Such attempts were further bolstered by 
the US congress’s involvement in the matter, as the US expressed human rights concern 
for West Papua, particularly regarding the military’s abuse of human rights in Papua. 
87
 
Yet, such pressures had not been substantiated nor had they led to suspension of military 
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cooperation or any forms of military and economic sanctions because the US government, 
in light of the “War on Terror” and the “Rise of China”, seemed to favour a congenial 
relationship with Indonesia rather than to see Indonesia under a heavy Islamist or Chinese 
influence.
88
 Even Ban Ki Moon, as the secretary general of the UN, seemed tentative in 
raising the Papuan issue within the UN.
89
 This makes external pressure for human rights 
improvements or external threats for supporting a referendum for Papua, as demanded by 
the Papua secessionist movement, appear to be rather low. 
 
  Thus, if seen from the neoclassical realism “domestic power structure-leader’s 
perception” perspective, considering the low external pressures, several prominent actors 
seem to have had a say on the matter. For parties and legislative members, the Papua 
problem was viewed by most as a recalling of the East Timor experience and, hence, 
strengthened their suspicions that external parties’ interests in Papua did not genuinely 
reflect human rights concerns or sympathy for the Papuans, but rather were attempts to 
further weaken Indonesia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Meanwhile, the military 
and KOMNAS HAM seemed approving of the parliament’s and SBY’s Papua’s solution 
through persuasion.
90
 In this respect, most NGOs, local and international, also seem to 





  Regarding leader’s perception, aware of low external pressure and reliable support 
from his domestic constituent on the matter, SBY was confident enough to warn the 
Western powers about their meddling in what SBY perceived as Indonesia’s internal 
affairs. Such a strong stand from the Indonesian government was demonstrated in SBY’s 
stern warning to the US Congress which had raised concerns over human rights conditions 
in Indonesia’s Papua province.
92
 Hence, the executive and the legislative reliance on the 
success of granting special autonomy status to Papua, and the betterment of human rights 
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conditions, as well as law enforcement in West Papua, were not challenged by the US and 
Western powers. Interestingly, SBY’s choice of bandwagoning policy by aligning 
Indonesia with the source of threat (in this case the US and the Western powers), as seen 
in SBY’s approach to respect human rights and the rule of law as part of a workable 
solution for his West Papua problem, can also be seen as an effective strategy in putting 
Indonesia’s interest to maintain its territorial integrity in perfect alignment with the US 




  Another important human rights issue that is worthy of analysis during the SBY 
period is the Ahmadiyah case. Here, if seen from a neorealist perspective, once again, 
external pressures began to mount. Human Rights Watch had actively monitored the 
human rights violations committed against Ahmadiyah followers, and NGOs and INGOs 
had also raised concerns about Indonesia’s treatment of Ahmadiyah followers, questioning 
Indonesia’s religious intolerance. Meanwhile, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, 
Navi Pillay, had also voiced her concern about the growing religious intolerance in 
Indonesia.
94
 In addition, 27 US Congress members sent letters to SBY urging him to 
revoke discriminatory regulations on minority religions.
95
 Yet, this did not impede 
Obama’s praise of Indonesia’s practice of pluralism and democracy in 2010 nor prevent 
SBY from getting the World Statesman award in 2013.
96
 Again, such systemic 
conditioning indicates that, though concerns about human rights in Indonesia were 
significantly raised, the pressure exerted was considerably low, especially with the 
ongoing US-led “War on Terror” campaign. 
 
  Meanwhile, if analysed using neoclassical realism’s “domestic power structure-
leader’s perception” model, a new phenomenon in Indonesia’s democratic environment 
had occurred. This was evident in the rise of political Islam in Indonesia’s domestic power 
structure, through parties, organisations and interest groups in dealing with the Ahmadiyah 
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 It is worth noting that Indonesia is semi-secular in terms of state policies with 
freedom of religion guaranteed in the Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.
98
 At the 
constitutional level, Indonesia is secular in terms of its legislative process as it does not 
involve any adoption of religious scriptural text to be imposed on its citizens.
99
 This 
results in a condition where freedom of religion is guaranteed in Indonesia
100
 and is 
considered as human rights.
101
 However, freedom of religion in Indonesia should not be 
understood as a non-derogable right (unlike the right not to be tortured for example) and 
thus can be limited by the rights of others.
102
 Hence, despite of the state nomination of 6 
religions
103
 but other belief system outside the 6 six religions is allowed in Indonesia as 
long as it does not contradict with Indonesia’s existing law.
104
  The law also indicated that 
the authority to determine whether a belief system is blasphemous or not and whether it 




  In applying the neoclassical realism model in the Ahmadiyah case, even though 
Ahmadiyah already possessed a legal status in Indonesia, the majority of Sunni Muslims 
would now utilise Indonesia’s new democratic domestic power structure to denounce 
Ahmadiyah, since a majority of Sunni Muslims refer to the movement as blasphemous. 
Consequently, Muslims in Indonesia would lobby the parliament, through Islamic parties 
such as the PAN, PKB, PKS, PPP and Muslim interest groups such as Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia (MUI) or the Indonesian Cleric Council, as well as Muslim NGOs such as FPI, 
HTI, and Forum Ulama Indonesia (FUI) or the Indonesian Cleric Forum, to exert pressure 
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on SBY’s government to ban and denounce the Ahmadiyah group.
106
 To some extent, 
some Muslim groups also managed to influence the military and police to take action 
against the Ahmadiyah movement by arresting some of its members and closing down 
their places of worship. Although opposition groups, such Megawati’s PDIP party, human 
rights groups and secular NGOs tried to challenge the majority Muslim stand through the 
Aliansi Kebangsaan untuk Kebebasan Beregama dan Berkeyakinan (AKKBB) or National 
Alliance for Freedom of Religion and Faith, the result was often futile or led to further 
intimidation by Muslim groups.
107
 The political Islamic movement was also considered to 
be important since SBY’s coalition of parties in the parliament also relied heavily on the 
Islamic parties’ cartel, as well as the support of the Islamic population in general. 
 
  With regard to leader’s perception, SBY seems to have a mixed perception about 
the Ahmadiyah movement. On one occasion he was noted to have said that he was worried 
about the growing manifestation of intolerance and that his government would not tolerate 
any act of senseless violence committed by any group in the name of religion.
108
 At other 
times, SBY seemed to be supportive of the political Islam movements which tried to 
denounce the Ahmadiyah group. This was seen in SBY’s supportive gestures toward MUI 
actions and his endorsement of the Department of Religious Affairs’ policy to reduce the 
status of Ahmadiyah.
109
 SBY’s choice of minister for religious affairs also indicated his 
favouritism towards the majority Sunni Islam, as the minister was recorded to have said 
that Ahmadiyah and Shiah problems in Indonesia would be easily solved if they all 




  The solutions for the Ahmadiyah case, however, seem to indicate the dominant 
influence of Muslim interests in the matter, as SBY would ignore the existing external 
pressures and opt for a compromise among the parliamentarians and Muslim NGOs by 
ordering the issuance of a Joint Ministerial Decree or Surat Keputusan Bersama (SKB), in 
2008, and the continuation of the 1965 Blasphemy Law.
111
 This solution indicates SBY’s 
convergence with the coalition of Muslim groups on the issue as part of his internal 
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balancing against possible domestic threat, to maintain his rule while snubbing external 
pressures. This was due to the fact that Islamic groups and parties, and Indonesia’s 
Muslim majority, were an imminent threat to SBY’s rule since they were an inextricable 
part of his party coalition in the parliament. At the same time, such a strategy also serves 
as an external bargaining strategy for Indonesia as it tried to send a message to the 
Western powers that their subjugation of Indonesia to force the embrace of a liberal 
democracy and human rights opened the way for the rise of political Islam, which may be 




  From the three case studies presented above, if seen from “Two Level Game” 
theory logic, it is clear that, like Megawati before him, SBY’s reasoning of the external 
and internal factors successfully managed to find the balance in the trade-off between the 
external constraints and domestic expectations, or a condition Robert Putnam referred to 
as a “synergistic linkage”.
113
 This can be seen from the US and Western powers’ toleration 
for SBY’s internal and external balancing behaviour with regard to Indonesia’s human 
rights policies, as well as SBY’s success in maintaining his domestic rule until the 
expiration of his leadership in 2004 without significant challenges to his rule or policies. 
From this theoretical approach, it is clear that SBY’s human rights policies and 
perceptions clearly served as political tools to secure his own rule, which may or may not 
have contributed to the overall promotion of, or better respect for, human rights in 
Indonesia. Thus, SBY’s usage of human rights policies is in accordance with realism’s 




To conclude, the research in this chapter finds that neoclassical realism is a better 
explanation for this period than neorealism. Mainly, this was due to the low pressure exerted 
by the major powers, which makes neorealism indeterminate. Additionally, there is the 
anomaly of Indonesia’s progression as a democracy, where domestic political institutions 
were increasingly becoming effective while, at the same time, the presidential figure was still 
in a privileged position, based on the newly amended UUD 1945.  
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According to neoclassical realism, SBY’s human rights policy can be understood as 
mostly a form of balancing strategy directed against Western powers. Such policy choices 
also indicate both a continuation and a shift from Megawati’s human rights policy, as SBY 
seemed to be selective in promoting Indonesia’s human rights development, despite his pro-
active agenda. Here, it is also important to note that, despite the existence of external and 
domestic constraints, the figure of SBY managed to maintain his rule through balancing 
internal and external threats. In this regard, the challenges posited by Indonesia’s domestic 
power structure could be overcome by the leaders political manoeuvring, causing the figure 
of SBY to be able to bypass any domestic hurdles for his policy options. This resulted in the 
condition where, despite the existence of influential institutions and figures in trying to affect 
policy outcomes, the dominance of the President’s perception in determining policy choices 
remains as the most crucial intervening variable.  
 
The interplay between SBY’s reasoning between domestic expectations and hurdles 
on the one hand, and foreign threats and opportunities on the other, can be analysed through 
the “Two Level Game” theory in understanding SBY’s policies through ASEAN and BDF, 
West Papua and the Ahmadiyah cases. In short, in spite of his remarkable achievements in 
terms of promoting human rights, SBY’s policies on human rights seem to have served a 
number of interests in order to secure his leadership, stability and Indonesia’s territorial 
integrity. He also seems to have prioritised stability and national consolidation over the 
prominence of human rights, as seen in the cases of ASEAN, BDF, West Papua and 








 This chapter will summarize the findings of all the case studies explored in this 
dissertation. The first section of this chapter will discuss the suitability of the neoclassical 
realism “domestic power structure-leader’s perception” model for the study of Indonesia’s 
human rights policy, based on the research findings. The second section will elaborate on the 
findings of the application of the neoclassical realism approach to the Indonesian case 
studies. The third section will relate impacts of the research to the existing IR literature and 
how neoclassical realism needs to be further modified and revised in order to provide a more 
comprehensive explanation of the policy transformation of Indonesian human rights policy 
and the development of democracy in Indonesia despite of its known suitability. The last 
section will make some overall conclusions and highlight where further research is needed. 
 
7.2 Neoclassical Realism ‘Domestic Power Structure-Leader’s Perception’ as an 
Apt Model for Indonesia’s Case 
 
This research has demonstrated the potential of neoclassical realism, as a realism sub-
school, in analysing the human rights policy of a former colony, third world and developing 
country. Similar to subaltern realism, neoclassical realism seeks to overcome the flaw in most 
IR theories that claim to transcend time and space or apply in a universal sense. In 
overcoming such condition, this research has, thus, tested the validity of neoclassical realism 
“domestic power structure-leader’s perception” model with important subaltern realism 
modification such as through a historically-grounded approach in discerning Indonesia’s state 
behaviour. Another important point that is still related with Indonesia’s condition as a small-
to-middle power is that the findings of this research also suggested that human rights policy 
(like any other government policy) has little to do with liberal values, ethnocentrism, “moral 
polytheism” or universalism, since human rights policy is simply a political manoeuvre 
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which can certainly be practised by either great or small powers in a two-way direction that 
often involves material-utility rather than normative reasoning and choices. 
The shift or continuation of Indonesia’s human rights policy may be analysed from 
many different approaches, such as liberalism and constructivism, but it has been argued by 
this research that the realism paradigm provides a more comprehensive analysis through the 
neoclassical realism “domestic power structure-leader’s perception” model. Neoclassical 
realism, as an analytical tool, has been used to highlight the centrality of external factors’ 
roles in advancing or discouraging human rights improvements in Indonesia, and at the same 
time analyses how Indonesia’s domestic politics responded to such external imperatives in 
deciding a shift or continuation in terms of human rights policy. Neoclassical realism analysis 
of Indonesia’s state behaviour regarding its human rights policy has shown that, in contrast 
with neorealism’s assumptions, Indonesia as a developing power is not a passive recipient of 
external pressures exerted by great powers. It managed to co-opt, align or even defy such 
pressures in accordance with its own strategic interests, as investigated by the neoclassical 
realism opening of the domestic “black box”. 
The assumptions made by liberalist and constructivist scholars in analysing 
Indonesia’s human rights policy shift or continuation tend to overlook the role of power 
politics, namely the great powers’ strategic interests in Indonesia, as well as Indonesia’s own 
strategic interests that greatly affected Indonesia’s choices of human rights policy. In terms of 
the dominance of the great powers’ strategic interests in Indonesia, their continuous 
involvement in the development of Indonesia’s domestic politics through direct or indirect 
interference has significantly affected Indonesia’s choice of human rights policy. By the same 
token, Indonesia’s own strategic posturing in relation to the great powers’ interests has also 
been effective in utilising the continuous involvement of those great powers (namely the 
Western powers, USSR/Russia and PRC), ever since Indonesia’s independence up to the 
present time, to entertain Indonesia’s causes or national interests. Such a mutual relationship 
between the two allows Indonesia, despite its small-to-middle power, third world and 
developing country status, to have a number of policy options: either to defy, contest, or 
accept international norms such as human rights norms. This indicates that Indonesia, as a 




By considering the arguments presented in the case study chapters of this research, the 
neoclassical realism method of analysis is effective in incorporating neorealism motives 
behind Indonesia’s policy choices. Neoclassical realism analysis, combined with Indonesia’s 
historical and comparative studies as applied in this research, for example, is able to account 
for the influence of the great powers on Indonesia throughout its history and Indonesia’s 
development as a modern state. Consistent with neorealist expectation this research has 
shown the great powers’ important roles in the formation of the regional and international 
structure of the system (the bi-polar, multi-polar or uni-polar structure) which acts as a 
constraint for the units (in this case the Indonesian state) and their policy options. This is 
consistent with neoclassical realism’s expectation of the importance of a state’s relative 
power distribution and the interests of great powers as a starting point of analysis. Indonesia’s 
case has demonstrated the correlation between the rising or declining power status of the 
great powers and a small power’s (like Indonesia’s) policy, as demonstrated by the impact of 
the declining power status of the British Empire, the rise of US power, the fall of the USSR 
and the rise of the PRC on the formation of Indonesia’s human rights policy. At the same 
time, the great powers’ changing agenda and interests have also been proven to be highly 
influential for Indonesia’s human rights policy choices, as seen in the US “domino 
theory/communist containment”, “democratic enlargement” and “War on Terror” doctrines 
and the PRC’s “intermediate zone”. 
Yet, neoclassical realism also provides more insightful explanations regarding 
contradictions and deviations from neorealist assumptions which increase the validity of 
neoclassical realism’s assumption of the existence of an “imperfect transmission belt”. 
Through neoclassical realism’s potential for opening the domestic “black box” of the state, 
the researcher is able to explore the deviations of Indonesia’s human rights policy from 
neorealism’s assumptions. Throughout its history, Indonesia has shown a number of 
deviations from neorealism’s assumption of an interrupted process between external 
pressures and policy options. For example, in 1955, during the “heat” of the Cold War and 
after the US support for Indonesia’s independence cause, as well as the US persuasion to join 
its bloc, Indonesia would instead choose to oppose imperialism and the Western powers’ 
hegemony and would instead promote a third world version of human rights and a non–
aligned policy. Such a move is a deviation from the neorealism logic since most countries in 
South East Asia at the time tended to bandwagon with their former coloniser or any powers 
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which could guarantee their survival and security against the external threats. This can be 
seen in Myanmar’s bandwagoning behaviour with the PRC by emulating PRC’s authoritarian 
system while relying on PRC for security, and the Philippines bandwagoning behaviour with 
the US by emulating democracy and human rights while relying on the US for security. In 
this regard, Indonesia’s chosen human rights policies seem to have been connected with 
Indonesia’s perceptions of threat and Indonesia’s own interests, as it instead tried to lessen 
the Western powers’ influence or halt the spread of democracy and human rights in the 
region. One way of investigating such deviation is by looking at Indonesia’s domestic 
variables to explain the reasoning behind such policy options. 
As neoclassical realism is quite loose in determining the potential intervening 
variables, the research utilises two domestic variables which are most influential and still fall 
within the realism domain in explaining Indonesia’s policy choices, namely “domestic power 
structure” and “leader’s perception”. In terms of domestic power structure, Indonesia’s 
internal power structure seems to be evolving from the one that had been designed based on 
the consent of its own people, known as the UUD 1945, to the ones that have been 
compromised by the influence of external powers, either directly (such as the colonial-written 
1949 constitution) or indirectly (by the inclusion of 1948 UDHR principles in the Post-
Suharto 1945 constitutional amendments). Such external influences have demonstrated the 
interplay between external and internal factors in deciding the kinds of domestic political 
system that Indonesia embraced and the individuals who headed the system and, hence, had 
the decision-making power in terms of policy making, regardless of whether it was a 
Pancasila Democracy or Guided Democracy authoritarian system. In terms of leader’s 
perception, the individual actor’s perception of threats, the state’s relative power and his/her 
own view of human rights and democracy have also been proven to be crucial aspects of the 
policy-making process. This can be seen in the views held by Sukarno, Hatta, Yamin, 
Suharto, Habibie, Wahid, Rais, Megawati and SBY, which have all impacted on Indonesia’s 
human rights policy choices.  
Overall, the research has demonstrated that the analytical framework and assumptions 
of neoclassical realism are applicable in investigating the Indonesian case because they are 
able to explain in great details of the reasoning behind Indonesia’s human rights policy shift 
or continuation. This is compelling because neoclassical realism as a theoretical approach has 
the fluidity and flexibility to explain Indonesia’s human rights policy shift or continuation 
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from its inception as a nation state to the present time. In this regard, neoclassical realism has 
the capability of being combined with historical analysis in discerning the progressive 
behaviour of the state and the evolution of policies, as exemplified by Indonesia’s experience. 
At the same time, neoclassical realism also can be useful for comparative studies because it is 
able to analyse the different or similar patterns in a state’s behaviour within different time 
periods in response to the changing external, as well as domestic, environments. On this note, 
neoclassical realism’s potential in discerning policy-making behaviour is effective in 
discerning the policy steps taken by a state, (inclusive of a third world and developing state 
like Indonesia, and in contrast to realism’s main emphasis on the great powers), the evolution 
of policies and the pattern of policy changes as part of its strength.  
 
7.3 Thesis Findings and Contribution of Research  
 
This research found that a developing country's dependence upon external 
constraints/opportunities can be used by leaders to hold its divided domestic forces under 
control, as long as the country rightly takes the position for their state survival. Choosing the 
wrong side, however, will instead unleash potential fragmentation of domestic forces where, 
in such a condition, foreign interests are more likely to prevail over domestic ones. Such 
findings can be substantiated by the example of Suharto’s right choice to bandwagon with the 
US (anti-communism stance) in order to control domestic oppositions and secessionist 
movements during the Cold War which was effective for 32 years.  Meanwhile, Sukarno’s 
and Habibie’s wrong choices are evidenced by the aggravation of the divisions in domestic 
forces. This can be seen in Sukarno’s favouring of anti-West movements which resulted in 
the PRRI/Permesta secessionist attempt in 1957-58 and Sukarno’s downfall in 1966 through 
external-domestic forces collaboration. Meanwhile, Habibie’s siding with the domestic 
democratic forces resulted in East Timor seceding from Indonesia and Habibie stepping down 
from power in 1999. 
This research also found that, despite of Indonesia’s new developing democracy, the 
new amended version of Indonesia’s UUD 1945 constitution in the post-reformasi era still 
privileges the presidential position as the head of the executive. This renders the condition 
where the decision-making power is still vested in the President as Indonesia still has an 
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insufficient mechanism for power sharing or check-and-balances between the executive and 
legislative. In such a case, the policy-relevant coalition-building would be restricted to the 
political elites or the President’s inner circle and these elites would be likely to have a more 
discretionary power to formulate human rights policy than any external influence, if the great 
powers are not committed to press human rights issues, as seen in Indonesia’s human rights 
violations during its East Timor campaign. This was also strengthened by the fact that, as 
argued by offensive realist, most of the time, great powers’ interests outweighed the 
importance of human rights norms, as demonstrated by the ending of the Cold War and the 
commencement of the “War on Terror”. Such conditions may create an anomaly in policy 
choices and the situation would be more likely to deviate from neorealism logic due to 
probable misperceptions, incomplete information or simply a whim on the part of the political 
leader or the elite.  
Another finding of this research is that, if the global strategic environment changes 
(i.e. ending of the Cold War), then leaders which exploit external conditions to safeguard 
their rules or states which exploit external conditions to maintain control over domestic 
political cleavages may find a lessening or intensifying of constraints to their policies. In 
Indonesia’s case, the ending of the Cold War, theoretically, could have freed the “winners” to 
pursue human rights matters to a greater extent, since the security threat from their main 
adversary had all but disappeared, creating greater constraints for Suharto’s leadership. 
However, such changes in external environment also change the domestic dynamics of ruling, 
as both may interact. Here, leaders who utilise such given  external constraints or 
opportunities to maintain effective leadership may no longer be able to do so, since domestic 
forces (political elites and societal actors) are likely to develop their abilities to seek political 
power to contend with the elites. In this regard, given the external opportunity, developing 
countries are expected to have a higher degree of societal mobilisation, if compared with the 
developed ones. If domestic forces are able to seek and maintain power, such as by 
strengthening domestic political institutions or maintaining democratic momentum, then 
political elites in the developing country need to engage in continuous bargaining/trade-off 
processes in search of human rights policy compromises in an interface of give-and-take 
between domestic audiences’ acceptance and international forces’ demands. 
Also, this research indicates that a small-to-middle power, a third world and 
developing country, like Indonesia, with a long colonial experience and a strong sense of 
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nationalism, is more likely to engage in a balancing behaviour than bandwagoning in 
responding to its external constraints, as can be partly seen from its chosen human rights 
policies. This is pertinent as such a finding may question Stephen Walt’s assumption, as a 
defensive realist, which states that in general weaker states have the tendency to bandwagon 
with great powers rather than to balance.
1
 It is also important to note that the research found 
that Indonesia, most of the time, would engage the external constraints through an internal 
balancing behaviour (by either emulating or innovating) regardless of whether the leader’s 
perceptions indicated Indonesia as weak or strong in terms of state relative power 
distribution. In this regard, Indonesia would be engaging in a soft form of external balancing, 
such as by hedging, diplomatic coalition, regional groupings, or both internal and external 
balancing, only when in a condition of low external pressure and the leader’s views of the 
state’s relative power distribution was strong. The only exception to such a pattern is during 
Sukarno’s Guided Democracy (1957-1966) era when, despite the high external pressure as 
seen in the US’ covert support for the PRRI/Permesta and the US’ economic conditioning, 
Sukarno applied both internal and external balancing, instead of sheer internal balancing. 
Sukarno, with his perception of strength, as symbolised by his famous “go to hell with your 
aid” slogan, decided to apply internal balancing as demonstrated by his innovation of creating 
a democracy that was semi-authoritarian as a way of consolidating domestic power and 
combining this with his external balancing policy by denouncing the UN, put forwarding 
Indonesia’s traditional values and anti-imperialism rhetoric, and establishing the NAM. At 
other times, if external constraints became an opportunity rather than a threat for Indonesia, it 
would most likely engage in a bandwagoning behaviour by aligning its interests with the 
external drive or appeasing them. 
Such findings have suggested the validity of this research in pointing out the 
correlation and causal relation between Indonesia’s external and internal environments in 
Indonesian human rights policy decision making. It also suggests which factors can override 
others and under what conditions these can be determining factors in affecting state 
behaviour (whether the condition is favourable or unfavourable). In this regard, Indonesia’s 
domestic power structure and its leader’s perception have been determining factors as the 
intervening variables in affecting Indonesia’s behaviour to balance or bandwagon as the 
chosen state behaviour in responding to external constraints or pressures. The result of such 
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 See Walt, 2007, p.100. 
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chosen behaviour has implications for Indonesia’s human rights policy, whether this leads to 
a policy continuation or a shift from the previous era. Mainly, as this thesis suggests, 
Indonesia’s human rights policy is correlated to Indonesia’s leaders’ decisions to heed or defy 
external pressures. In this sense, the existence of external constraints and domestic politics 
are in a cause-effect relationship, with Indonesia’s human rights policy outcomes being 
affected by the possible interplay between the two levels of politics. Mainly, this is because, 
as this research found , insistence on human rights has been one of the most dominant 
external pressures that have been directed at Indonesia and it has been proven, since 
Indonesia’s inception, to be one of the most influential and constant  external pressures. 
The research findings are also pertinent to the realism school of thought due to the 
possible modification of neoclassical realism analysis by other mid-range theories, which can 
be used in tandem in order to fully understand the relationships between external and internal 
factors in influencing the transformation of Indonesia’s human rights policy. The 
combination of these analyses is able to show the interplay between the external factors, in 
terms of constraints and pressures, and Indonesia’s internal political context and national 
interests. As this research has demonstrated, neoclassical realism modification through the 
usage of Steven R. David’s “omnibalancing” thesis and Robert Putnam’s “Two Level Game” 
theory analysis provides a more complete picture in showing the interplay between two levels 
of politics (domestic and external) in affecting policy outcomes. Although neoclassical 
realism maintains the supremacy of neorealism external constraints, but David’s 
“omnibalancing” thesis has pointed the need for realism to be modified since leaders 
especially leaders in former colonies and third world states face both external and internal 
threats to their rule and hence they tend to balance both threats through “omnibalancing”. In 
this regard, neoclassical realism emphasis on the role of leaders in policy making and its 
possible investigation into domestic variables by opening neorealism’s “black box” fits well 
with David’s “omnibalancing” analysis of the third world.    
Meanwhile, Putnam’s “Two Level Game” theory also complements neoclassical 
realism analysis in a crucial way. Whereas neoclassical realism maintains the dominance of 
neorealism systemic imperative in affecting policy outcome and explains how domestic 
intervening variables respond to external constraints and opportunities, but there are times 
when external imperatives becomes less influential in affecting policies as they are sometime 
indeterminate in encouraging states behaviour. As shown in this research such condition is   
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mainly caused by the existence of a hegemonic balancer or competition among great powers 
such as the emergence of US and USSR as Cold War competing powers, “Rise of China” or a 
rapid change in global agenda such as from “democratic enlargement” to the “War on Terror” 
as external threats can quickly become opportunities for a country like Indonesia and vice 
versa. In such condition neorealism and neoclassical realism investigation can only pin point 
the underlying factors of a policy response through an investigation into the external, internal 
and individual variables or the correlation among them but neorealism and neoclassical 
realism alone cannot fully explain the causal relation or the interplay between the variables in 
affecting policy choices. This is when Putnam’s “Two Level Game” modification becomes 
pertinent as it is able to use neorealism and neoclassical realism external and internal 
variables in an interactive and dynamic way to explain policy choices taken by leaders.  Thus, 
this research found that the actual interplay between neoclassical realism’s external and 
internal  factors with “omnibalancing” and “Two Level Game” theory modifications in 
determining Indonesia’s behaviour, as a former colony, third world state, and developing 
country significantly causes Indonesia’s shifting or continuation of human rights policy, as 
presented in  Figure 1.2. 
Figure 1.2 
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 Bandwagoning, aligning, appeasing: Pro-West human rights policy 
 Internal and external balancing: Indonesia’s own human rights policy 
 Omnibalancing is semi-bandwagoning and semi-balancing: Pro-West human rights 
policy for the purpose of balancing a primary threat 
 
7.4 Impact of the Research  
 
The research findings are also important for great and small powers’ policies with 
regard to human rights. The success of great powers in pressuring a small-to-middle power 
like Indonesia to promote democracy and human rights should not rely mostly on coercive 
measures, such as sanctions, the funding of domestic networks to pressure targeted 
governments, or isolation policies. As Indonesia’s case has shown, when Sukarno was 
pressured by the US to join the “free world” cause and the US substantiated such pressure 
with economic or military assistance, or the withholding of assistance, Sukarno decided to 
counter such measures with his very own internal and external balancing strategies. Likewise, 
Suharto’s alignment with the US “communist containment” agenda and his invocation of 
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“Asian Values”, Megawati’s alignment with the US “War on Terror” agenda and SBY’s “soft 
power” projection are all counter-balancing strategies that could impede great powers’ 
ambitions to make Indonesia respect human rights.  
Based on the research findings, it would also be counter-productive for small-to-
middle powers to continue their violations of human rights. This is due to the multiple 
international agreements that have been achieved on human rights that are claimed to be 
universal, regardless of the double standards displayed by those who dominated the drafting 
of such instruments. Thus, both alignment of interests with the major powers and a deliberate 
anti-human rights strategy in order to continue violations of human rights will not be 
sustainable. As Indonesia’s case has shown, in the end, governments will have to comply 
with or enforce minimum standards of human rights, regardless of the anti-human rights 
strategy or policy being used. In this context, preventing “double standard-ness” and 
politicking in terms of the global promotion of human rights has been proven, in Indonesia’s 
case, to be the most effective strategy because it will not raise anti-West sentiments, extreme 
Islamist interpretations or excessive nationalistic overtones within the domestic environment 
of policy-making that could be counter-productive to the overall promotion of, and protection 
purposes of, human rights. 
The research findings for NGOs and democratic groups also are crucial. In this 
regard, democratic movements and human rights INGOs and NGOs need to promote their 
agenda and methods strictly through democratic links and they should be purely for the 
interest of promoting democracy and human rights. For example, the current practices of 
INGOs, NGOs and democratic movements in promoting their agenda by hitch-hiking with a 
great power’s policy as the enforcer have caused their interests to vary from promotion of a 
genuine democracy and respect for human rights to promoting the great powers’ political 
interests, hence becoming agents of the great powers whether they realise it or not. The 
impact of such a method, though effective in the short term, will be ineffective in the long 
term. Based on the findings of this research, the heavy reliance of democratic movements on 
the Western powers have caused them to be ineffective once human rights-violating 
governments pursue the same strategy by aligning their own interests with Western powers’ 
interests. Indonesia has been one of the most successful countries to do so, as seen in 
Suharto’s “New Order” regime’s ability to suppress democratic movements by aligning its 
own interests with the Western powers’ “communist containment” agenda, or Megawati’s 
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ability to isolate NGOs  and democratic movements by joining the US’ “War on Terror” 
campaign. In this regard, most of the time, NGOs or INGOs will lack the bargaining power 
when compared with the targeted state in vying for a great power’s support. At other times, 
NGO and INGO’s credibility as human rights or democracy advocates will be at stake if the 
public, as seen in Indonesia’s case, views them as foreign agents who are not acting on their 
behalf. This can be clearly seen in Indonesia’s case since, after the great powers which 
funded the NGOs in Indonesia withdrew their financial support at the end of the reformasi 
period, most NGOs soon collapsed and stopped operating. 
As for the future of the research on Indonesia’s human rights policy, there are several 
elements that need to be analysed in order to cover the full spectrum of Indonesia’s policy 
choices. One of them is regarding the formation of Indonesian identity, which falls beyond 
the scope of neoclassical realism analysis but, nevertheless, is crucial to understand 
Indonesia’s human rights policies. Mainly, this relates to neoclassical realism’s restricted 
usage of intervening variables, which still falls under the realism domain and does not 
venture into the constructivism domain of identity or norm formation. Despite such a 
restriction, neoclassical realism’s limited understanding of the importance of identity 
formation indicates one of neoclassical realism’s weaknesses as a tool of analysis. Mostly, 
this is because identity formation also plays a significant part in a great power’s isolation 
policies, especially with regard to building a state’s identity as a “democracy” or some other 
form.  Such argument is crucial because isolation policies have played a significant role in 
most Western powers’ strategies to promote and protect human rights. 
 Whereas, in terms of neoclassical realism’s approach in discerning Indonesia’s 
human rights policy, future research needs also to study the correlation between Indonesia’s 
foreign policy trajectory and Indonesia’s human rights policy trajectory. This is quite an 
important area of study since, although there are times when the two converge, there were 
also cases where the two diverged and, hence, the impact upon Indonesia’s human rights 
policy could further be analysed. For example, Indonesia’s policy under Wahid, which 
somehow mirrored a pro-human rights policy based on his neo-modern Islamic view of 
human rights, clearly diverged from his decision to open diplomatic relations with Israel as 
his preferred foreign policy (since Israel was seen as a violator of the Palestinian people’s 
rights by the majority of the Indonesian Muslim population) and this later sparked protests 
from his own Islamic support base. 
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Also, still within the neoclassical realism framework, there are other potential 
intervening variables in trying to understand Indonesia’s policy continuation or shift which 
are not activated in this research, namely political legitimacy and both societal and elite 
cohesion. Political legitimacy, though important for specific foreign policy study such as 
security studies, is less relevant for Indonesia’s human rights policy study. Mainly, this is 
because, as this thesis has argued, a democratically elected leader or President with a strong 
legitimacy, such as SBY, may not necessarily advocate a pro-human rights policy. At other 
times, an undemocratically elected leader, such as Sukarno, Hatta or Syahrir, may instead 
advocate pro-human rights policies. Hence, the correlation or link between political 
legitimacy and human rights policy may range from non-existent to blurry. Meanwhile, the 
same applies to societal and elite cohesion and, though important, investigation of such 
variables is harder to do, when based on the chosen research design of a historically-
grounded approach, as these variables need extensive research and therefore must be 
undertaken in a restricted study of a specific time period (unlike this research’s continuous 
historical flow design). Even so, a realist researcher should maintain caution in investigating 
societal relations and elites cohesion because extensive investigation into these intervening 
variables may potentially intersect with the approach of liberalism and, thus, it may no longer 
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